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d) Methodical Thematization of Life Throughout Originary ScienceIt has been pointed out already that the “scientificity” (Wissenschaftlichkeit) oforiginary science points toward a given methodical process: it sets up a ‘how,’ as we arealready immersed within the object. We can neither escape it, nor can we set it inopposition to ourselves. Rather, a philosophical thematization of pre-thematic life takesplace. However, by speaking of methodical theme-making, the question whether everytheme-making be already and in itself an object-making once again arises. In other words,theorizing. Doesn’t an essential change that would prevent access to that which is pretheoreticalfrom happening take place as well, in the shift from that which is pre-thematicto that which is thematic?Should the guiding question be the question after the access to life and life-experiences(Erlebnis), then life itself would be made thematical in relation to its access. This way,we shall discover that the access to life plays a unique role: the “access” is not a tool thatcould make any object thematic in an arbitrary way. For that reason, we can state nowthat making life thematic is itself a making-thematic that does not necessarily fall withinthe realm of objectual-theoretical making-thematic. In this light, any non-explicitmodifications that life might undergo in its explicitness doesn’t necessarily take placethroughout a process of objectivity. Someone might suspect here that this explicit makingthematicalso belongs to a different way of understanding explicitness and conceptforming.That is what Heidegger means when he said in 1919 that any explicitness thatmatches originary science ought to be understood as a concrete feature of the apprehensionof life itself. 57 Still submerged in this context, he would later write in his followinglecture that: “The main problem when forming philosophical concepts is not posterior orscientific in nature, but rather, it is a philosophical problem at its core.” 58 Traditioncouldn’t show this possibility of thematizing because it was always guided in a way thatconcentrated on the theoretical, as Heidegger would have it in 1919. 59 For this reason,conceptual making-thematic within the philosophical tradition was always determined“according to class.” 60 That is why it is not quite plain that when access to life tookplace in the context of tradition, it happened always in a theoretical fashion. It was thisblindness that made a non-theoretical access seem impossible.If the scientific aspect of originary science points to its methodical aspect, which alsoincludes its object, we might as well say that originary science likewise points to both amethodical way of accessing as well as to a thematic realm. The access happens in ahermeneutical-phenomenological fashion. That’s why, in 1919, Heidegger spoke about acomprehending science. 61 The hermeneutic aspect of the “access” entails phenomenologicalfeatures, which are nevertheless interpreted in an even more originary way. It isthroughout a more originary characterization of phenomenology so that its methodicalinstances are thus unveiled. They are not, however, unveiled reflexively but hermeneutically.Hermeneutics determines the way phenomena will be dealt with, somethingwhich leads us to a modification of the methodical aspect: the phenomenon of life. Forthis reason Heidegger would characterize philosophy as a comprehensive guideline duringthe winter semester of 1919-20. 62 That is, the phenomenological reduction and the575859606162GA58, 139, 232.GA59, 169.GA56/57, 59.GA59, 8.GA56/57, 208.GA58, 150.285