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not participate in causal connections existing in the real world). 6 This implies that theobjectives of phenomenology come down to initiating a cognitive contact with what isdirectly given, without any mediation, “face to face,” so to speak. Therefore, there aremany methods of cognitive “proximity” to objects, many varieties of experience.Husserl did not want to lose an individual’s seeing of reality; facts that are experiencedare objects of conscious experiencing. As a matter of fact, when practicing phenomenology,we are not dealing with what is, but rather with what we see and sense as existing.For this reason, Husserl suggested we follow some procedures (for instance epoché,eidetic reduction), in order to grasp necessary truths that go beyond the casual characterof the natural world. He pointed to the existence of some “timeless ego” in every human,the basis for every experience, which he called “transcendental Ego.” People, when thinking,have this type of assumption-free, pure point of observation. This transcendental idealismof Husserl shows the “power of consciousness,” which constitutes the sense of objects. It isthe “origin” of the evident character of all concepts and all beings. At the same time, itis intentional, and this means that it always refers to phenomena. Consequently, in orderto reach for scientific and “absolute” knowledge, we need to rely on intentional consciousness.Due to Husserl, the scholastic term ens intentionale gained a new meaning. A humanbeing is no longer res corporea, rather, it exists as “open,” united by meaning. Therefore,each phenomenon is a phenomenon for the experiencing subject. Without this relation,there can be no object of cognition. Consciousness is a “miracle of miracles.” It createsthe “sense of the world,” and this means that it constitutes the meaning of things. To behuman means to be able to constitute sense. More specifically: Husserl attributes theconstituting properties to the “transcendental Ego” (not existing in the world), which“grows out of and beyond the world as a mysterious reality.” 7 What is presented as theorigin is given in a fundamental way, depending on “how” it is presented to the experiencingsubject. With consciousness, a philosophical importance attaches to the humaninner experience. And this experience is the area of reflection and philosophical thought(and was so for Husserl, especially in his later years), concerning, among other things,religious issues. As a matter of fact, phenomenology is a philosophy of the inner workings.It directs us to pay attention to the “what” and the “how” of human consciousness. Andit features not only phenomena of sensual experience, but also other types of experience,for instance in the field of ideas. A phenomenologist trusts what he finds, in a direct way,within him or herself; he/she does not have to refer to anything external to consciousness(or against his/her findings). But does the phenomenologist avoid the trap of solipsism?Did Husserl’s assumption of the concept of the “pre-Ego” propel him into areas of thoughtdealing with what is absolute (in the religious sense)? It is hard to give an explicit answer,though Husserl suggested that God could be regarded as the Creator of “sensible matter”as well as the existence and movement of transcendental consciousness. 86See Antoni B. Stępień, “Zagadnienie Boga w fenomenologii (Kilka uwag wstępnych),” in BohdanBejze, ed., Aby poznać Boga i człowieka. Część pierwsza – O Bogu dziś (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo SióstrLoretanek, 1974), 86; Jan Krokos, “Metody fenomenologiczne i ich aktualność. Zarys problemu,” StudiaPhilosophie Christianae 34, no. 2 (1998): 103-111.7See Józef Tischner, Świat ludzkiej nadziei (Kraków: Znak, 1975), 114.8See Halina Perkowska, Bóg filozofów XX wieku. Wybrane koncepcje (Warszawa: PWN, 2001),183.261