more than externality and its unfolding, when it is no longer something alive, and that bywhich it is life is lost sight of, deni<strong>ed</strong> or conceal<strong>ed</strong>, and this by philosophy and sciencealike, then the former has no lesson to remind the latter, they both live in the same oblivion,in the same stupor in the face of what is in front, which only qualifies as being intheir eyes. (…) It is also necessary to understand this subjectivity as life, in such a waythat the transcendental contributions which make up, or rather are, science let themselvesbe recognis<strong>ed</strong> as modes of absolute life, for the same reasons as the creations of art, forinstance, and in the same way as cultural phenomena for the same reasons as artisticphenomena.” 37Michel Henry’s critique to the egological character of phenomenology is direct<strong>ed</strong> at itsinsufficiency in over<strong>com</strong>ing the “illusions” of the transcendental and empirical subject.The critique of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty is bas<strong>ed</strong> on the idea of the founding absenceof the “Oneself” (Soi), that is, in Henry’s phenomenology of life the fundamental issue isthat of the transcendental “Oneself” which allows us to say “I” and “Myself” (Soi). The“Self” is something affect<strong>ed</strong> as “Oneself” without distance, without the power of selfdetachment,without the power to escape the deepest layers of its being. “Ontologicalmonism” -- the philosophy that upholds that nothing is given to us except inside andthrough the m<strong>ed</strong>iation of the transcendental horizon of the being in general, 38 thatsubordinates the given, such as it is, to the order of transcendence or externality -- rest<strong>ed</strong>on this illusion of an ontological homogeneity between the plane of immanence, that ofLife, and the plane of transcendence, that of Being. Echoing the concerns of Maine deBiran, who replac<strong>ed</strong> a classic and empirical psychology for a subjective ideology ortranscendental phenomenology, 39 Michel Henry breaks away from the whole tradition ofwhat he characterizes as ontological monism. The critique of ontological monism enablesthe unveiling of the subjective dimension of the body and its analysis enables the characterizationof this absolute subjectivity on which all existence is dependent. According toHenry, in a phenomenological ontology the issue of our primary knowl<strong>ed</strong>ge of the bodyis, simultaneously, the issue of the ontological nature of the body itself since, in such ontology,the appearance is the measure of the being. 40 Distancing himself from Heidegger,Henry defends a material phenomenology whose objective is that of discerning, withinpure appearance and under the phenomenality of the visible, a deeper dimension in whichlife attains itself before the emergence of the world. 41 To think sensations, affections, affectivity,thoughts, phenomenologically implies that the dimension of the bodiless psyche orof the interpretation of the issue of the body (physical body on the one hand, and psychicalbody on the other) is over<strong>com</strong>e. It is necessary to hold in suspension all non-reflect<strong>ed</strong>and non-criticiz<strong>ed</strong> pre-determination of the “prejudice” about the soul and the body, tostrive to think without a pre-given frame of reference. The chasm meanwhile creat<strong>ed</strong>between the somatic and the mathematical overlooks two fundamental dimensions of thesingular experience of “being alive,” the flesh and the ego, which, by their very nature,are not the object of scientific knowl<strong>ed</strong>ge. As Merleau-Ponty stat<strong>ed</strong>, we strive to think the37Henry, La Barbarie, 105-106.38Michel Henry, Philosophie et phénoménologie du corps (Paris: Puf, 2003), 20.39Ibid., 22.40“L’édification d’une telle phénoménologie va de pair avec la constitution d’une ontologie de lasubjectivité. … C’est parce que toutes les intentionnalités générales et, par suite, les intentionnalités essentiellesde la conscience se connaissent originairement dans l’immanence de leur être même et dans leurac<strong>com</strong>plissement immédiat que nous sommes capables de les nommer et d’en acquérir l’idée.” Ibid., 22.41“Discerner au sein même du pur apparaître et sous la phénoménalité du visible, une dimensionplus profonde où la vie s’atteint elle-même avant le surgissement du monde.” Henry, La Généalogie dela psychanalyse, 7.158
“liv<strong>ed</strong> body,” the “incarnat<strong>ed</strong> living,” from within, intrinsically, the “excess” in theaffection itself, without reference to the having or the being, but not without reference tothe who. The pure object (which intellectualism and realism want to r<strong>ed</strong>uce to own-body)is itself a horizon since it is remov<strong>ed</strong> from a purely representative consciousness. This isa fertile idea, in terms of the issue of the body, since it reveals to us the deep reasons forwhich the character specific to the body was mostly overlook<strong>ed</strong> in favor of a pure andsimple r<strong>ed</strong>uction of the body to the external object: “As regards the theory of the body,ontological monism had this decisive consequence of constantly preventing philosophicalreflection from rising to the idea of the subjective body. The body, a real element in theeffectiveness of the being in general, was necessarily something transcendent. Thusr<strong>ed</strong>uc<strong>ed</strong> to its subjective manifestation, what constitutes its essential being, i.e., the subjectivebody as inner transcendental experience of the movement, as well as the feeling,was mutilat<strong>ed</strong>.” 42 Now, if the experience of the body is that of a reality that I do not have,but am, then it belongs originally to the sphere of existence which is subjectivity itself. 43Not only is the body not an object amongst others, but it is not an object at all, i.e., itdoes not belong, in any way, to the order of exteriority. The issue of the fair distancebetween the “self” and its body 44 is express<strong>ed</strong> by the contribution of phenomenology tothe discovery of the subjective body which is at the origin of experience, but which,according to Henry, restrict<strong>ed</strong> its investigation to the relationship of this sensing body withwhat it senses, understanding it as an intentional relationship: “The body, which is the realsubject of knowl<strong>ed</strong>ge, knows other bodies by relating intentionally to them. Consciousnessis the setting of this fundamental overflow by which it always throws itself out into aworld, into other bodies and its own. If we keep the word subjectivity, it must be said thatmodern phenomenology interprets our subjective body as an intentional body because ithas already interpret<strong>ed</strong> subjectivity as an intentional subjectivity.” 45Biranian thinking on the body had already determin<strong>ed</strong> the cogito as a power of production,updating the radical insufficiency of those philosophies which tri<strong>ed</strong> to constitute the bodyas an object, particularly Cartesian philosophy: “The Cartesian cogito should thereforeundergo a radical change in value to adapt to the demands of the fundamental trend ofBiranian thought. It would have to sh<strong>ed</strong> this immobility of substance-thought to be<strong>com</strong>e,on the contrary, the very experience of an effort in its fulfilment, an effort with which,according to Biran, the very being of the self begins and ends.” 46 The hand (cf. Étienn<strong>ed</strong>e Condillac) is an example of the knowl<strong>ed</strong>ge of own-body: constantly direct<strong>ed</strong>, it knowsitself first through the experience of a power of production. As an instrument, it revealsitself within a power of prehension which cannot be given in the element of exteriority.The knowl<strong>ed</strong>ge of the hand by itself is effect<strong>ed</strong> in the effort as pure auto-affection. Whatis specific to the effort is that it is given to itself without exteriority: the “content” whichaffects the effort is no more than the effort itself or, in other words, the being of the effort isthis profound cohesion with itself, this impossibility of self-detachment, pure immanence,auto-affection, this presence unto oneself, without distance. In the effort, I propel a movementthat is such that I do not detach myself from it: the “self” is only at the root of the42Ibid., 261.43“Le corps, dans sa nature originaire, appartient à la sphère d’existence qui est celle de lasubjectivité elle-même.” Ibid., 11.44Xavier Thévenot, “L’Église et le corps. Axes de recherches,” Cahiers Universitaires Catholiques2 (1991): 15.45Henry, Auto-donation, 88.46Ibid., 72; “Cette pensée primitive, substantielle, qui est censée constituer toute mon existenceindividuelle, … je la trouve identifiée dans sa source avec le sentiment d’une action ou d’un effort voulu.”Ibid.159
- Page 6 and 7:
various forms of idealist philosoph
- Page 8:
self-givenness (Selbstgegebenheit)
- Page 12:
It must be admitted in this regard
- Page 18 and 19:
down and all the way back.” 51 Fo
- Page 20 and 21:
Heidegger characterized his own pro
- Page 22 and 23:
Heidegger’s transcendental-existe
- Page 24 and 25:
perceived world” (PP, 25), Merlea
- Page 26 and 27:
in the unreflected, in “perceptio
- Page 28 and 29:
Nor would Merleau-Ponty have had an
- Page 32 and 33:
a way that we do not all crash into
- Page 34 and 35:
“I think” but in “the dialogu
- Page 36 and 37:
in existence a “super-abundance o
- Page 38 and 39:
crucial “other” in our becoming
- Page 40 and 41:
to its being grounded in terms of b
- Page 42 and 43:
(“History is this quasi-‘thing
- Page 44 and 45:
manner (statistical or regression a
- Page 46 and 47:
and they are such, precisely becaus
- Page 48 and 49:
interpreted the world, and that the
- Page 50 and 51:
is not rationalist or idealist in t
- Page 52 and 53:
title Herbert Spiegelberg gave to h
- Page 55:
II.TOWARD A TELOS OF SIGNIFYING COM
- Page 59 and 60:
published in Being and Having. 12 T
- Page 61 and 62:
inside me which makes me able to re
- Page 63 and 64:
or is not existence something that
- Page 65 and 66:
ReflectionPhilosophical thought is
- Page 67 and 68:
attempt at unification, the reflect
- Page 69 and 70:
thereof. And an ethical aspect: tha
- Page 71 and 72:
According to Ricoeur, “It is here
- Page 74 and 75:
the most meaningful contemporary sw
- Page 76 and 77:
ival hermeneutics that we perceive
- Page 78 and 79:
more pronounced recoil whereby the
- Page 80 and 81:
these structures throughout the who
- Page 82 and 83:
By seeking a deeper unity of Dasein
- Page 84 and 85:
folds a pre-given set of possibilit
- Page 86 and 87:
of experience is correlated to a pa
- Page 88 and 89:
explanations of causal events in th
- Page 90 and 91:
accept one argument over another. A
- Page 92 and 93:
a subtle dialectic between argument
- Page 94 and 95:
or warrant an assertion. Such fulfi
- Page 96 and 97:
the assertive vehemence of the hist
- Page 98 and 99:
positions of the subject. For memor
- Page 100 and 101:
attestation slips a plurality, most
- Page 102 and 103:
What confidence in the word of othe
- Page 104 and 105:
From where, perhaps, the place of t
- Page 106 and 107:
Sans le correctif du commandement d
- Page 108 and 109:
life), Rembrandt proposes an interp
- Page 110 and 111: only as a place made for oneself as
- Page 113: III.THE HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY O
- Page 116 and 117: consolidated by terming it an “un
- Page 118 and 119: If our analysis is correct, the “
- Page 120 and 121: The esthesiology of the senses of t
- Page 122 and 123: in certain cases, together with the
- Page 124 and 125: what the touched hand recognizes wh
- Page 126 and 127: heart; a presence where a lived tak
- Page 128 and 129: conceives it, not on the basis of n
- Page 130 and 131: Merleau-Ponty, a form, a relation o
- Page 132 and 133: out in “Eye and Mind.” So, let
- Page 134 and 135: God creates, or better, draws, a
- Page 136 and 137: the “there,” the “one same sp
- Page 138 and 139: free to function more purely as a p
- Page 140 and 141: close grasp of the sleight of the h
- Page 142 and 143: understood both as discursive thoug
- Page 144 and 145: While Henry thus questions “the m
- Page 146 and 147: is able to persist in the undergoin
- Page 148 and 149: “remember,” but not as I would
- Page 150 and 151: intentionally structured self-consc
- Page 152 and 153: life can ultimately be defined in i
- Page 154 and 155: 4. THE SUBJECTIVE BODY AND THE IDEA
- Page 156 and 157: and the represented body (the combi
- Page 158 and 159: The Oversight of Life’s OneselfTh
- Page 162 and 163: effort if this effort gives rise to
- Page 164 and 165: manifest in the self-givenness of l
- Page 166 and 167: Transcendental affectivity 71 is th
- Page 168 and 169: The pursuit of health, strongly rei
- Page 170 and 171: each the prey of their own pathos.
- Page 172 and 173: According to views held by Gadamer
- Page 174 and 175: and writing - the tools which human
- Page 176 and 177: or disclosedness (Erschlossenheit)
- Page 178 and 179: exclusively from his own point of v
- Page 180 and 181: the same direction as practical wis
- Page 182 and 183: of ‘art’ which still stands bef
- Page 184 and 185: Gadamer’s approach, however, is n
- Page 186 and 187: of biology and physiology, or they
- Page 189: IV.PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOMENTS IN THE
- Page 192 and 193: Therefore, I would like to concentr
- Page 194 and 195: classical Greek tradition of thinki
- Page 196 and 197: This uneasiness in human beings, wh
- Page 198 and 199: appears in the way of its appearanc
- Page 200 and 201: We can sense such a philosophical d
- Page 202 and 203: the act of interpreting, except whe
- Page 204 and 205: phenomenological development. The p
- Page 206 and 207: II.A Liberation, With a Meeting in
- Page 208 and 209: denken lässt -, sondern das Leben:
- Page 210 and 211:
Sinn” 17 and, following this: “
- Page 212 and 213:
Wenn ich dieses Buch sehe, sehe ich
- Page 214 and 215:
Der christlich-jüdische Gott ist d
- Page 216 and 217:
3. A “BETTER” OR JUST “ANOTHE
- Page 218 and 219:
if we have two persons, a master an
- Page 221:
V.THE ARCHEOLOGY OF HERMENEUTIC PHE
- Page 224 and 225:
cosmic world, and Nietzschean nihil
- Page 226 and 227:
absolute lawgiver to any possible
- Page 228 and 229:
solitude.” 26 If there is a “hi
- Page 230 and 231:
of reason, as far as the single hum
- Page 232 and 233:
transcendental reason, 46 pure rati
- Page 234 and 235:
and properties of sensible phenomen
- Page 236 and 237:
In clear distantiation from his own
- Page 238 and 239:
2. HISTORY AS THE OTHER -- NOTES ON
- Page 240 and 241:
precisely the accomplishment of phe
- Page 242 and 243:
ought as such into the present, it
- Page 244 and 245:
educed state. As soon as the reflec
- Page 246 and 247:
explicitly in the Vienna lecture, w
- Page 248 and 249:
the task and the very environment o
- Page 250 and 251:
stood “from itself.” As a resul
- Page 252 and 253:
makes possible the further interpre
- Page 254 and 255:
of Being -- already grown into Bein
- Page 256 and 257:
the Husserlian idea of phenomenolog
- Page 258 and 259:
into the openness of Being, it diff
- Page 260 and 261:
We now need to quote a second, well
- Page 262 and 263:
“knowledge about the world.” In
- Page 264 and 265:
Husserl’s ConversionsTheological
- Page 266 and 267:
And this proved, probably, to be a
- Page 268 and 269:
Husserl’s Reflective Phenomenolog
- Page 270 and 271:
to beings of the same nature. But t
- Page 272 and 273:
worldlessness of Husserl’s intent
- Page 274 and 275:
According to Aristotle, intellectio
- Page 276 and 277:
6. RIGOR AND ORIGINARITY: THE TRANS
- Page 278 and 279:
The latter, the nonessential princi
- Page 280 and 281:
that, for Husserl, every act is ind
- Page 282 and 283:
not forget what Husserl meant by a-
- Page 284 and 285:
things, we shall comprehend by intu
- Page 286 and 287:
something,’ is not merely there (
- Page 288 and 289:
epoché in Husserl become a hermene
- Page 290 and 291:
When Heidegger characterizes world-