[Andrzej_Wiercinski_(ed ... - WordPress.com

if we have two persons, a master and his pupil, for instance, dealing with the sameinstrument we will even be able to foresee, who of them “understands it” better. Whyshould it lose its validity for “things” like texts, films, theater performances?Gadamer is of course right when he says that the objects of interpretation are not thespiritual states or ideas in the mind of the author of the text, but his work as it exists inthe intersubjective world, open to any kind of understanding. The author has no authorityover his creation. In interpreting his work he is one of many interpreters, each equal inprinciple.One can understand the reasons that led Gadamer to abandon the distinction betweenunderstanding and interpretation. It is true that every interpretation is directed by somethingHeidegger called the pre-structure of understanding (Vorstruktur des Verstehens).But it not true that every understanding is connected with the elaboration of an explicitand lingually articulated interpretation. There are automatic understandings, especially inbanal cases of everyday communication. Further, it is useful to distinguish between interpretationand understanding by presuming that a formulation in the words of a commonlanguage is a condition sine qua non, to speak about an interpretation. It forbids us tocompare between an understanding and an interpretation and permits it in the case of twointerpretations, in the above defined sense. Thus we are allowed to assume that there issomething like a quality of interpretation.The phenomenological evidences show us very often that we can talk about better orworse interpretation. Assume that we go to a theater to watch a piece by Pirandello.Dramas and texts of that range demand interpretation. Without it they can be amusing butthey will not form themselves into a unity of meaning. Given that not every possibleinterpretation is a good one, what is decisive here?In the seventies, during the long debate on Gadamer’s theory of understanding,Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel elaborated their own transcendental hermeneutics. Apelespecially defended the possibility of better interpretation. Developing Apel’s argumentsand trying to mediate between him and Gadamer, the philosopher Albrecht Wellmerdevoted an important text 3 to this subject. Let’s have a look on the line of his argumentation.To escape the dilemma between a “better” and a “different” understanding, Wellmermakes a distinction between two types of interpretation that are in principle different. Henames the first one an “intern” or “immanent” interpretation. It is irreducible to the secondone that he calls “extern” or “productive.” According to him, their difference is phenomenologicallyevident. The best example for the first one is a philologically faithful,immanent reconstruction of the sense of a text. The example of the second one would bea new, very critical reading of this text, in the manner of Heidegger’s or Adorno’sproductive (mis)readings of the classical works of philosophy.Both kinds of interpretation demand intellectual activity and creativity of the interpreter.The type of creativity and the conditions of it differ according to the different aimsof them. The first one is captured by its text. It does not question the truth of the text.Instead, it tries to discover this truth, to participate in it. The second kind of interpretationtries purposefully to be critical about the truth of the analyzed text, hoping to discover itsdeeper meaning through a kind of deconstruction of it. According to Wellmer,we can speak about understanding if the interpreter succeeds in transcending the textaccording to his/her own authority (Massgabe) in the direction of his/her truth claims3Albrecht Wellmer, “Zur Kritik der hermeneutischen Vernunft,” Lingua ac Communitas 5 (1995).216