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not forget what Husserl meant by a-theoretical pre-theoretical, in order to set proper limitsto the slogan of Heidegger’s “originary a-theoretical science.”Pre-theoretical,’ when used by Husserl, can be understood in the following way: Onthe one hand, ‘pre-theoretical’ refers to the fundamental feature of the natural attitude, inwhich the general thesis of the world’s ‘being-there-simply-for-me’ and mundane thingsis valid. An attitude shift from naïveté to the transcendental realm by means of reductionand phenomenological epoché can also be understood as a shift from pre-scientific to ascientific attitude. Only through the discovery of transcendentalism can the world and themundane thing cease to be merely a theme for discussion. Scientific work as such needsto sort out what is otherwise merely discussed. On the other hand, we have discoveredpre-theoreticality in a pre-transcendental level in the LU, at the point where phenomenologyis, so to speak, sorted away from any particular science. Phenomenology is not scientificin the way explicative or descriptive sciences are, but rather, and to put it in Kantianterms, it is focused on the conditions of possibility of knowledge of whatever be regardedas ‘scientific.’ This is why Husserl says that particular sciences are rooted in phenomenology.The first meaning of ‘pre-theoretical’ points to a transition, the transition from prescientificityto scientificity. This can be regarded thus as the ‘thematic transition.’Something being scientific shows therefore that phenomena as such pertain only to thetranscendental realm, as that is where they become properly thematic. 38The second meaning of pre-theoretical points to an essential structure or determinationof Husserlian phenomenology, and philosophy in general. These must not be mistaken forany particular science, not even psychology. Phenomenology entails rather its own wayof being determined throughout a search to comprehend how the world is constituted. Itis originally pre-scientific, as it establishes the groundwork for particular sciences.However, both meanings of ‘pre-scientific’ are to be understood within the frameworkof their determining scope: theoreticality. Pre-scientificity (understood as pre-phenomenologicality),it being a step toward scientificity (as phenomenologicality), has already beendetermined theoretically, as stated above. Pre-scientific life, within the natural attitude,can’t be the same thing as pre-theoretical factual life. It is, rather, pre-scientific lifeassumed in a theoretical fashion.The pre-scientific aspect of phenomenology, inasmuch as it founds particular sciences,can be found also within a theoretical framework. As a matter of fact, Husserl sees thisas a strengthening of the scientificity of particular sciences. That’s why he would laterspeak of prescientificity as a ‘theory of theory.’ 39 Heidegger’s achievement is thereforea radical overturning of this theoretically coined scientificity. This radicalism is shown inthe concept of ‘originary a-theoretical science.’ In this light, we can already tell thatwhatever Heidegger called ‘originary a-theoretical science,’ is neither pre-scientificity asunderstood by the ‘natural attitude’ nor in the way it is understood by the theoreticalstructure of Husserlian phenomenology.38See Eugen Fink, “Reflexionen zu Husserls phänomenologischer Reduktion,” in idem, Nähe undDistanz (Freiburg i.Br.: Alber, 1976), 113. In that work, Fink demonstrates that we can truly speak ofthree concepts of ‘phenomenon’ in Husserl. The first of these must be understood as the thing groundedwithin its appearing. The second is the result of the eidetic reduction, that is, its essence. And the thirdis what remains after the phenomenological reduction and the epoché have taken place, that is, the thingin its neutrality.39Hua XIX/1, A 21.280