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that, for Husserl, every act is indeed intentional, yet not every act need be cognitive. Onlythose acts characterized by the fulfilling intuition would be cognitive. Fulfillment thusshows that acts of knowledge are stratified in such a way that they take place throughouta modification of meaningful acts or “empty intentions,” 25 that is to say, by means ofmodifying the meaningful intention. 26 In other words: when, during a statement, meaningis ‘free’ from what is being meant, an ‘empty meaning’ (Leermeinen) hence takes place,or, as Husserl stated in his Méditations cartésiennes (MC), “to mean a thing” (Sachmeinung).No knowledge is acquired in this case. However, if a meaningful intention is‘attached,’ then a modification might happen just where the Adäquation appeared: betweenwhat was meant and what was intuited. Only through this modality of fulfilling intuitionis knowledge possible.Adequatio is also characterized as evidence. Science’s founding task is to have atendency toward evidence. This was cleared up by Husserl in the MC: “Instead of thething’s being present as a mere assumption made from “a distance,” to evidence that thething is there, present, “itself,” the objective fact “by itself.” 27 Further ahead it will beshown just how this scientific tendency of Husserl’s grounds itself in such a principle thatis, however, de-formalized within the framework of theoretical-cognitive scientificity.It is henceforth shown that reflexive phenomenology is rooted in its attempts to achievea theoretical-cognitive objective, or as Husserl put it in the MC, a realm of knowledge. 28Husserl stressed this objective in his Logos article, taking a firm stand against historicismand naturalism. Husserl showed that philosophy alone, as a rigorous science, can solve theenigma of knowledge, this being possible if philosophy becomes a transcendental phenomenology.29 Naturalism cannot solve such an enigma as it necessarily originates with anaturalization of consciousness and ideas. Historicism, and most ‘world-view (Weltanschauung)philosophies’ aim at a ‘striving for knowledge’ (Weisheitsstreben), 30 bymeans of which philosophy’s scientific aspect withers: “True science knows no deepmeanings, as they are not within the scope of its true doctrine ... deep meaning belongs towisdom, but clarity and distinction belong with strict theorization.” 31Grounded on what has so far been worked upon, we can now understand Heidegger’slater remark about Husserl’s being guided by the decisive idea of Philosophy as a strictscience, an idea that “has guided modern philosophy ever since Descartes.” 32 The ideaof Philosophy as an absolute science follows the Cartesian idea of science, 33 while beingfounded upon intuitive evidence.25Hua XIX/2, A 568.26Husserl distinguished between meaningful and intuitive acts. The former are empty intentions, thatis, intentions that lack the fulfilling moment which nevertheless they aspire to. Intuitive acts, on the otherhand, do entail fulfilment. To these both imagination and perception belong. We can find different degreesof fulfilment within the intuitive act. The task of phenomenological knowledge will examine the mutualrelation between those two different kinds of acts.27Hua I, 51. (MC).28Hua I, 53.29That knowledge be an enigma is something that Husserl remarked in the Die Idee der Philosophielectures, in 1905. See Hua II, 36. Also see Bernet, Kern, Marbach, ed. Edmund Husserl, 52.30PhSW, 331.31PhSW, 339. It’s not surprising at all that Biemel noted the fact that Husserl didn’t understandphilosophy as a Sophia but rather as science in the way we nowadays understand this concept. WalterBiemel, “Die entscheidenden Phasen der Entfaltung von Husserls Philosophie,” in Gesammelte SchriftenI, 86.32GA20, 147; GA17, 72. Also refer to GA32, 14 onward. See J. F. Courtine, Heidegger et laphénoménologie (Paris: Vrin, 1990), 192ff.33Hua I, 52ff.278