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appears in the way of its appearance,” as Husserl says, expressing the designation of thisphenomenological notion. Phenomenology remains open to different implementations andtransformations precisely for this reason, i.e., it is always open to a new and renewedcharacterization of that which appears within its appearance (des Erscheinenden in seinemErscheinen). The experience of reality (the everyday, academic, artistic reality, etc.) formsitself within the interpretative possibilities, which can be historically concealed, or againstill unrevealed, not yet overcome or surpassed, or even inaccessible. This dynamicopenness within the possibility characterizes the living-world as such.In the term “living-world,” Husserl believes that he has found a grounding for thehorizon of our experience. The a posteriori experience of historicity and the a prioricritical experience of reason are encapsulated in this notion. By defining the world as atranscendental horizon, Husserl has simultaneously forced reason into its most extremetranscendental possibility, which surpasses all the other possible interpretations of theworld opened to us. It is here that the boundaries of his phenomenology are set in relationto its own historicity, which auto-proclaims itself as a teleology of reason. So doing, wedefinitively shut the door that would give access to a historical openness “between” manand the world.We could assert the same with regard to Wilhelm Dilthey, who, at the beginning of thetwentieth century, strove to elaborate a hermeneutic methodology for the humanities andfor historical interpretation. Dilthey had great regard for Husserl’s theory of phenomenologyand tried to integrate it into his Critique of Historical Reason. Dilthey also dealtwith the over-determinedness of historicity on the basis of critical reason. Indeed, heasserted that only history could tell humans who they are. By asserting this, however, hedidn’t mean the historicity of the inter-relation of the world and human beings, but ratherworld-history, which already assumes the openness of the world for humanity. Even ifDilthey did not rise to the level of transcendental reflection, in particular that whichconcerns the world as a subject to be discussed, as Husserl had done, Heideggernevertheless kept Dilthey’s historical hermeneutics before his eyes and later challengedit with Husserl’s transcendental position.Strictly speaking, inasmuch as the experience of reality, or as Heidegger says, “theunderstanding of being,” relocated itself within the possibilities of interpretation, a finitehistorical thrownness within space (Spielraum) bears witness to these possibilities. Theproject of such a possibility cannot be brought to a uniform transcendental level. It mustagain and again be factually accepted as a pure possibility of the transcendence of beingin-the-world.On a philosophical level, the openness of man and of the world, which turnsagainst itself, is undoubtedly grasped more radically on the basis of this “hermeneutics offacticity.” In turn, it also announces the Heideggerian use of the term “Dasein” for thebeing that we are ourselves, which is open to the world in its being. Heideggerunderstands the openness of the human being and the apparentness of the world on thebasis of an ecstatically horizontal temporality, and on the basis of transcendental reason.Nevertheless, the openness of the world still remains locked up in finite temporality. Thatis to say that if time originally yielded itself out of the finite temporality of Dasein, onemay ask then, whether it wouldn’t be appropriate to say that historicity -- insofar as it isnot to be understood as the historical time of world history -- apportions itself beyond thisfinite temporality? Do we not thus open a possibility in which we could adequately thinkthrough what formed itself historically as “over-delivery,” i.e., as tradition? Does traditionnot reach into our finiteness exactly when it encroaches upon it?It seems that Heidegger endorses a vanguard view of tradition, given that he conceivesof historicity from the viewpoint of the finite temporality of Dasein. Accordingly, traditionmust dissolve into its elements (phenomenological destruction), in order to be able thento arise once again out of the determinedness of finite existence. This would perhaps be196