[Andrzej_Wiercinski_(ed ... - WordPress.com

of Being -- already grown into Being. That is to say, it is Da-sein (“being there”) only inso far as it opens itself to the openness of Being. Or, to put it the other way round: Daseinis Da-sein only in so far as he is opened to himself by the openness (die Offenheit) ofBeing. Consequently, there is, in the openness of Being, no space that would be separateor transcendent with regard to Dasein and thus hidden from its sight. There is nothing inBeing -- as openness -- which Dasein would not understand and would not interpret in hisunderstanding.Clearly, this apprehension of the relationship between the openness of Being andDasein (which latter ‘stands open’ in Being) excludes the possibility that a phenomenologistmight commit a transgression with regard to the “thing” that he or she describes,but also looks at, from its own perspective. For, how could Dasein change over to thatwhich makes his standing open within himself possible? How can he discard his ownOffenstehen in the openness of Being, when it is only in this openness (Offenheit) that the‘thing’ of Being can possibly show itself to Dasein?If this is so, then Heidegger’s program of phenomenology would represent some sortof descriptive mysticism, contradicting the fundamental presumptions of the analytic ofDasein, and the phenomenologist would be the one who endeavors to reach something thatis impossible to reach: while seeing things “from themselves” (von ihnen selbst her), heor she would also have seen right through them. Any given ‘thing’ would be absolutelytransparent to him or her, because their gaze would melt into one with “the thing” andwould shine through it from inside it.In a way, and as a whole, Being and Time is an attempt to demonstrate, step by step,the impossibility of such a going beyond Dasein to reach Being. This is already excludedby the fundamental existential structure of Dasein, conceived by Heidegger as a “thrownproject” (geworfener Entwurf). This formula implies that Dasein, as always already opento Being, relates to Being from the perspective of his “thrownness,” that is to say, fromthe perspective of his a priori being-open to Being.The “thrown” character of the relationship of Dasein to Being also implies that otherwell-known Heideggerian assertion, which maintains that Dasein’s way of being consistsin the understanding of Being. According to this assertion, Dasein’s understanding of Beingdoes not represent an additional activity, superimposed on the primary way of Dasein’sexistence, but is identical with his existence. In other words, Dasein does not so muchexist “as” the one that understands Being, as it is his understanding of Being that representsthe way in which he exists. Hence, not only does Dasein always understand Being (whileinterpreting it), but his prior understanding of Being also presupposes Being in his selfunderstanding,his understanding of others, and his understanding of the world. In short,only because Dasein always understands Being (while interpreting it) can Dasein understandanything at all.Yet if this is so, then the phenomenologist, in striving to describe/interpret Being, doesnot have to change over to Being’s side before he or she can see the “thing” of Being“from itself” (von ihm selbst her), since he or she is always already there! That is to say,while describing Being, the phenomenologist is always already open (in his or her understanding)to its meaning. The circular structure of the relationship between Dasein andBeing comes to light when phenomenologists ask their question about the meaning ofBeing. It appears, then, that they are not able to answer this question because their veryquestioning is already a way of being. For, how can one characterize the “meaning” ofsomething that presupposes this thing in one’s self-understanding?***252