[Andrzej_Wiercinski_(ed ... - WordPress.com

a rather weak foundation for ethical theory, especially if it is divorced from its Kantianroots in the categorical imperative. 36I believe phenomenology opens up possibilities for a more substantial theory of whatmakes a good life than liberalism and utilitarianism, just as it opens up possibilities fora more substantial theory of health than medical science by itself does; but these possibilitiesneed to be surveyed in a systematic manner, and they have problems of their own.It is also essential to realize that the critique of certain modern theories of a good life doesnot render the key concepts of these theories vacuous, just as the critique of a notion ofmedical practice as merely applied science is not a critique of medical science in itself.Freedom of choice and pleasure are important for us if we are to achieve good living, justas the treatment of disease is of the uttermost importance in the struggle for health.Authenticity is the road most often travelled in phenomenological and hermeneuticattempts to address the question of good living. 37 It has its roots in Heidegger’s philosophy(ultimately in Heidegger’s reading of Kierkegaard and other Christian thinkers), andit has been the main source of inspiration for existentialist renderings of the meaning ofexistence, such as those found in Sartre or Camus. Authenticity, in its existentialist formas the solution of ethical dilemmas, tends to suffer from the same weaknesses as theliberal tradition’s concept of autonomy. According to these doctrines, the only criterionfor a good choice is that it is my choice (although “my choice” would mean differentthings for an existentialist and a libertarian, since their philosophical anthropologies areindeed very different). If the concept of authenticity is to offer a substantive theory ofgood living, then it needs to be thicker, in the sense of incorporating intersubjectivity -- thatis, in the sense of formulating the concept of a good life with others. Indeed, Heidegger’sconceptualization of authenticity -- as a bravely solitary being-towards-death -- has beencriticized on many occasions precisely for its lack of this kind of thickness. 38With this remark we seem to be back with Aristotle and the philosopher’s attempts atanalyzing philia (friendship) in the communal life of the polis, found in the NicomacheanEthics. For Aristotle it is here, in philia, that phronesis has its roots, as do humanflourishing and happiness (eudaimonia). But we are also back with Gadamer. As I mentionedabove in introducing the main thoughts of Truth and Method, authentic understandingin Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics is a shared dialogic process of seekingthe truth together, in and through language. This process might be taken as a model for agood life, a kind of ethics. Such a concept of good living, however, still needs to be differentiatedfrom the concept of health, since they represent different aspects and differentqualities of our being-in-the-world. Authenticity sets higher standards than health, and itcan hardly in itself be the goal of medical practice, although health and authenticity areclearly related.Concluding ThoughtsGadamer is hardly the first philosopher in the phenomenological-hermeneutic tradition toapproach the issues of health and sickness. But the attempts made for developing theoriesof health and sickness on a phenomenological basis have most often been restricted to theareas of psychiatry and psychology; somatic ailments have either been seen as the territory36Jos V. M. Welie, In the Face of Suffering: The Philosophical-Anthropological Foundations ofClinical Ehtics (Omaha, Nebr.: Creighton University Press, 1998).37Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992).38Jean-Luc Nancy, Être singulier pluriel (Paris: Galilée, 1996).183