the “there,” the “one same space,” (OE 85/147) the “one same being”; (OE 17/124) depthis the experience of the reversibility of dimensions, of a global “locality,” where all th<strong>ed</strong>imensions are at once. (OE 65/140) Now, and perhaps this is not so well known,Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of depth (la profondeur) in “Eye and Mind,” refers us backto his early work in The Structure of Behavior on the Gestalt, to the relation of figure andground (le fond). Therefore, we can see how Merleau-Ponty is proce<strong>ed</strong>ing here (in PartIV). With the enigma of vision we have depth and therefore we have the background; nowwe ne<strong>ed</strong> the figure.For Merleau-Ponty, the figure is generat<strong>ed</strong> by color and line. But, color and line, likeall the other dimensions, are not bas<strong>ed</strong> in a “recipe,” as Merleau-Ponty says, for thevisible. It is not a question of adding other dimensions to the two of the canvas. The lackof a recipe means that painting, or more generally pictures, for Merleau-Ponty do notimitate nature. He is rejecting the traditional concept of imitation, which implies an externalrelation between the painter and something outside of him or herself. For Merleau-Ponty, the painter is not viewing something else from the outside. Instead, the painter isborn in the things by the concentration and <strong>com</strong>ing to itself of the visible. This “beingborn in [dans] the things” is what Merleau-Ponty means when he speaks of the picturebeing “auto-figurative.” (OE 69/141) But, what is most important about this discussion inPart IV of “Eye and Mind” -- it seems to me that pages 69-72/141-42 are the heart of theessay; they overlap with the final pages of Chapter 4 of The Visible and the Invisible 26 -- is that, not only is the painter born in the things, but also the writer, or better, the poet.Here, through the idea of auto-figuration, Merleau-Ponty is trying to bring the languagearts back to painting, back to the visible. 27 First, Merleau-Ponty refers to Apollinaire,who said that there are phrases in a poem that do not appear to have been creat<strong>ed</strong> but thatseem “to have form<strong>ed</strong> themselves.” (OE 69/141) Then, second, Merleau-Ponty quotesMichaux as saying that Klee’s colors seem to have been born slowly upon the canvas, tohave emanat<strong>ed</strong> from “a primordial ground” (un fond primordial), “exhal<strong>ed</strong> at the right spotlike a patina or mold.” Between these two <strong>com</strong>ments we have an “et,” an “and,” whichimplies a <strong>com</strong>parison or better a <strong>com</strong>patibility between the colors forming themselves onthe canvas and the words forming themselves on the page, a <strong>com</strong>patibility between theeye that sees and the eye that reads. Here we must also refer to the intersection withFoucault. On the one hand, Apollinaire of course <strong>com</strong>pos<strong>ed</strong> his poems as a calligram, thecalligram being what Magritte “unmakes,” according to Foucault, in This is not a Pipe.On the other, in Chapter Nine of Les mots et les choses, Foucault will say that an “et”connects the doubles that define man’s ambiguous existence. The “et” means thatMerleau-Ponty wants the painter and the poet -- in a word, man -- not on the inside ofGod (this would be large rationalism), but on the inside of the visible. Merleau-Ponty’sdefinition of art shows us that this “et” implies a mixture, an ambiguous relation of lightand feeling, of the visible and the invisible. Art, for Merleau-Ponty, is not a “skillfulrelation, from the outside, to a space and a world.” Instead, “art is the inarticulate cry, thevoice of light,” “la voix de la lumière.” (OE 70/142) In the course from 1961, “CartesianOntology and Contemporary Ontology,” Merleau-Ponty reproduces Valéry’s poem“Pythie,” which speaks of a voice of no one, the voice of the waves and the woods, which26Deleuze in his book on Foucault cites these final pages of The Visible and the Invisible. (VI 201-02/153-54 See Gilles Deleuze, Foucault (Paris: Minuit, 1986), 119 no. 39; English translation by SeánHand as Foucault (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 149 no. 38.27For more on Klee, Merleau-Ponty, and auto-figuration, see Stephen Watson, “On the Withdrawalof the Beautiful: Adorno and Merleau-Ponty’s Readings of Klee,” Chiasmi International 5 (2003): 201-21.See also Galen Johnson, “Thinking in Color: Merleau-Ponty and Klee,” in Veronique Fóti, <strong>ed</strong>., Merleau-Ponty: Difference, Materiality, Painting (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1996).134
is literature, and the unveiling of the visible, the speech of things. Merleau-Ponty<strong>com</strong>ments on this poem by saying that “the visible and what the poem means [are]interwoven (entrelacés). 28 (NC 1959-61, 186)In “Eye and Mind,” Merleau-Ponty provides a remarkable example of this interweaving,which is the painter’s vision (and not the profane vision) of a swimming pool. 29It is clear that, with this description of the view of a swimming pool, Merleau-Ponty isstill concern<strong>ed</strong> with a figure-ground relation, since he is speaking about the bottom (lefond) of the pool. Here is the description:If I saw, without this flesh, the geometry of the tile, then I would stop seeing the til<strong>ed</strong>bottom as it is, where it is, namely: farther away than any identical place. I cannot saythat the water itself – the aqueous power, the syrupy and shimmering element – is inspace; all this is not somewhere else either, but it is not in the pool. It dwells in it, ismaterializ<strong>ed</strong> there, yet it is not contain<strong>ed</strong> there; and if I lift my eyes toward the screenof cypresses where the web of reflections plays, I must recognize that the water visitsit as well, or at least sends out to it its active and living essence. This inner animation,this radiation of the visible, is what the painter seeks beneath the names of depth,space, and color. (OE 70-71/142, my emphasis)Merleau-Ponty selects the vision of a swimming pool because, it seems, any swimmingpool has to have depth so that one might be able to swim in it. The depth is the water,which is not in space or in the pool; the water “dwells there,” as Merleau-Ponty says, butdwelling (habiter) means that the water is not contain<strong>ed</strong> in the pool but is itself thecontainer. Or, as Merleau-Ponty says here, it is an “element.” Now in The Visible and theInvisible Merleau-Ponty also calls the flesh an element, saying “to designate the flesh, wewould ne<strong>ed</strong> the old term ‘element,’ in the sense it was us<strong>ed</strong> to speak of water, air, earth,and fire, that is, in the sense of a general thing, midway [mi-chemin] between the spatiotemporalindividual and the idea.” (VI 184/139) Without the flesh of the water, we wouldbe able to grasp the tiles with our hands and hold them in one identical place, but thenwe would not see their geometry, or, more precisely, geometry. The flesh allows us to seethe geometry, since the water’s distortions function as a sort of variation of the spatiotemporalindividual. The variation makes that the geometry is “farther away than anyidentical place.” But, being midway, the water makes that the geometry is not so far awayas to exist in a second world of forms without any support from the visible; (Cf. OE91/149) again, we see here that Merleau-Ponty’s thought is an anti-Platonism. Thegeometry reaches only as low as the bottom of the syrupy element and only as high as thescreen of cypresses.You can see, I hope, that with this description of the swimming pool Merleau-Pontyis no longer speaking of voice. The geometry of the tiles refers us to the line. It is wellknown that Merleau-Ponty says, in this context, that modern painting contests the “prosaicline,” the line between a field and a meadow which the pencil or brush would only haveto reproduce. Again, we can see that Merleau-Ponty is not interest<strong>ed</strong> in the traditional ideaof art as imitation or reproduction. It is also well known that in this context Merleau-Ponty turns to Klee again. For Klee, according to Merleau-Ponty, the line is the genesisof the visible, and then, still according to Merleau-Ponty, Klee “leaves it up to the titleto designate by its prosaic name the being thus constitut<strong>ed</strong>, in order to leave the painting28“L’entrelacs – le chiasme” is, of course, the title of The Visible and the Invisible’s fourth chapter.29Merleau-Ponty, in fact, says that art, once it has awoken, gives vision new powers; these powerswould have to define the painter’s vision.135
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various forms of idealist philosoph
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down and all the way back.” 51 Fo
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“I think” but in “the dialogu
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crucial “other” in our becoming
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interpreted the world, and that the
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title Herbert Spiegelberg gave to h
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published in Being and Having. 12 T
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inside me which makes me able to re
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ReflectionPhilosophical thought is
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attempt at unification, the reflect
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thereof. And an ethical aspect: tha
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the most meaningful contemporary sw
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more pronounced recoil whereby the
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these structures throughout the who
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By seeking a deeper unity of Dasein
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folds a pre-given set of possibilit
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IV.PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOMENTS IN THE
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Therefore, I would like to concentr
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classical Greek tradition of thinki
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This uneasiness in human beings, wh
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phenomenological development. The p
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II.A Liberation, With a Meeting in
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denken lässt -, sondern das Leben:
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Sinn” 17 and, following this: “
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Wenn ich dieses Buch sehe, sehe ich
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cosmic world, and Nietzschean nihil
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absolute lawgiver to any possible
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solitude.” 26 If there is a “hi
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transcendental reason, 46 pure rati
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2. HISTORY AS THE OTHER -- NOTES ON
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precisely the accomplishment of phe
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the task and the very environment o
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the Husserlian idea of phenomenolog
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We now need to quote a second, well
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“knowledge about the world.” In
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Husserl’s ConversionsTheological
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And this proved, probably, to be a
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Husserl’s Reflective Phenomenolog
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to beings of the same nature. But t
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worldlessness of Husserl’s intent
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According to Aristotle, intellectio
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things, we shall comprehend by intu
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something,’ is not merely there (
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epoché in Husserl become a hermene
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When Heidegger characterizes world-