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Husserl’s ConversionsTheological issues were of no interest to Husserl. He radically separated philosophy fromtheology. He nonetheless supposed that phenomenological studies could be of some importancefor theological determinations.Our direct intentions are not heading toward theology, but toward phenomenology,though indirectly it can be of great significance for theology. 9On the other hand, he regarded himself as someone who was intentionally searchingfor the truth, wanting to hold “the crown of truth.” And in order to do so, he abandonedmathematics in favor of philosophy and also converted to Protestantism. From then on --as formulated by Manfred Sommer -- Husserl thought in the Cartesian manner and livedthe life of a Protestant. 10 Of Jewish origin -- which led to some dramatic existential consequencesfor this philosopher -- Husserl was baptized on 26 April 1886, being namedEdmund Gustav Albrecht, in the municipal church of the Evangelical Augsburg parish inVienna. This was for him the fulfillment of what he perceived to be his calling: to builda philosophy in the manner of mathematics, a serious science. Whereas a philosophy ofoptimism and peace -- like Mach’s philosophy -- was perceived as a kind of deviation fromthe proper calling of the professional philosopher, something sinful even. 11 Thus it wasphenomenology, as a primordial and self-legitimate philosophy, that was, in his opinion,to pave the way toward God and a truthful life.And yet, why did Husserl not expressly advocate the God of religion, or at least theGod of philosophy? What was it that checked his acceptance of a religious lifestyle, whilemany of his disciples (apart from Roman Ingarden) were brought to God or even tosainthood (as recognized by the Catholic Church), like Edith Stein, by philosophizing “inthe spirit of Husserl”? Perhaps the main reason for this lies in the character of phenomenologyitself, which confines experience within the borders of consciousness. If the“transcendental Ego” category were to refer to an even more primary “source” than consciousness,then the foundations of phenomenology as such would be destroyed. ThereforeHusserl could not cross the limits set by consciousness, since it represented the ultimate(perhaps even the divine?) dimension of all experience. We cannot find much in Husserl’stexts, however fragmentary, that would prove his philosophical search for God. Rather,we should simply recognize their atheistic character. This philosophy does not ask for God,and frequently used terms like “God” or “god” are only figures in a kind of intellectualexperiment, marginal figures understood as fictum. In Husserl’s texts it even happens thathe refers absurd, blasphemous, or contradictory expressions to God himself -- after theearlier example of Pseudo-Dionysios Areopagita -- though, at the same time, they havenothing to do with any form of negative theology. Calling God “boundlessly stupid” onlysuggests that this God is not one that could be blasphemed against. The egocentrism ofphenomenology makes consciousness “absolute,” even in the sense that it has the capabilityof “self-creation.” 12 And it can be called God. In no way, however, is this the God ofScripture, or of the Christian faith.9Edmund Husserl, Idee czystej fenomenologii i fenomenologicznej filozofii, trans. Danuta Gierulanka(Warszawa: PWN, 1967), 96-97.10Manfred Sommer, “Fenomenologia jako poważna praca i pogodna pasywność,” in StanisławCzerniak and Jarosław Rolewski, ed., Studia z filozofii niemieckiej, vol. 3, Współczesna fenomenologianiemiecka (Toruń: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika, 1999), 134.11Ibid., 135.12Ibid., 136-137.262