[Andrzej_Wiercinski_(ed ... - WordPress.com

By seeking a deeper unity of Dasein’s Being which is distinct from but not exclusiveof all ontical considerations, Heidegger’s hermeneutics is able to avoid some of thetendencies that stem from characterizing the nature of man primarily in terms of a presetextended ethical vision and thus of the existential power of volition. Heidegger does,however, fail to focus on the synthesis of the infinite and the finite in human existence,but rather, chooses to bring the spirit or reason of man down to the finite and to assert theunity of care on the level of existence, thus leading him to affirm the coincidence ofDasein’s existence and essence in contrast to Ricoeur. Thus, the short way misses themore complex ontic dimensions of human existence which should have some play in amore explicit ontological focus. As will be seen further, it likewise misses, as sometimesdoes Ricoeur, a certain equi-primordiality of the epistemic and ontological at the fundamentallevel of human existence in being-in-the-world. For, if it is so that the understandingand interpretation of its own being is so fundamental to human existence, it is likewisetrue that the difference between the ontological and the epistemological focuses, overcomingtraditional restrictions and limitations, are merely two distinctively differing focuses onthe same fundamental dimension of human ontological-epistemic existence. In this context,perhaps it is necessary to affirm a reciprocal guidance on one another of the long andshort ways to ontology. For, Ricoeur’s short way can be guided by an adjusted Heideggerianpre-comprehension and the attempt to get Dasein properly within the focus of forecomprehensionof the hermeneutic method, now taking into account human being as asynthesis of the finite and infinite; and then a pause and detour become necessary preciselyat this point, in order to reflect further on human existence in its desire and spiritleading to the Sacred. This will bring to light the disproportion in the synthesis betweenthe finite and infinite on the cognitive, practical and especially affectively levels of thissynthesis, which is something to which Heideggerian analysis is totally oblivious, due toits lopping off of the infinite and its burying of reason in the finite.In such an expansion, what emerges is the view that the structures of human existenceare, like the eidetic or essential structures, equally foundational for innocent, fallen, andregenerated existence, for it is precisely existence which is neutral to all of these. Thisaltered view does not rule out of place the privileged place of the mythic of evil, but,rather, puts it on an equal footing with the mythic of innocence and of regeneration, allwithout over-playing or over-interpreting its place in the philosophical analysis of humanexistence. Far from foreclosing all “specific” analyses of aspects of concrete existencewithin the world, the project of hermeneutic phenomenology opens up precisely thoseavenues by illuminating beforehand the horizon for the understanding of human existencein the synthesis of the finite and infinite in human being. What still needs to be determined,is some of the implication of this correction of Ricoeur’s long way to ontology inhis grafting of hermeneutics onto phenomenology. Now that we have established aneutrality on the level of human existence in this grafting process, we can attempt to bringto light some of the insights for a philosophy that wants to inquire into human evil bylooking at religious language and the experience that underlies it. We must try to flesh outa further presupposition that stands in need of correction if philosophical reflection on evilis to be further grounded, but without an initial unwarranted prejudice.In order to achieve this end, a philosophical foundation must be provided to supportthe various levels of religious options which are operative in philosophical reflection onreligious existence and which originate from the essential level of openness and prior disclosureof human existence. In this context much of Ricoeur’s philosophical reflection onthe religious realm of the Sacred and on evil is, however, philosophically ambiguous. Hisenthusiastic openness to the sciences on the ontic level implicitly allows for a possiblerapport with such philosophical reflection on the Sacred and on the religious dimensionsof experience. As will become evident shortly, Ricoeur’s philosophical reflection of the80