consolidat<strong>ed</strong> by terming it an “unmistakable withdrawal of phenomena (un retrait àdécouvert des phénomènes), 9 is often <strong>com</strong>par<strong>ed</strong> to the idea of night. As for those who areplung<strong>ed</strong> into night, night is never an object. The darkness surrounds us and touches us, 10eliciting our participation in the intricacies of reversibility and endorsement in a space whichunbalances and disorientates us but is, at the same time, the condition of our situation. Weare referring here to an experience of space that is distance in the closest proximity:proximity, because space envelops me and I am one with it; distance, because I cannotever fully coincide with space.Vitally, the ultimate truth of perceiv<strong>ed</strong> spatial relations depends on whether they subsistin the natural world in non-thematic form, while keeping a sense of interpenetration withthe perceiving subject that corporeally inhabits the world. In this sense, the ghosts ofdream and myth, 11 every human being’s favorite images -- or even the poetic image 12 --may well be seen as so many modes of emphasizing spatial relations as impos<strong>ed</strong> by spaceitself. Many examples could be cit<strong>ed</strong> here, and the search for the presence of space couldbe explor<strong>ed</strong> with each impressive expression that depicts space as a reality which cannot ber<strong>ed</strong>uc<strong>ed</strong> to functional, productive or technical factors, since it equally <strong>com</strong>prises symbols,memory, desires and dreams. One way or another, there is always the ghost of a persistent,underlying question: is the specific character of the human being-in-the-world arelation to space as dwelling, a relation that expresses the inhabiting and the living in andwith the world? Inde<strong>ed</strong>, it is as if, besides a physical and geometrical distance existingbetween me and things, there is also a liv<strong>ed</strong> distance, uniting me to what matters and whatexists for me. The experience of being in space makes us recognize ‘expressive experiences’“before the ‘signification acts’ of theoretical and thetical thought; it is prior to thesignifi<strong>ed</strong> sense, as the expressive sense; prior to the subsumption of the content under theform, the ‘fullness’ of form in the content.” 13On account of all these reasons, liv<strong>ed</strong> space will always remain alien to any philosophicalposition ultimately orient<strong>ed</strong> toward the pure domain of experience, and, therefore, alreadyoblivious of all that is irreflect<strong>ed</strong> and yet nourishes all thinking. It is my contention that9Cf. Jan Patočka, Papiers phénoménologiques (Grenoble: Millon, 1995), 64.10Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie, 328. Cf. Eugène Minkowski, Le temps vécu (Neuchâtel:Delachaux et Niestlé, 1968), 372.11As J. B. Vico had realiz<strong>ed</strong> already, myth is not just an allegorical clothing of truth but a peculiarform of language with which man seeks to over<strong>com</strong>e his original strangeness to the world. This path,open<strong>ed</strong> up by Vico, was later follow<strong>ed</strong> by Ernst Cassirer, who sees myth as an expressive <strong>com</strong>prehension,capable of conveying an ultimate layer, which is an act of assuming an attitude, an act of affection andwill, a dynamic of vital sense. It is in this light that myth can be said to reveal a way of being in the worldroot<strong>ed</strong> in what is affective and impressive, and coloring it in tones of trust, intimacy and care. Thismythical presence in space is discover<strong>ed</strong> at the center of the very presence of space. Cf. Miguel BaptistaPereira, “O Regresso do Mito no Diálogo entre E. Cassirer e M. Heidegger,” Revista Filosófica de Coimbra7 (1995): 7.12Here, we could first concentrate on what is “poetic,” not as meaning the attainment of aestheticenjoyment, but as a sign of something that opens us up toward the world and gives rise to the presenceof things, making us participate in the living mystery of the real and, thereby, in the vital experience ofa space liv<strong>ed</strong> out in its density and untam<strong>ed</strong> brilliance. Yet “poetic” also describes the space that can beexpress<strong>ed</strong> poetically, in other words, a space that consists of a tissue of the symbolic and mythical, acultural entity, a throbbing texture symbolizing itself as enigma, a place containing incarnat<strong>ed</strong> allusionsto each and every possible thing. Cf., for example, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Résumés de cours – Collèg<strong>ed</strong>e France, 1952-1960 (Paris: Gallimard, 1968), 26.13Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie, 337.114
the model of play 14 can help us understand what is at issue here, since being in spaceis to be implicat<strong>ed</strong> in the multiplicity of its symbols and rules. In other words, we cannotbehave toward space as we would toward an external object, we can only participate ina process that draws us to itself and forms us, enveloping us in total fascination andsurprise, and entailing great risk. 152.Words such as mythical, poetic, playful, speak of a space that eludes being measur<strong>ed</strong> orany other kind of calculation; better words may say about space what can only be knownthrough liv<strong>ed</strong> experience. We should, however, take note at this point and discern somethingessential: the “liv<strong>ed</strong>” that is <strong>com</strong>pris<strong>ed</strong> in space is far from representing any kindof psychological experience or any subjectivism that would interpret in individual termswhat <strong>com</strong>es to the human being through the senses. This “liv<strong>ed</strong>,” of space, is not somethingliv<strong>ed</strong> but, rather, the liv<strong>ed</strong> itself, thus translating the very mode of man’s emb<strong>ed</strong>d<strong>ed</strong>nessin the world in terms of an integral presence that reveals a pre-possession of spaceover body. In other words, if there is ‘a liv<strong>ed</strong>’ concerning space, it is what space throwsback at me as a reflection, by way of surmounting the traditional split between interiorand external world. It is as if a very particular mode of being a body (my own body) isthe very place where space gets to be experienc<strong>ed</strong> and express<strong>ed</strong>, i.e., where space <strong>com</strong>esto exist as sense. And this is far from saying too little: the subject as body knows theworld in the act that makes it a body, and the world knows itself in the subject.A body’s belonging to space may be describ<strong>ed</strong> as indwelling, in the sense that the bodyis emb<strong>ed</strong>d<strong>ed</strong> or inlaid in space, “frequents” it, is present to it, simultaneously integratingthat “outside” 16 which is always already an “inside.” Therefore we can discover, in this indwellingwhich is also an intertwining, the body’s responses to the enticement ofthings. 17 From a phenomenological point of view, there are several equally importantimplications to such an assumption. First of all, they allow us to conclude that space putsmy whole body into play, in the same manner that my body puts the whole of space intoplay, given that no other affinity with an external aspect is conceivable here. Moreover,if this is so, it will be equally clear that I am Leib rather than Körper, i.e., a living bodythat, as Marc Richir rightly remarks, never leaves us, 18 being the framework of ourcondition as beings in the world. Finally, we are speaking here of a connection which,being always already “felt,” is then first to be consider<strong>ed</strong> for thematization. Hence it ispossible to affirm, more precisely, that no place could ever be understood, unless it alsowere of an affective or ante-pr<strong>ed</strong>icative character, for body and space are always born inone and the same moment, as well as from each other.14Play, as was shown by E. Fink, is an anthropological category which, by reinstating existence inits rational plenitude, reflects a form of symbolico-metaphorical coincidence of that existence with the totalitywhich animates it. In brief, play is truly an existential act characteriz<strong>ed</strong> by the wel<strong>com</strong>ing and reflectionof the escalating possibilities of the world. Cf. Eugen Fink, Le jeu <strong>com</strong>me symbole du monde (Paris:Minuit, 1966), 22; 138; 228.15Cf. Maria Luísa Portocarrero Silva, “Linguagem, Tradição e Jogo em H.-G. Gadamer,” in MiguelB. Pereira, <strong>ed</strong>., Tradição e Crise (Coimbra: F.L.U.C., 1986), 358ff.16Henri Maldiney, “À l’écoute de Henri Maldiney, à propos de corps et architecture,” in Chris Youènes,Philippe Nys, and Michel Mangematin, <strong>ed</strong>., L’architecture au corps (Bruxelles: Ousia, 1997), 18.17Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie, 161.18Marc Richir, “Corps, espace et architecture,” in Youènes, Nys, and Mangematin, <strong>ed</strong>.,L’architecture au corps, 24.115
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various forms of idealist philosoph
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self-givenness (Selbstgegebenheit)
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It must be admitted in this regard
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down and all the way back.” 51 Fo
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Heidegger characterized his own pro
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Heidegger’s transcendental-existe
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perceived world” (PP, 25), Merlea
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in the unreflected, in “perceptio
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Nor would Merleau-Ponty have had an
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a way that we do not all crash into
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“I think” but in “the dialogu
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in existence a “super-abundance o
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crucial “other” in our becoming
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to its being grounded in terms of b
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(“History is this quasi-‘thing
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manner (statistical or regression a
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and they are such, precisely becaus
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interpreted the world, and that the
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is not rationalist or idealist in t
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title Herbert Spiegelberg gave to h
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II.TOWARD A TELOS OF SIGNIFYING COM
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published in Being and Having. 12 T
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inside me which makes me able to re
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or is not existence something that
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Transcendental affectivity 71 is th
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The pursuit of health, strongly rei
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each the prey of their own pathos.
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According to views held by Gadamer
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and writing - the tools which human
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or disclosedness (Erschlossenheit)
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exclusively from his own point of v
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the same direction as practical wis
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of ‘art’ which still stands bef
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Gadamer’s approach, however, is n
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of biology and physiology, or they
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IV.PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOMENTS IN THE
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Therefore, I would like to concentr
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classical Greek tradition of thinki
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This uneasiness in human beings, wh
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appears in the way of its appearanc
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We can sense such a philosophical d
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the act of interpreting, except whe
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phenomenological development. The p
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II.A Liberation, With a Meeting in
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denken lässt -, sondern das Leben:
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Sinn” 17 and, following this: “
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Wenn ich dieses Buch sehe, sehe ich
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Der christlich-jüdische Gott ist d
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3. A “BETTER” OR JUST “ANOTHE
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if we have two persons, a master an
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V.THE ARCHEOLOGY OF HERMENEUTIC PHE
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cosmic world, and Nietzschean nihil
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absolute lawgiver to any possible
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solitude.” 26 If there is a “hi
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of reason, as far as the single hum
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transcendental reason, 46 pure rati
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and properties of sensible phenomen
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In clear distantiation from his own
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2. HISTORY AS THE OTHER -- NOTES ON
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precisely the accomplishment of phe
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ought as such into the present, it
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educed state. As soon as the reflec
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explicitly in the Vienna lecture, w
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the task and the very environment o
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stood “from itself.” As a resul
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makes possible the further interpre
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of Being -- already grown into Bein
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the Husserlian idea of phenomenolog
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into the openness of Being, it diff
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We now need to quote a second, well
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“knowledge about the world.” In
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Husserl’s ConversionsTheological
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And this proved, probably, to be a
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Husserl’s Reflective Phenomenolog
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to beings of the same nature. But t
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worldlessness of Husserl’s intent
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According to Aristotle, intellectio
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6. RIGOR AND ORIGINARITY: THE TRANS
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The latter, the nonessential princi
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that, for Husserl, every act is ind
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not forget what Husserl meant by a-
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things, we shall comprehend by intu
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something,’ is not merely there (
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epoché in Husserl become a hermene
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When Heidegger characterizes world-