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case, since its existence depends at least partially on the natural tie of biologicalgeneration, while its concrete form and development are no longer determined by naturebut subject to political decisions. 39 This double characteristic reveals the borderlinebetween natural generation, which consists in the diachronic process of reproduction ofindividuals of the same species, and another, non-biological form of “generativity,” whichrefers to the transmission of the collective human consciousness, whose contents arecontinually enriched and transformed by means of historical memory and tradition.The application of the concept of “organism” to cultural and inter-subjective entitiesresults in a fragmentation and multiplication of the phenomenological notion of “world.”This concept no longer denotes, in its primary sense, the homogeneous, totalizing horizonof sensible phenomena, but rather, the horizon of comprehension of any kind ofphenomenon in a given historical situation and with regard to a certain cultural context.Only subsequently can this multiplicity of partial “life-worlds” 40 be referred to theunifying notion of “the” world, which, however, is neither an actual totality nor a pregivenhorizon of totality, 41 but the idea of an active overcoming of the limited “environmentalworlds” (Umwelten) by a graduated approximation of human subjectivity to theinfinite ideal of transcendental reason. 42In the case of artefacts, the teleological openness was still limited to the regionallydetermined finality of each cultural product. In a similar way, the teleology of“organisms” and “personalities of a higher order” remained inside a finite horizon ofdevelopment, according to their specific and more or less universal goal. For the teleologyto be infinite, it has to refer, not to this or that domain of rationally guided, humanactivity, but to rationality as such, in the plenitude of its historical development. And forHusserl, this new insight implies the necessity of reformulating his own approach oftranscendental phenomenology in terms that take into account the essentially historical,generative dimension of human rationality without ever renouncing reason’s claim touniversality.The Teleological Profile of HistoryTo the early Husserl, logic, in its most general and highest form -- as a purely theoretic“doctrine of science” (Wissenschaftslehre) 43 -- had to be purged of all normative, that is,practical connotations. 44 At the same time, history -- as the totality of contingent, pastfacts -- was considered a mere “spectacle” (Darbietung) like art and poetry, whose onlyutility consists in providing our imagination with the largest possible number of eideticvariations on the empirical forms of human existence. 45 For the later Husserl, in contrast,this devaluation of practice and historical facticity is no longer sustainable. If, on the onehand, human history can only be understood, as history of the logos, in the form ofVorträge (1922-1937), 5.39See Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlaß, ErsterTeil (1905-1920), Hua XIII (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973), 106; 110, and idem, Zur Phänomenologie derIntersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlaß. Zweiter Teil, 183; 205; 406.40See Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften, 130-138.41See Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlaß, Dritter Teil(1929-1935), 614.42See Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie,Ergänzungsband. Texte aus dem Nachlaß, 310, and idem, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität.Texte aus dem Nachlaß, Dritter Teil (1929-1935), 436.43See Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Erster Teil, 26-32, §§ 5-6.4445Ibid., 44-71, §§ 13-20.See Husserl, Ideen zur einer reinen Phänomenologie, 148, § 70.229