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not forget what Husserl meant by a-theoretical pre-theoretical, in order to set proper limitsto the slogan of Heidegger’s “originary a-theoretical science.”Pre-theoretical,’ when used by Husserl, can be understood in the following way: Onthe one hand, ‘pre-theoretical’ refers to the fundamental feature of the natural attitude, inwhich the general thesis of the world’s ‘being-there-simply-for-me’ and mundane thingsis valid. An attitude shift from naïveté to the transcendental realm by means of reductionand phenomenological epoché can also be understood as a shift from pre-scientific to ascientific attitude. Only through the discovery of transcendentalism can the world and themundane thing cease to be merely a theme for discussion. Scientific work as such needsto sort out what is otherwise merely discussed. On the other hand, we have discoveredpre-theoreticality in a pre-transcendental level in the LU, at the point where phenomenologyis, so to speak, sorted away from any particular science. Phenomenology is not scientificin the way explicative or descriptive sciences are, but rather, and to put it in Kantianterms, it is focused on the conditions of possibility of knowledge of whatever be regardedas ‘scientific.’ This is why Husserl says that particular sciences are rooted in phenomenology.The first meaning of ‘pre-theoretical’ points to a transition, the transition from prescientificityto scientificity. This can be regarded thus as the ‘thematic transition.’Something being scientific shows therefore that phenomena as such pertain only to thetranscendental realm, as that is where they become properly thematic. 38The second meaning of pre-theoretical points to an essential structure or determinationof Husserlian phenomenology, and philosophy in general. These must not be mistaken forany particular science, not even psychology. Phenomenology entails rather its own wayof being determined throughout a search to comprehend how the world is constituted. Itis originally pre-scientific, as it establishes the groundwork for particular sciences.However, both meanings of ‘pre-scientific’ are to be understood within the frameworkof their determining scope: theoreticality. Pre-scientificity (understood as pre-phenomenologicality),it being a step toward scientificity (as phenomenologicality), has already beendetermined theoretically, as stated above. Pre-scientific life, within the natural attitude,can’t be the same thing as pre-theoretical factual life. It is, rather, pre-scientific lifeassumed in a theoretical fashion.The pre-scientific aspect of phenomenology, inasmuch as it founds particular sciences,can be found also within a theoretical framework. As a matter of fact, Husserl sees thisas a strengthening of the scientificity of particular sciences. That’s why he would laterspeak of prescientificity as a ‘theory of theory.’ 39 Heidegger’s achievement is thereforea radical overturning of this theoretically coined scientificity. This radicalism is shown inthe concept of ‘originary a-theoretical science.’ In this light, we can already tell thatwhatever Heidegger called ‘originary a-theoretical science,’ is neither pre-scientificity asunderstood by the ‘natural attitude’ nor in the way it is understood by the theoreticalstructure of Husserlian phenomenology.38See Eugen Fink, “Reflexionen zu Husserls phänomenologischer Reduktion,” in idem, Nähe undDistanz (Freiburg i.Br.: Alber, 1976), 113. In that work, Fink demonstrates that we can truly speak ofthree concepts of ‘phenomenon’ in Husserl. The first of these must be understood as the thing groundedwithin its appearing. The second is the result of the eidetic reduction, that is, its essence. And the thirdis what remains after the phenomenological reduction and the epoché have taken place, that is, the thingin its neutrality.39Hua XIX/1, A 21.280
) ‘Science’ in ‘Originary Science,’ Understood As Methodical CharacterizationFrom the start, science is understood as knowledge; that is, as knowledge of objectsor of a certain realm. It’s been so far shown that for Husserl science obtains its scientificstatus by knowing its groundwork and through a unifying principle. However, philosophyis geared toward clearing up knowledge in itself, and toward the mutual relationshipbetween knowledge and that which is known. Therefore, we can feature the structure ofHusserlian phenomenology as pre-scientific, as it points specifically to the conditions ofpossibility of knowledge.With this in mind, we ought to pose the question regarding whether science as‘originary science’ has that same meaning for Heidegger, that is, to direct itself towardthe condition of possibility of knowledge. We can thus say that by keeping the conceptof ‘science,’ Heidegger refers to something that stands in a given relationship withknowledge. It will later be shown, by Heidegger, that knowledge is something groundedon the originary realm of life and life experiences, in the life experience of the surroundingworld. The apparent obviousness of the scientific determined by theoretical knowledgeis followed to its origin, that is, radicalized through a more originary scientificity. Thisway, the relation with knowledge expressed by the concept ‘science’ is a questionedrelation instead of being an understood founding relation. If knowledge is to be revealedas founding through a radical, originary science, the question about how this originaryscience should take place arises. Could it possibly be without knowledge? Were this tobe the case, originary science wouldn’t have any scientific-methodical features and itwould thus become, as some improper interpretations would want it, irrationality ormysticism. 40 We will therefore state without hesitation that originary science isscientifically and methodologically directed, in so far as it entails ‘knowledge.’ It is nota mystical or mythical construction, but instead, radically scientific. Its knowledge is moreoriginary and radical than the knowledge of a theory of knowledge or of the conditionsof possibility of transcendental philosophy. If we comprehend the scientific with regardto knowledge, the originary scientific will be as well understood as originary knowledge.How should that be understood?It has already been said that for Husserl it is necessary that phenomenology entailspecifically theoretical-cognitive features, owing to the fact that intuition is understood byhim as knowledge. This way, the manner in which something is seen has been determinedtheoretically beforehand. Further ahead we shall see that this yields a deformalizing of themain phenomenological principle. If Heidegger, however, tries to show the foundedfeatures of knowledge through the idea of an originary science, this means, thus, thatHusserlian intuition should already be a founded intuition. “Intuition” is shown forHeidegger then as the most originary founding ground, that is, even more originary thanthe theoretic-cognitive intuition. Its source of knowledge would not be a theoreticalintuition, but rather a comprehending intuition. The comprehending intuition would bemore originary than the theoretical one, inasmuch as the latter would always be amodification of the former. Heidegger already had this theory of comprehension in mindeven as he gave his first course as Privatdozent: “Instead of an exhaustive knowledge of40Irrationalism only makes sense if it is opposed to rationalism. If this opposition is surpassed,which is in itself theoretical knowledge, this objection becomes pointless. On the other hand, mysticismpoints to the object’s opening into subject, that is, the lack of a boundary between them. This objectionmisses the mark as well, as in originary science the concept of science is understood in a completelymethodological fashion. That is, there is no mystical fusion of the object with the subject in originaryscience. Rather, originary science goes beyond this difference and shows that the origin of such adifference is a theory of knowledge grounded upon subjects and objects.281
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various forms of idealist philosoph
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self-givenness (Selbstgegebenheit)
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It must be admitted in this regard
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down and all the way back.” 51 Fo
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Heidegger characterized his own pro
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Heidegger’s transcendental-existe
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perceived world” (PP, 25), Merlea
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in the unreflected, in “perceptio
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Nor would Merleau-Ponty have had an
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a way that we do not all crash into
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“I think” but in “the dialogu
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in existence a “super-abundance o
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crucial “other” in our becoming
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to its being grounded in terms of b
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(“History is this quasi-‘thing
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manner (statistical or regression a
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and they are such, precisely becaus
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interpreted the world, and that the
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is not rationalist or idealist in t
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title Herbert Spiegelberg gave to h
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II.TOWARD A TELOS OF SIGNIFYING COM
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published in Being and Having. 12 T
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inside me which makes me able to re
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or is not existence something that
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ReflectionPhilosophical thought is
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attempt at unification, the reflect
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thereof. And an ethical aspect: tha
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According to Ricoeur, “It is here
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the most meaningful contemporary sw
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ival hermeneutics that we perceive
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more pronounced recoil whereby the
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these structures throughout the who
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By seeking a deeper unity of Dasein
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folds a pre-given set of possibilit
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of experience is correlated to a pa
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explanations of causal events in th
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accept one argument over another. A
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a subtle dialectic between argument
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or warrant an assertion. Such fulfi
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the assertive vehemence of the hist
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positions of the subject. For memor
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attestation slips a plurality, most
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What confidence in the word of othe
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From where, perhaps, the place of t
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Sans le correctif du commandement d
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life), Rembrandt proposes an interp
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only as a place made for oneself as
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III.THE HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY O
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consolidated by terming it an “un
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If our analysis is correct, the “
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The esthesiology of the senses of t
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in certain cases, together with the
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what the touched hand recognizes wh
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heart; a presence where a lived tak
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conceives it, not on the basis of n
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Merleau-Ponty, a form, a relation o
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out in “Eye and Mind.” So, let
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God creates, or better, draws, a
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the “there,” the “one same sp
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free to function more purely as a p
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close grasp of the sleight of the h
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understood both as discursive thoug
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While Henry thus questions “the m
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is able to persist in the undergoin
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“remember,” but not as I would
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intentionally structured self-consc
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life can ultimately be defined in i
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4. THE SUBJECTIVE BODY AND THE IDEA
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and the represented body (the combi
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The Oversight of Life’s OneselfTh
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more than externality and its unfol
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effort if this effort gives rise to
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manifest in the self-givenness of l
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Transcendental affectivity 71 is th
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The pursuit of health, strongly rei
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each the prey of their own pathos.
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According to views held by Gadamer
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and writing - the tools which human
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or disclosedness (Erschlossenheit)
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exclusively from his own point of v
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the same direction as practical wis
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of ‘art’ which still stands bef
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Gadamer’s approach, however, is n
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of biology and physiology, or they
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IV.PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOMENTS IN THE
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Therefore, I would like to concentr
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classical Greek tradition of thinki
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This uneasiness in human beings, wh
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appears in the way of its appearanc
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We can sense such a philosophical d
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the act of interpreting, except whe
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phenomenological development. The p
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II.A Liberation, With a Meeting in
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denken lässt -, sondern das Leben:
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Sinn” 17 and, following this: “
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Wenn ich dieses Buch sehe, sehe ich
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Der christlich-jüdische Gott ist d
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3. A “BETTER” OR JUST “ANOTHE
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if we have two persons, a master an
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V.THE ARCHEOLOGY OF HERMENEUTIC PHE
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cosmic world, and Nietzschean nihil
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absolute lawgiver to any possible
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solitude.” 26 If there is a “hi
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of reason, as far as the single hum
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Page 236 and 237: In clear distantiation from his own
Page 238 and 239: 2. HISTORY AS THE OTHER -- NOTES ON
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Page 244 and 245: educed state. As soon as the reflec
Page 246 and 247: explicitly in the Vienna lecture, w
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Page 250 and 251: stood “from itself.” As a resul
Page 252 and 253: makes possible the further interpre
Page 254 and 255: of Being -- already grown into Bein
Page 256 and 257: the Husserlian idea of phenomenolog
Page 258 and 259: into the openness of Being, it diff
Page 260 and 261: We now need to quote a second, well
Page 262 and 263: “knowledge about the world.” In
Page 264 and 265: Husserl’s ConversionsTheological
Page 266 and 267: And this proved, probably, to be a
Page 268 and 269: Husserl’s Reflective Phenomenolog
Page 270 and 271: to beings of the same nature. But t
Page 272 and 273: worldlessness of Husserl’s intent
Page 274 and 275: According to Aristotle, intellectio
Page 276 and 277: 6. RIGOR AND ORIGINARITY: THE TRANS
Page 278 and 279: The latter, the nonessential princi
Page 280 and 281: that, for Husserl, every act is ind
Page 284 and 285: things, we shall comprehend by intu
Page 286 and 287: something,’ is not merely there (
Page 288 and 289: epoché in Husserl become a hermene
Page 290 and 291: When Heidegger characterizes world-
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