[Andrzej_Wiercinski_(ed ... - WordPress.com

Recommendations

Info

say that Marcel’s solution is more simplistic than Heidegger’s. It is true that the metaphorof Light is classic within the Western philosophical tradition, from Plato onwards. Nevertheless,there is an element distinguishing Marcel’s use and the classic use of this metaphor.This metaphor is used by classic metaphysical philosophers to explain that beingsexist only because there is a Being conferring an ontological status on them. On thecontrary, according to Marcel, “There is no way in which we can conceive of being assomething cut off from existence.” 44 Continuing to use our metaphor, we can say that wecan see the light only in beings, which are illuminated by it. In other words, Being is akind of horizon formed by the existences of all beings, of all individuals. Marcel does notdistinguish between Existence and Being. Being is “being in a situation,” and thus isalways changing. Our own mode of Being is being-in-the-world. 45In passing, it is interesting to note that Marcel’s thought is similar to Heidegger’s fromthis point of view, but is different if we consider existence itself. According to Heidegger,my existence is singular and unique because I am an historical being (Dasein), whereasin Marcel’s view my historical collocation is important, but not fundamental: my existenceis singular and unique because I am I, thanks to my self-consciousness, because I see theworld with my eyes.It is clear that, since the beginning of his philosophical work, Marcel confers onexistence and consciousness a value which transcends the mere biological life and eventhe most complex psychic activity. Existence which deals with Being is something more,but Marcel does not demonstrate it; on the contrary, he affirms that it cannot be demonstrated,just because it is not a problem, in the meaning of the word that we have seenbefore; it is not something which deals with the scenario of Having.Is this an act of faith? The answer depends on the point of view. A materialist surelywill answer that it is. For his part, Marcel probably retorts that the materialist is simplyguilty of naivety, as he wants to apply to the sphere of Being a method of survey whichis instead valid only within the sphere of Having. Moreover, scientific thought is universallyvalid just because -- Marcel says -- “science does not speak about the real, but in thethird person.” 46 whereas the thought on Being does not speak but in the first person. 47In this sense, what Marcel demands of his hypothetical materialist interlocutor is towonder if there are not concrete experiences which can lead one to consider the plausibilityof a speech on Being. It is not an act of faith: it is, rather, a wager.But if existence becomes, within Marcel’s thought, the indispensable datum of everyconcrete philosophical reflection, it cannot constitute the backbone of this reflection --otherwise philosophy could fall into vitalism or intuitionism. Therefore, it is necessary tofind a philosophical strategy in order to formulate a thought which is concrete and neverthelessshareable, not merely subjective.(Paris: Aubier, 1955), 147; quoted in Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, 449. About therelationship between Marcel and Heidegger, see Dialogue sur l’espérance, in Gabriel Marcel et la penséeallemande. Nietzsche, Heidegger, Ernst Bloch (Paris: Présence de Gabriel Marcel, 1979).44Marcel, The Mystery of Being, 2: 33.45“Gabriel Marcel seems to have been the first to use the phrase être-au-monde in this sense, i.e.,of “having business with the world” (“avoir affaire au monde”), while expressing his reservations aboutHeidegger’s too “spatializing” conception of être-dans-le-monde (in-der-Welt-sein).” Spiegelberg, ThePhenomenological Movement, 581, note 10.46Marcel, Journal, July 23, 1918.47“Three ideas are condensed here. First, speech in the third person is powerless to say «thou».Second, the recognition of the other is not a second step preceded by the certitude of the cogito, but rathercommunication is constitutive of my very existence. Finally, attesting to the presence of the other dependson my degree of ‘defensiveness’ and therefore on my «unreadiness» or my ‘openness.’” Ricoeur, “GabrielMarcel and Phenomenology,” 484.62
ReflectionPhilosophical thought is reflective. Reflection is the recall or re-examination of experiencein order to understand or to comprehend it. Experience transforms itself into reflection.Reflection, according to Marcel, operates on more than one level. Marcel writes: “thereis primary reflection, and there is also what I shall call secondary reflection.” 48What is first degree reflection? A problem is something I meet, which I find completebefore me, but which I can reduce. Each problem can, in principle, produce verifiable solutions.We have to get sufficient distance from our own, subjective selves, in order to posean objective problem, and thus we can get a verifiable answer. This is basically a phenomenologicalmethod, and Marcel believes that it will drive man to the right position. Butit must also be emphasized that this kind of reflection -- first degree reflection -- “breaks theunity of experience,” as the subject does not enter into the object investigated. It is clearthat Marcel, here, for “subject,” does not mean the body, but the I. When an experiencedeals with my I, I necessarily enter into the object investigated. But first degree reflectiontends to ignore this. If we treat these experiences as problems, first degree reflection tendsto analyze them, dissolving the unity of experience. 49 “Reflection, because it is critical,is cold: it not only puts a bridle on the vital impulses, it freezes them.” 50Second degree reflection occurs when we recognize a break in the continuity of ourexperience: “To reflect, in this kind of case, is to ask oneself how such a break can haveoccurred.” 51 Second degree reflection intervenes when I look back and realize that the“fixity” of the experience (derived from the work of first degree reflection) does not correspondanymore to the real, to the concrete. In this act, a keeping distance from the immediatehappens; and this is the essence of the second degree reflection, and constitutes thecondition of the possibility of thinking a conceptual universality which concedes nothingto the “spirit of abstraction,” but which on the contrary remains anchored to the concrete.Marcel gives a very concrete example of these dynamics: “A man who has been travelingon foot arrives at the edge of a river where the bridge has been carried away by a flood.He has no option but to call a ferryman. In an example such as that which I have just cited,reflection does really play the part of the ferryman. . . . I cannot go on just as if nothinghad happened: there really is something that necessitates an act of readjustment on mypart.” 52 First degree reflection tends to break down the unity of experience, whereas seconddegree reflection tends to restore it: “Roughly, we can say that where primary reflection48Marcel, The Mystery of Being, 1: 83. It is convenient to say something, in passing, about thestandard English translation of the two levels of reflection we are talking about. In French, Marcel callsthem réflexion primaire and réflexion seconde. He does not use secondaire, which would translateperfectly into the English term secondary but means “subordinate,” “dependent.” These are not the meaningsin the French term seconde; in fact, the réflexion seconde is not subordinate to the réflexion primaire:it is sufficient to note that Marcel sometimes defines the réflexion seconde as “reflection to the power oftwo,” which is very far from being “subordinate” or “dependent.” This is the reason why I prefer to translateréflexion primaire and réflexion seconde with “first degree” or “first level” reflection and “seconddegree” or “second level” reflection. I will continue to use “primary” and “secondary reflection” in thequotations. It is interesting to note that Marcel himself, who often used English words or phrasal verbsin order to explain his thought better, considering the English language more “concrete” and more closeto the real, often complained about English translations of his works.49Marcel, The Mystery of Being, 1: 83.50Ibid., 1: 81.51Ibid., 1: 78.52Ibid., 1: 79.63
Page 6 and 7:
various forms of idealist philosoph
Page 8:
self-givenness (Selbstgegebenheit)
Page 12:
It must be admitted in this regard
Page 18 and 19: down and all the way back.” 51 Fo
Page 20 and 21: Heidegger characterized his own pro
Page 22 and 23: Heidegger’s transcendental-existe
Page 24 and 25: perceived world” (PP, 25), Merlea
Page 26 and 27: in the unreflected, in “perceptio
Page 28 and 29: Nor would Merleau-Ponty have had an
Page 32 and 33: a way that we do not all crash into
Page 34 and 35: “I think” but in “the dialogu
Page 36 and 37: in existence a “super-abundance o
Page 38 and 39: crucial “other” in our becoming
Page 40 and 41: to its being grounded in terms of b
Page 42 and 43: (“History is this quasi-‘thing
Page 44 and 45: manner (statistical or regression a
Page 46 and 47: and they are such, precisely becaus
Page 48 and 49: interpreted the world, and that the
Page 50 and 51: is not rationalist or idealist in t
Page 52 and 53: title Herbert Spiegelberg gave to h
Page 55: II.TOWARD A TELOS OF SIGNIFYING COM
Page 59 and 60: published in Being and Having. 12 T
Page 61 and 62: inside me which makes me able to re
Page 63: or is not existence something that
Page 67 and 68: attempt at unification, the reflect
Page 69 and 70: thereof. And an ethical aspect: tha
Page 71 and 72: According to Ricoeur, “It is here
Page 74 and 75: the most meaningful contemporary sw
Page 76 and 77: ival hermeneutics that we perceive
Page 78 and 79: more pronounced recoil whereby the
Page 80 and 81: these structures throughout the who
Page 82 and 83: By seeking a deeper unity of Dasein
Page 84 and 85: folds a pre-given set of possibilit
Page 86 and 87: of experience is correlated to a pa
Page 88 and 89: explanations of causal events in th
Page 90 and 91: accept one argument over another. A
Page 92 and 93: a subtle dialectic between argument
Page 94 and 95: or warrant an assertion. Such fulfi
Page 96 and 97: the assertive vehemence of the hist
Page 98 and 99: positions of the subject. For memor
Page 100 and 101: attestation slips a plurality, most
Page 102 and 103: What confidence in the word of othe
Page 104 and 105: From where, perhaps, the place of t
Page 106 and 107: Sans le correctif du commandement d
Page 108 and 109: life), Rembrandt proposes an interp
Page 110 and 111: only as a place made for oneself as
Page 113: III.THE HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY O
Page 116 and 117:
consolidated by terming it an “un
Page 118 and 119:
If our analysis is correct, the “
Page 120 and 121:
The esthesiology of the senses of t
Page 122 and 123:
in certain cases, together with the
Page 124 and 125:
what the touched hand recognizes wh
Page 126 and 127:
heart; a presence where a lived tak
Page 128 and 129:
conceives it, not on the basis of n
Page 130 and 131:
Merleau-Ponty, a form, a relation o
Page 132 and 133:
out in “Eye and Mind.” So, let
Page 134 and 135:
God creates, or better, draws, a
Page 136 and 137:
the “there,” the “one same sp
Page 138 and 139:
free to function more purely as a p
Page 140 and 141:
close grasp of the sleight of the h
Page 142 and 143:
understood both as discursive thoug
Page 144 and 145:
While Henry thus questions “the m
Page 146 and 147:
is able to persist in the undergoin
Page 148 and 149:
“remember,” but not as I would
Page 150 and 151:
intentionally structured self-consc
Page 152 and 153:
life can ultimately be defined in i
Page 154 and 155:
4. THE SUBJECTIVE BODY AND THE IDEA
Page 156 and 157:
and the represented body (the combi
Page 158 and 159:
The Oversight of Life’s OneselfTh
Page 160 and 161:
more than externality and its unfol
Page 162 and 163:
effort if this effort gives rise to
Page 164 and 165:
manifest in the self-givenness of l
Page 166 and 167:
Transcendental affectivity 71 is th
Page 168 and 169:
The pursuit of health, strongly rei
Page 170 and 171:
each the prey of their own pathos.
Page 172 and 173:
According to views held by Gadamer
Page 174 and 175:
and writing - the tools which human
Page 176 and 177:
or disclosedness (Erschlossenheit)
Page 178 and 179:
exclusively from his own point of v
Page 180 and 181:
the same direction as practical wis
Page 182 and 183:
of ‘art’ which still stands bef
Page 184 and 185:
Gadamer’s approach, however, is n
Page 186 and 187:
of biology and physiology, or they
Page 189:
IV.PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOMENTS IN THE
Page 192 and 193:
Therefore, I would like to concentr
Page 194 and 195:
classical Greek tradition of thinki
Page 196 and 197:
This uneasiness in human beings, wh
Page 198 and 199:
appears in the way of its appearanc
Page 200 and 201:
We can sense such a philosophical d
Page 202 and 203:
the act of interpreting, except whe
Page 204 and 205:
phenomenological development. The p
Page 206 and 207:
II.A Liberation, With a Meeting in
Page 208 and 209:
denken lässt -, sondern das Leben:
Page 210 and 211:
Sinn” 17 and, following this: “
Page 212 and 213:
Wenn ich dieses Buch sehe, sehe ich
Page 214 and 215:
Der christlich-jüdische Gott ist d
Page 216 and 217:
3. A “BETTER” OR JUST “ANOTHE
Page 218 and 219:
if we have two persons, a master an
Page 221:
V.THE ARCHEOLOGY OF HERMENEUTIC PHE
Page 224 and 225:
cosmic world, and Nietzschean nihil
Page 226 and 227:
absolute lawgiver to any possible
Page 228 and 229:
solitude.” 26 If there is a “hi
Page 230 and 231:
of reason, as far as the single hum
Page 232 and 233:
transcendental reason, 46 pure rati
Page 234 and 235:
and properties of sensible phenomen
Page 236 and 237:
In clear distantiation from his own
Page 238 and 239:
2. HISTORY AS THE OTHER -- NOTES ON
Page 240 and 241:
precisely the accomplishment of phe
Page 242 and 243:
ought as such into the present, it
Page 244 and 245:
educed state. As soon as the reflec
Page 246 and 247:
explicitly in the Vienna lecture, w
Page 248 and 249:
the task and the very environment o
Page 250 and 251:
stood “from itself.” As a resul
Page 252 and 253:
makes possible the further interpre
Page 254 and 255:
of Being -- already grown into Bein
Page 256 and 257:
the Husserlian idea of phenomenolog
Page 258 and 259:
into the openness of Being, it diff
Page 260 and 261:
We now need to quote a second, well
Page 262 and 263:
“knowledge about the world.” In
Page 264 and 265:
Husserl’s ConversionsTheological
Page 266 and 267:
And this proved, probably, to be a
Page 268 and 269:
Husserl’s Reflective Phenomenolog
Page 270 and 271:
to beings of the same nature. But t
Page 272 and 273:
worldlessness of Husserl’s intent
Page 274 and 275:
According to Aristotle, intellectio
Page 276 and 277:
6. RIGOR AND ORIGINARITY: THE TRANS
Page 278 and 279:
The latter, the nonessential princi
Page 280 and 281:
that, for Husserl, every act is ind
Page 282 and 283:
not forget what Husserl meant by a-
Page 284 and 285:
things, we shall comprehend by intu
Page 286 and 287:
something,’ is not merely there (
Page 288 and 289:
epoché in Husserl become a hermene
Page 290 and 291:
When Heidegger characterizes world-
show all

[Andrzej_Wiercinski_(ed ... - WordPress.com

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?