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When Heidegger characterizes world-view as something extraneous to philosophy, in1919, his ‘alienation’ takes place in respect to the boundaries of world-view. This is notsufficiently unveil<strong>ed</strong>, philosophically. This way, it cannot offer an adequately originaryaccess to factual life. The position concerning world-view must be question<strong>ed</strong> as well.That’s why Heidegger was actually asking for the originary groundwork of world-viewwhen he wrote that “the essence of world-view is bound to be problematic.” 76During the 1919/1920 Winter semester, Heidegger mention<strong>ed</strong> that “a certain meaning”of world-view will be reject<strong>ed</strong>, that is, “the general realm (life) shall remain, but only asa strict science.” 77 That means that it ought to be a pre-theoretic originary science.Heidegger’s intentions to grasp life as it is (something attempt<strong>ed</strong> by world-view also), asit can be thus seen, is not merely reject<strong>ed</strong>. What is rather reject<strong>ed</strong> by Heidegger is just themanner by means of which world-view makes life accessible. It doesn’t apprehend life asit “arises from an origin.” 78 That’s where the limitations of the so-call<strong>ed</strong> “life-view”philosophies show themselves. Pre-theoretical science, on the other hand, is the sciencethat can open life within its primitiveness (Ursprünglichkeit).This means that philosophy, seen as an originary science, should depart from itsrelation with world-view, a relation that has always been taken for grant<strong>ed</strong>. Shouldphilosophy ask for the originary groundwork of world-view, for its essence, then quite adifferent link between them is given: “World-view be<strong>com</strong>es a problem for philosophy ina very different way.” 79 This tells us two things: on the one hand philosophy cannotafford being merely a world-view anymore, and, on the other hand, the very essence ofworld-view hence be<strong>com</strong>es a philosophical problem in itself. This separation thus demandsthat such relationship be understood in a radically different fashion, and that a new kindof philosophy be undertaken. That is to say, that philosophy itself be<strong>com</strong>es now aproblem. It is now therefore mandatory that an overturning of its essence take place.Heidegger’s new conception of what philosophy ought to be is precisely that which wehave so far analyz<strong>ed</strong> under the name of originary pre-theoretical science. Philosophy isdetermin<strong>ed</strong> at its core as an originary science. The main drawback of philosophy as anoriginary science dictates that it be always understood within its tradition as a protephilosophia, prima philosophia, metaphysics, transcendental philosophy (Kant), a scienc<strong>ed</strong>octrine (Fichte), absolute science (Hegel) or transcendental phenomenology (Husserl).The originary science that Heidegger sought is to be understood as a new radical figureof a Western first philosophy. In other words, the very same intentions that characteriz<strong>ed</strong>Western philosophical thought are also found within the concept of originary science.Those intentions were to guide Heidegger’s thought in each and every one of its latermanifestations, including his Ereignis period.Philosophy as an originary science points to an originary <strong>com</strong>prehension of life. Thisis the same as a different way of opening life itself. This way is shown as an apprehensionof life, as a ‘deepening of the origin.’ This ‘deepening’ entails three specific features: selfsufficiency,expression, and meaningfulness. It is possible to foretell that within thesethree features the radical characteristics of originary science make themselves known inscience. We have already shown self-sufficiency as a self-grounding of life and its ownaccess. Likewise, the expression of this self-sufficient way of opening is not an external,be<strong>com</strong>es difficult to see a thing where a name is missing. Fink, Studien, 215.76GA56/57, 12.77GA58, 28. Nevertheless, what Heidegger means by ‘strictness’ [Strenge] in this case is not whatHusserl meant by it. For Heidegger, at least in 1920, ‘strict’ meant: “to focus on the authenticity of life’sreferences within concrete life itself.” GA58, 231. Also see GA58, 137; GA60, 10; GA27, 44.78GA58, 81.79GA56/57, 12.288

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