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When Heidegger characterizes world-view as something extraneous to philosophy, in1919, his ‘alienation’ takes place in respect to the boundaries of world-view. This is notsufficiently unveiled, philosophically. This way, it cannot offer an adequately originaryaccess to factual life. The position concerning world-view must be questioned as well.That’s why Heidegger was actually asking for the originary groundwork of world-viewwhen he wrote that “the essence of world-view is bound to be problematic.” 76During the 1919/1920 Winter semester, Heidegger mentioned that “a certain meaning”of world-view will be rejected, that is, “the general realm (life) shall remain, but only asa strict science.” 77 That means that it ought to be a pre-theoretic originary science.Heidegger’s intentions to grasp life as it is (something attempted by world-view also), asit can be thus seen, is not merely rejected. What is rather rejected by Heidegger is just themanner by means of which world-view makes life accessible. It doesn’t apprehend life asit “arises from an origin.” 78 That’s where the limitations of the so-called “life-view”philosophies show themselves. Pre-theoretical science, on the other hand, is the sciencethat can open life within its primitiveness (Ursprünglichkeit).This means that philosophy, seen as an originary science, should depart from itsrelation with world-view, a relation that has always been taken for granted. Shouldphilosophy ask for the originary groundwork of world-view, for its essence, then quite adifferent link between them is given: “World-view becomes a problem for philosophy ina very different way.” 79 This tells us two things: on the one hand philosophy cannotafford being merely a world-view anymore, and, on the other hand, the very essence ofworld-view hence becomes a philosophical problem in itself. This separation thus demandsthat such relationship be understood in a radically different fashion, and that a new kindof philosophy be undertaken. That is to say, that philosophy itself becomes now aproblem. It is now therefore mandatory that an overturning of its essence take place.Heidegger’s new conception of what philosophy ought to be is precisely that which wehave so far analyzed under the name of originary pre-theoretical science. Philosophy isdetermined at its core as an originary science. The main drawback of philosophy as anoriginary science dictates that it be always understood within its tradition as a protephilosophia, prima philosophia, metaphysics, transcendental philosophy (Kant), a sciencedoctrine (Fichte), absolute science (Hegel) or transcendental phenomenology (Husserl).The originary science that Heidegger sought is to be understood as a new radical figureof a Western first philosophy. In other words, the very same intentions that characterizedWestern philosophical thought are also found within the concept of originary science.Those intentions were to guide Heidegger’s thought in each and every one of its latermanifestations, including his Ereignis period.Philosophy as an originary science points to an originary comprehension of life. Thisis the same as a different way of opening life itself. This way is shown as an apprehensionof life, as a ‘deepening of the origin.’ This ‘deepening’ entails three specific features: selfsufficiency,expression, and meaningfulness. It is possible to foretell that within thesethree features the radical characteristics of originary science make themselves known inscience. We have already shown self-sufficiency as a self-grounding of life and its ownaccess. Likewise, the expression of this self-sufficient way of opening is not an external,becomes difficult to see a thing where a name is missing. Fink, Studien, 215.76GA56/57, 12.77GA58, 28. Nevertheless, what Heidegger means by ‘strictness’ [Strenge] in this case is not whatHusserl meant by it. For Heidegger, at least in 1920, ‘strict’ meant: “to focus on the authenticity of life’sreferences within concrete life itself.” GA58, 231. Also see GA58, 137; GA60, 10; GA27, 44.78GA58, 81.79GA56/57, 12.288
synthetic construction. Instead, it is founded in the links of meaning that pervade life aspart of life itself, that is, it’s founded on another “objectivity” that isn’t theoretical:meaningfulness.Translation: Jonathan Camargo289
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various forms of idealist philosoph
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self-givenness (Selbstgegebenheit)
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It must be admitted in this regard
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down and all the way back.” 51 Fo
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Heidegger characterized his own pro
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Heidegger’s transcendental-existe
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perceived world” (PP, 25), Merlea
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in the unreflected, in “perceptio
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Nor would Merleau-Ponty have had an
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a way that we do not all crash into
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“I think” but in “the dialogu
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in existence a “super-abundance o
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crucial “other” in our becoming
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to its being grounded in terms of b
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(“History is this quasi-‘thing
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manner (statistical or regression a
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and they are such, precisely becaus
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interpreted the world, and that the
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is not rationalist or idealist in t
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title Herbert Spiegelberg gave to h
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II.TOWARD A TELOS OF SIGNIFYING COM
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published in Being and Having. 12 T
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inside me which makes me able to re
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or is not existence something that
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ReflectionPhilosophical thought is
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attempt at unification, the reflect
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thereof. And an ethical aspect: tha
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According to Ricoeur, “It is here
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the most meaningful contemporary sw
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ival hermeneutics that we perceive
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more pronounced recoil whereby the
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these structures throughout the who
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By seeking a deeper unity of Dasein
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folds a pre-given set of possibilit
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of experience is correlated to a pa
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explanations of causal events in th
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accept one argument over another. A
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a subtle dialectic between argument
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or warrant an assertion. Such fulfi
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the assertive vehemence of the hist
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positions of the subject. For memor
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attestation slips a plurality, most
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What confidence in the word of othe
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From where, perhaps, the place of t
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Sans le correctif du commandement d
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life), Rembrandt proposes an interp
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only as a place made for oneself as
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III.THE HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY O
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consolidated by terming it an “un
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If our analysis is correct, the “
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The esthesiology of the senses of t
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in certain cases, together with the
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what the touched hand recognizes wh
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heart; a presence where a lived tak
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conceives it, not on the basis of n
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Merleau-Ponty, a form, a relation o
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out in “Eye and Mind.” So, let
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God creates, or better, draws, a
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the “there,” the “one same sp
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free to function more purely as a p
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close grasp of the sleight of the h
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understood both as discursive thoug
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While Henry thus questions “the m
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is able to persist in the undergoin
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“remember,” but not as I would
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intentionally structured self-consc
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life can ultimately be defined in i
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4. THE SUBJECTIVE BODY AND THE IDEA
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and the represented body (the combi
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The Oversight of Life’s OneselfTh
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more than externality and its unfol
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effort if this effort gives rise to
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manifest in the self-givenness of l
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Transcendental affectivity 71 is th
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The pursuit of health, strongly rei
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each the prey of their own pathos.
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According to views held by Gadamer
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and writing - the tools which human
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or disclosedness (Erschlossenheit)
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exclusively from his own point of v
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the same direction as practical wis
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of ‘art’ which still stands bef
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Gadamer’s approach, however, is n
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of biology and physiology, or they
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IV.PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOMENTS IN THE
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Therefore, I would like to concentr
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classical Greek tradition of thinki
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This uneasiness in human beings, wh
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appears in the way of its appearanc
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We can sense such a philosophical d
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the act of interpreting, except whe
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phenomenological development. The p
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II.A Liberation, With a Meeting in
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denken lässt -, sondern das Leben:
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Sinn” 17 and, following this: “
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Wenn ich dieses Buch sehe, sehe ich
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Der christlich-jüdische Gott ist d
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3. A “BETTER” OR JUST “ANOTHE
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if we have two persons, a master an
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V.THE ARCHEOLOGY OF HERMENEUTIC PHE
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cosmic world, and Nietzschean nihil
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absolute lawgiver to any possible
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solitude.” 26 If there is a “hi
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of reason, as far as the single hum
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transcendental reason, 46 pure rati
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and properties of sensible phenomen
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In clear distantiation from his own
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2. HISTORY AS THE OTHER -- NOTES ON
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Page 250 and 251: stood “from itself.” As a resul
Page 252 and 253: makes possible the further interpre
Page 254 and 255: of Being -- already grown into Bein
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Page 258 and 259: into the openness of Being, it diff
Page 260 and 261: We now need to quote a second, well
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Page 264 and 265: Husserl’s ConversionsTheological
Page 266 and 267: And this proved, probably, to be a
Page 268 and 269: Husserl’s Reflective Phenomenolog
Page 270 and 271: to beings of the same nature. But t
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Page 274 and 275: According to Aristotle, intellectio
Page 276 and 277: 6. RIGOR AND ORIGINARITY: THE TRANS
Page 278 and 279: The latter, the nonessential princi
Page 280 and 281: that, for Husserl, every act is ind
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Page 284 and 285: things, we shall comprehend by intu
Page 286 and 287: something,’ is not merely there (
Page 288 and 289: epoché in Husserl become a hermene
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