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and the represented body (the combination of forces, actions, affections, frailties). Theliving knowledge of life, in its original appearance, would be thought about by Heideggerin his early Freiburg Courses, delivered between 1919 and 1923, in terms of Erlebnis orlived, 12 and subsequently, after 1920, as the practical affective dimension of the experienceof life in terms of Befindlichkeit and Stimmung, starting from the reading of Aristotle. 13The essentially affective knowledge of life, proper to all that is lived, is not only characterizedby a certain passivity but also, and mainly, by the absence of distance thatseparates the cognizant subject from the object known within theoretical knowledge,because to live something is to be it. Erlebnis does not mean the contemplation of anexternal process nor an “inner” or “psychological” process pertaining to subjectivity orconsciousness, since the lived knows no internal nor external, i.e., my life is only livingto the extent that it lives in a world, has a world, which is but the world I have and livein. 14 Experience being a vital, historical process, its intelligibility does not depend on themere observation of facts but on the blending of memory and expectation, as Dilthey hadalready argued. The ideality of meaning cannot, therefore, be assigned to a transcendentalsubject because it comes from the lived. The experience that offers itself to the subject isfounded on meaningfulness and experiential nexus. Therefore, epistemic consciousnesssimply continues the thought initiated in the experience of life, since it is previouslysituated in its vital nexus and finds in it the reference of its own being. Science cannot,therefore, replace the ground on which it is itself rooted, i.e., the sensus communis (Vico),the ground for all ability and legitimacy to think and act (ability to judge). The sensuscommunis, or “common understanding” (der gemeine Verstand), is decisively characterizedby the ability to judge, so judgement is not a concept created by reflective consciousnessbut indeed a sense of judgement similar to the sensitive judgements that, despite beingformed with some certainty, are not however logically demonstrable. Life itself is theorigin and fundament both of the objectivity of scientific knowledge and the philosophicalreflection to arrive at the truth: the link between Life and knowledge is, therefore, anoriginary given, since consciousness is always incorporated in history, in society, in economy,in technique and in culture. Since Dilthey, subject/consciousness and object/naturecease to be regions of the Metaphysica Specialis; instead they designate concrete circlesof phenomena, layers of facts, which concrete man describes and observes according tohis position in the world, his experiential, cognitive and volitive attitude. The lived body(corps vécu) re-establishes the importance of the phantasmic, suffering body in the faceof the dissected body.Heidegger’s analysis of the structure of man’s way of being meant the overcoming ofa monadological and self-sufficient concept of man, rooting human essence in the connectionwith the other and others, in tradition, within the framework of societies and theirinstitutions as significant mediations of language. The work of rationalization and systematizationof the world, therefore, can only be explained by the hermeneutics of facticityin its capacity to analyze the previous way of being-there of the being in the world, thereason why Heidegger does not talk about the subject as something separated from theworld but about Dasein -- something that is related to and inseparable from the world. Forits facticity, the subject in its hermeneutic experience returns in the guise of the object,12Martin Heidegger, Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie, GA 56/57, ed. Bernd Heimbüchel (Frankfurta.M.: Klostermann, 1987), 63-67.13Here it is no longer the concept of life that enables existence (Dasein) to be thought, but thebeing-for-death, the ontological difference that brings about anguish.14Cf. Martin Heidegger, Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Einführung in diephänomenologische Forschung (Wintersemester 1921/22), GA 61, ed. Walter Bröcker und Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1985), 86.154