Transcendental affectivity 71 is the original mode of revelation by virtue of which lifereveals itself and be<strong>com</strong>es possible as it is, as life. Life is essentially affective and affectivityis the essence of life. 72 Pathos, as originary affectivity, is the mode of phenomenologizationaccording to which life is phenomenologiz<strong>ed</strong> in its originary self-revelation, thephenomenological matter this self-givenness is made of, its flesh: a pure transcendentalaffectivity in which all self-experiencing has its concrete phenomenological effectuality. 73Now the objectification of the pathos through contemporary scientific discourse was andis express<strong>ed</strong> in the thinking of the body as the merely physical support of an ego: “Thewill to consider Nature as simply a “natural being,” alien to life, already witnesses to th<strong>ed</strong>esire of this life to deny itself. … To consider the object in an exclusive fashion and, whatis more, as a pure object, from which everything that would evoke life in it and, aboveall else, everything that is sensory and affective was exclud<strong>ed</strong>, eliminat<strong>ed</strong>, repudiat<strong>ed</strong>,devalu<strong>ed</strong> – to know a totally objective being, i.e., totally independent from subjectivity …is, after all, the best means of escape from oneself.” 74Pathos as an Originary Mode of the Phenomenologization of LifeIn the mid-twentieth century, under the apologetic discourse of a new imagination ofthe body, critical of the social modalities of physical existence (with a whole literature,unconsciously surrealistic, appealing to the “liberation of the body”), the body is posit<strong>ed</strong>not as the condition of man, but as an existence exterior to the concrete man, another selfsame.Ontologically different from the subject, the body be<strong>com</strong>es a concern (souci) andan object of disquiet: it is the body as alter-ego, 75 the only unquestionable permanence,the target property for investments of all sorts, a “place” of conquest and even s<strong>ed</strong>uction.It is necessary to “fight” the intentional variations of the objective body over time, time’smarks on the face and the hair: it is necessary to remain “young.” The finitude of the fleshexpress<strong>ed</strong> by the disease, precariousness and pain which afflict it, its vulnerability andfrailty, originate the objectification of the body, leading man to the “utopia of perfecthealth,” to the pursuit of immortality. The idea of health is reifi<strong>ed</strong>, transform<strong>ed</strong> into ascientific-technological object, and its dimension of a singularly liv<strong>ed</strong> experience is r<strong>ed</strong>uc<strong>ed</strong>.It is valu<strong>ed</strong> as a purely physiological good within a horizon of reifi<strong>ed</strong> hopes, withinan objectivist view of the physical and worldly dynamics in which all significations thatmake it a living body or a body-flesh (Leibkörper) are r<strong>ed</strong>uc<strong>ed</strong>, and in which health ceasesto be a metaphorical referent and <strong>com</strong>es to be understood as the optimization of a risk. 76Thus, the mystery of incarnation is forgotten and the dissolution of the flesh, the disincarnationof the self, occurs: “The phenomenology of the flesh re-conducts us from ouropenness to the world, in the transcendental contributions of our various senses, to theauto-impressionability of these on the flesh of life. It is only because of this pathetic selfgivennessthat our senses belong to a flesh, and that all that is given in them, that sensorycontent of our experience that we relate to things as their particular qualities, is found tobe originally and in itself made of “impressions.” Now, this pathetic self-givenness of oursenses in life has another decisive meaning: that of turning each of them into a power. …It is this originary impossibility for the living to move away from life that founds theirown impotence in moving away from themselves. Thus, the living cannot remove them-717273747576Cf. Henry, La Barbarie, 30.Henry, L’essence de la manifestation, 596.Henry, “Phénoménologie matérielle et langage,” 25.Henry, La Barbarie, 128.Cf. David Le Breton, Anthropologie du corps et modernité (Paris: Puf, 1990).Ivan Illich, La perte des sens (Paris: Fayard, 2004), 334.164
selves from themselves, from their Self, their pain or their suffering. If in the world’soutside of itself, which is the place of the separation, our own body cannot place itselfoutside itself, even if it is stretch<strong>ed</strong> out and its parts are external to each other, it isbecause this body, far from defining our real body – our invisible and indivisible flesh –is only its external representation.” 77This questioning and crisis of the body are ac<strong>com</strong>pani<strong>ed</strong> by the growth crisis of contemporaryindividualism, i.e., that of a narcissistic sensitivity. The value crisis problematizesthe relationship with the world, and it is in this context that the body be<strong>com</strong>es a havenand an ultimate value of youth, s<strong>ed</strong>uction, vitality, “best friend,” a “capital” that one ne<strong>ed</strong>sto manage with the best resources, prime value property, an object for great attention, careand treatment: “A ruse of modernity passes off as “liberation” what is no more than praisefor the young, healthy, slender, spotless, s<strong>ed</strong>uctive body. The fashioning of appearance,the cult of form, the imperative of good health, induces a careful, often strict, relation tothe self. The key values of modernity … are those of youth, health, vitality, s<strong>ed</strong>uction andhygiene. They are the cornerstones of the modern discourse on the body.” 78 The individualis r<strong>ed</strong>uc<strong>ed</strong> to his organic physicality (corporéité) to such an extent that, when it deteriorates(old age, illness) he believes that he has lost his dignity: “The weakness of lifeconsists of its will to escape itself – and this is an ever-present temptation. … The impossibilityof breaking up the string that attaches life to itself, which is to say to escape itssuffering, increases the latter, exasperates the will to escape it and, in turn, simultaneously,the feeling of its helplessness, the feeling of Oneself as an original impossibility of escapingoneself, a feeling which finally reaches its peak and resolves itself in anguish.” 79 Oldage and illness mark the progressive r<strong>ed</strong>uction of subjectivity to its organic body, reflectingthe moment when this very body is expos<strong>ed</strong> to the gaze, but without the other’s lenienceon a not too favorable day. 80 The temptation to “recycle” 81 the body in the denial ofits relationship with pathos, with pain, with anguish, is the reflection of the new representationof a body-object capable of being “dismount<strong>ed</strong>” and “rearticulat<strong>ed</strong>” down to its lastrecess. The notion of perfect health is subsidiary to the notion of body-object since, likeit, health has been objectifi<strong>ed</strong> and defin<strong>ed</strong> as absence of illness, pain and suffering,dispossessing therefore the own-body from what defines it: its experiences, pain andsuffering (pathos) as originary affection, hence non-objectifiable or representable. Illnessis what be<strong>com</strong>es opaque, hidden, it is the stalemate and obstacle to the originary experienceof human authenticity. Illness is the diffuse perception of the tension of a distance(alienation) between the self and the oneself that expresses itself throughout an entirehuman life. 82 Like practical experience, the experience of suffering, the state of healthis not objectifiable despite it having been made a sector of appearances.77Michel Henry, Phénoménologie de l’Incarnation (Paris: Seuil, 2000), 247-252.78David le Breton, “À la recherche du secret perdu,” Revue Le groupe familial, no. 141(October/December 1993): 6-7.79Henry, La Barbarie, 128.80Cf. Le Breton, “À la recherche du secret perdu,” 8.81Cf. Gilles Lipovetski, L’ère du vide (Paris: Gallimard, 1983).82In this context Georges Canguilhem says: “s’agissant de la maladie, l’homme normal est celui quivit l’assurance de pouvoir enrayer sur lui ce qui, chez un autre, irait à bout de course. Il faut donc àl’homme normal, pour qu’il puisse se croire et se dire tel, non pas l’avant-goût de la maladie, mais sonombre portée.” Georges Canguilhem, Essai sur quelques problèmes concernant le normal et le pathologique(Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1950).165
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various forms of idealist philosoph
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self-givenness (Selbstgegebenheit)
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It must be admitted in this regard
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down and all the way back.” 51 Fo
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Heidegger characterized his own pro
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Heidegger’s transcendental-existe
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perceived world” (PP, 25), Merlea
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in the unreflected, in “perceptio
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Nor would Merleau-Ponty have had an
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a way that we do not all crash into
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“I think” but in “the dialogu
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in existence a “super-abundance o
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crucial “other” in our becoming
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to its being grounded in terms of b
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manner (statistical or regression a
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and they are such, precisely becaus
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interpreted the world, and that the
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is not rationalist or idealist in t
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title Herbert Spiegelberg gave to h
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II.TOWARD A TELOS OF SIGNIFYING COM
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published in Being and Having. 12 T
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inside me which makes me able to re
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or is not existence something that
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ReflectionPhilosophical thought is
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attempt at unification, the reflect
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thereof. And an ethical aspect: tha
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According to Ricoeur, “It is here
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the most meaningful contemporary sw
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ival hermeneutics that we perceive
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more pronounced recoil whereby the
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these structures throughout the who
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By seeking a deeper unity of Dasein
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folds a pre-given set of possibilit
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of experience is correlated to a pa
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explanations of causal events in th
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accept one argument over another. A
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a subtle dialectic between argument
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or warrant an assertion. Such fulfi
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the assertive vehemence of the hist
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positions of the subject. For memor
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attestation slips a plurality, most
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What confidence in the word of othe
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From where, perhaps, the place of t
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Sans le correctif du commandement d
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life), Rembrandt proposes an interp
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only as a place made for oneself as
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III.THE HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY O
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3. A “BETTER” OR JUST “ANOTHE
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if we have two persons, a master an
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V.THE ARCHEOLOGY OF HERMENEUTIC PHE
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cosmic world, and Nietzschean nihil
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absolute lawgiver to any possible
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solitude.” 26 If there is a “hi
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of reason, as far as the single hum
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transcendental reason, 46 pure rati
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In clear distantiation from his own
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2. HISTORY AS THE OTHER -- NOTES ON
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precisely the accomplishment of phe
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ought as such into the present, it
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educed state. As soon as the reflec
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explicitly in the Vienna lecture, w
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the task and the very environment o
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stood “from itself.” As a resul
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of Being -- already grown into Bein
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the Husserlian idea of phenomenolog
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into the openness of Being, it diff
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We now need to quote a second, well
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“knowledge about the world.” In
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Husserl’s ConversionsTheological
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And this proved, probably, to be a
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Husserl’s Reflective Phenomenolog
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to beings of the same nature. But t
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worldlessness of Husserl’s intent
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According to Aristotle, intellectio
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The latter, the nonessential princi
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that, for Husserl, every act is ind
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not forget what Husserl meant by a-
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things, we shall comprehend by intu
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something,’ is not merely there (
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epoché in Husserl become a hermene
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When Heidegger characterizes world-