manifest in the self-givenness of life, in the originary One who engenders in himselfabsolute life, in the self-revelation unto itself.The objectification of originary affectivity (pathos) is express<strong>ed</strong> in the thinking of thebody (Leib) as objective transcendent body, as mere physical and biological support(Körper) for an Ego. Ontologically different from subjectivity, the objective body becamea primary material in which personal identity is dilut<strong>ed</strong> and no longer an identitarianmanifestation of subjectivity: “(...) It is not because our body is also a transcendent body,a body such as philosophy understood it before the discovery of the subjective body, thatthe being of man is a situat<strong>ed</strong> being. Rather the contrary, our objective transcendent bodyis only situat<strong>ed</strong> in a well-determin<strong>ed</strong> sense that is peculiar to it because our absolute bodyis already situat<strong>ed</strong> as subjectivity in a transcendental relationship with the world. Thusontological analysis destroys the naive representations which dominate philosophicaltradition, and according to which the metaphysical being of man, understood as pure consciousnessand as abstract subjectivity, would only be situat<strong>ed</strong>, determin<strong>ed</strong>, even individualiz<strong>ed</strong>by its being brought into relation, a mysterious one for that matter (as the mythsconcerning the “fall” of the soul into the body show) to an objective body. It is not thatthe character of being-in-situation somehow <strong>com</strong>municates itself from the body-object tothe absolute body, it is in fact in the opposite sense that this “<strong>com</strong>munication” iseffect<strong>ed</strong>.” 59Passivity as an Originary Auto-AffectionThe emergence of a new concept of subject is link<strong>ed</strong> to the ne<strong>ed</strong> for over<strong>com</strong>ing varioussystems of historical and cultural references, definitions and experiences justifyinganthropological coordinates that delimitate human nature, since psychocentric, sociocentric,theocentric and biocentric polarizations have always l<strong>ed</strong> to man’s loss of identity. Thesubject’s sovereignty us<strong>ed</strong> to rest on the sovereign demarcation of its space, from whichit knew and appropriat<strong>ed</strong> what in nature, and by nature, was still external to it, giving riseto the great difficulties between theory and practice. The definition of man progressivelysh<strong>ed</strong> the dichotomous, subjective-transcendental, empirical-biological prejudices on whichit was found<strong>ed</strong>. The refusal of the modern concept of autonomous subject in the name ofthe originary passivity and sensitive affectivity asserts the originary One as a self-givenoneself and not a self-proclaim<strong>ed</strong> ego, root of all thought, knowl<strong>ed</strong>ge or power. Therefore,the belonging of (my) body to the being-of-the-world is far from that of objects to theworld. A pure object only exists in the infinite term of a movement of objectification, whichreveals the originary link between things and my body: the frontal correlation of the constituentsubject and the blosse Sachen derives from the live unity of the body and itsworld. There is no life without the living, and no living without life; there is no life fora living creature except that liv<strong>ed</strong> by him. Life is not an external representation and noliving creature brings himself to life: “If life originally only reveals its own reality, it issimply because its mode of revelation is the pathos, this essence entirely taken by itself,this wholeness of flesh immers<strong>ed</strong> in the auto-affection of its pain and joy. In theimmanence of its own pathos, this reality of life, therefore, is not just any reality. It iseverything except what modern thought will make of it, some impersonal, anonymous,blind, silent essence. It necessarily carries in itself this Self generat<strong>ed</strong> in its pathetic selfgeneration,this Self which only reveals itself in Life as the very revelation of this Life59Henry, Philosophie et phénoménologie du corps, 267-268.162
to the self – as its Logos.” 60 Life in the world can do nothing to relieve us from thesuffering and anguish 61 which are the indelible core of our feeling of existence. Theworld does not heal us from our suffering in existence unless it hides our true life fromus and obliterates in us all sense of our existence. But suffering, without ceasing to be so,can at the same time be joy insofar as, suffering from life, it opens to us the door of theexperience of the Divine in us. The unity of joy and pain is, therefore, an auto-affectionthat testifies to the double phenomenalization of phenomenality: the human and th<strong>ed</strong>ivine. 62 Far from being transcendence in the face of the subject, sensing is posit<strong>ed</strong> fromthe start in the relationship from which it is possible to identify the “sensing” and the“sensing oneself,” but the sensing, in turn, never is and can never be sens<strong>ed</strong>, 63 since itdoes not ensue from what affects us. 64 Michel Henry posits affectivity itself in the dividewhere the dualist perspective would posit the nominative and the reflective subjects:“Affectivity is the essence of ipseity.” 65 The ‘being subject’ means suffering, meansbeing: “The constitutive subjectivity of the being, and identical to it, is the being-withitself,the achievement in itself of the being such that it ac<strong>com</strong>plishes itself in the originalpassivity of suffering. The essence of subjectivity is affectivity.” 66 Suffering is a word becauseit is it that speaks and says, because it is in the flesh of life’s suffering and throughit that the revelation is made of what it says to us in this way: simply this suffering flesh.If it says itself to us without ever resorting to language, we may ask: “How does it sayit? In its suffering and by it.” 67 For this reason, in this pain, in this suffering, life hasalready spoken differently, in a more primitive suffering: “This suffering, in which lifeembraces itself in the process of <strong>com</strong>ing to itself in the love and joy of itself – thissuffering, which inhabits every mode of life, pain or joy, because in each one it is whatgives life to itself inasmuch as it is in it, this original pathos of life belonging to it, [it isin this suffering] that absolute Life gives itself to itself.” 68 The living creature, experiencinghimself, is this Word of Life which he himself hears: “The possibility of hearingthe Word of life is for each living Self consubstantial to its birth, to its condition ofSon.” 69 In his way of living, this fundamental passivity is a concrete phenomenologicalfeature of concrete life. This is the legacy of Descartes who, in his Méditations métaphysiques,defin<strong>ed</strong> man as an apparatus which he calls thought, i.e., a being who feels andthis feeling is self-feeling: “Cogitatio is a subjective mode which, like suffering, cold,hunger, heat, etc. experiences itself imm<strong>ed</strong>iately, regardless of the world, in an a-cosmicway and, if the world did not exist, it does not necessarily mean that it would disappear.In other words, suffering might well exist outside the world to the extent that it exists asit experiences itself imm<strong>ed</strong>iately. (…) Consequently, it is in affectivity that the unshakeablefoundation sought by Descartes lies. I call this life because all that lives is ofthis order. Even seeing, to the extent that it is a living seeing, is always a pathos.” 7060Henry, “Phénoménologie matérielle et langage,” 25-26.61Cf. Henry, C’est moi la Vérité, 137.62Cf. ibid., 257.63Henry, L’Essence de la manifestation (Paris: Puf, 1963), 579.64Ibid., 829.65Ibid., 581.66Ibid., 595.67Henry, “Phénoménologie matérielle et langage,” 27.68Ibid., 29: «ce souffrir en lequel elle s’étreint elle-même dans le procès de sa venue en soi, dansl’amour et la jouissance de soi – ce souffrir qui habite, toute modalité de la vie, souffrance ou joie, parcequ’il est en chacune ce qui la donne à elle-même pour autant que c’est en lui, dans ce pathos originel quiest le sien, que la Vie absolue se donne à soi.»69Ibid.70Henry, Auto-donation, 134-135.163
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various forms of idealist philosoph
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self-givenness (Selbstgegebenheit)
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It must be admitted in this regard
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down and all the way back.” 51 Fo
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Heidegger characterized his own pro
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Heidegger’s transcendental-existe
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perceived world” (PP, 25), Merlea
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in the unreflected, in “perceptio
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Nor would Merleau-Ponty have had an
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a way that we do not all crash into
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“I think” but in “the dialogu
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in existence a “super-abundance o
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crucial “other” in our becoming
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to its being grounded in terms of b
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(“History is this quasi-‘thing
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manner (statistical or regression a
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and they are such, precisely becaus
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interpreted the world, and that the
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is not rationalist or idealist in t
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title Herbert Spiegelberg gave to h
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II.TOWARD A TELOS OF SIGNIFYING COM
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published in Being and Having. 12 T
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inside me which makes me able to re
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or is not existence something that
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ReflectionPhilosophical thought is
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attempt at unification, the reflect
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thereof. And an ethical aspect: tha
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According to Ricoeur, “It is here
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the most meaningful contemporary sw
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ival hermeneutics that we perceive
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more pronounced recoil whereby the
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these structures throughout the who
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By seeking a deeper unity of Dasein
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folds a pre-given set of possibilit
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of experience is correlated to a pa
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explanations of causal events in th
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accept one argument over another. A
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a subtle dialectic between argument
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or warrant an assertion. Such fulfi
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the assertive vehemence of the hist
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positions of the subject. For memor
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attestation slips a plurality, most
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What confidence in the word of othe
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From where, perhaps, the place of t
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Sans le correctif du commandement d
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life), Rembrandt proposes an interp
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only as a place made for oneself as
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Der christlich-jüdische Gott ist d
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3. A “BETTER” OR JUST “ANOTHE
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if we have two persons, a master an
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V.THE ARCHEOLOGY OF HERMENEUTIC PHE
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cosmic world, and Nietzschean nihil
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absolute lawgiver to any possible
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solitude.” 26 If there is a “hi
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of reason, as far as the single hum
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transcendental reason, 46 pure rati
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and properties of sensible phenomen
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In clear distantiation from his own
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2. HISTORY AS THE OTHER -- NOTES ON
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precisely the accomplishment of phe
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ought as such into the present, it
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educed state. As soon as the reflec
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explicitly in the Vienna lecture, w
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the task and the very environment o
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stood “from itself.” As a resul
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makes possible the further interpre
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of Being -- already grown into Bein
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the Husserlian idea of phenomenolog
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into the openness of Being, it diff
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We now need to quote a second, well
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“knowledge about the world.” In
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Husserl’s ConversionsTheological
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And this proved, probably, to be a
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Husserl’s Reflective Phenomenolog
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to beings of the same nature. But t
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worldlessness of Husserl’s intent
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According to Aristotle, intellectio
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6. RIGOR AND ORIGINARITY: THE TRANS
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The latter, the nonessential princi
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that, for Husserl, every act is ind
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not forget what Husserl meant by a-
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things, we shall comprehend by intu
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something,’ is not merely there (
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epoché in Husserl become a hermene
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When Heidegger characterizes world-