is able to persist in the undergoing of an “experience” [une épreuve] that is also a“trial,” 23 the trying experience of the Henryian text itself. 24The reader who persists in sustaining the trauma of the Henryian text is brought torealize that although “textual truth” taken by itself inevitably subverts itself in a destructivemanner as long as it remains found<strong>ed</strong> on transcendence and the transcendentalhorizon, this same “textual truth” is able to subvert itself in a positive manner when itsfoundation is relocat<strong>ed</strong> in immanence. Immanence is the essence of manifestation;affectively structur<strong>ed</strong> immanence is Being, inde<strong>ed</strong> “the Self of Being,” 25 which showsitself to itself in the form of the “archi-impressionality” of the immanent dialectic ofsuffering and joy. Once the Being of the text is resituat<strong>ed</strong> in this manner, the “worldlyword” and the “textual truth” is able to turn itself “away from itself,” able now to achieve“the displacement that leads outside its own word to this other site where the Word ofLife speaks.” 26 In short, the Being of the text -- and the Being of the human subject --is properly to be situat<strong>ed</strong> within God, whom Henry understands to be the Unity of theRelationship of Strong Reunion of the Self of Being with Itself. 27 Both the humansubject and apophantic logos are to be situat<strong>ed</strong> in God and not in the transcendentalhorizon. When this truth is understood, the text is able to serve as the very Gestalt of thenow positively understood invisibility that determines both human and divine ipseity.23Cf. EL, 312. “Violence” is a concept that appears with some frequency in Henry’s later writing.Cf. Michel Henry, C’est Moi la Vérité: pour une philosophie du Christianisme [= CMV] (Paris: Seuil,1996), 189, at which Henry speaks of the violence done to the human ego in order that it be in fact aliving person, “cette violence lui est faite d’être un vivant.” Henry believes it is both just and necessaryto inflict violence on the apophatic logos because violence is what makes the human ego a vivant, a livingone. Cf. also CMV, 251, at which Henry points out that the suffering of Self is always already a violence,and “plus violente l’étreinte et s’empare de soi et jouit de soi—plus forte est la joie.” Cf. also REP, 224:“N’est-ce pas du reste ceci, l’essence de la violence: la possibilité inhérente à toute force de se donnertoujours, en dépit de sa propre impuissance, et proportionellement à elle, les moyens de la conjurer en s’endélivrant?”24Cf. EL, 282. As Sebbah points out, the Henryian text is precisely a text, relying upon the veryapophatic logos to which it seeks to do violence. As Sebbah also points out, the reliance of the Henryiantext on the apophatic logos that it seeks to overthrow raises serious questions about the consistency ofHenry’s philosphical enterprise. I think, however, that Sebbah overstates things when he says here thatone cannot look directly to Henry to answer the questions rais<strong>ed</strong> by his dependence on the text, that “pourraisons d’essence il n’y a nulle place dans M. Henry pour une théorie du texte,” so that “il faut se tournervers quelque indications, <strong>com</strong>me telles indirectes.” To the contrary, in connection with a consideration ofthe meaning of the truth of the Christian scriptures, Henry in fact explicitly discusses the inadequacy ofthe text as such relative to the Absolute Reality to which the text is subordinate. Cf. CMV, 7-19. Henry’sdirect remarks regarding the inadequacy of the text might seem only to serve to render more pressing thequestion regarding his philosophical consistency. Henry himself points out that neither the ChristianScriptures nor the text as such is the object of his study in CMV. Cf. ibid., 286. Nonetheless, the wholeof chapter 12 of CMV is d<strong>ed</strong>icat<strong>ed</strong> to articulating the manner in which human language and the writtentext can serve the self-revelation of God in man. See especially ibid., 290-91. Cf. also Michel Henry,Paroles du Christ [= PC] (Paris: Seuil, 2002). The entirety of this book, Henry’s final work, concerns thenature of the relationship between human language/the human text and the original Logos of la vie. Infairness to Sebbah, however, it is of course necessary to point out that this last work was not availableto Sebbah at the time of his own writing.25EM, 337.26Cf. IAT, 8 and 230. Cf. also EL, 287-88: “Le texte n’est-il pas précisément, et de manière exemplaire,ce dehors consenti, cette percée chez l’ennemi, qui ne peut se faire sans risque, qui ne peut se fairesans le risque . . . d’opacifier, de rendre ambiguë la Parole de la Vie? Plus radicalement, le texte n’est riend’autre que ce risque. Le risque du texte, n’est-il, <strong>com</strong>me M. Henry semble implicitement le penser, qu’unsacrifice provisoire et contrôlé pour la Parole de la Vie, ou bien en aura-t-il toujours déjà assombril’immédiateté?”27Cf. EM, 167 et passim.144
As Sebbah points out, the Henryian text is thus an instance of a new genre of protrepticor hortatory philosophical discourse, such that it is “less descriptive than indicative, oreven prescriptive,” prescriptive of a task that is also an experience [une épreuve] to whichthe reader must submit himself precisely in order to be himself. 28Ultimately, therefore, the “trial” to which the reader is submitt<strong>ed</strong> by means of the textis something more and something other than the text itself. The trying experience to whichthe reader is submitt<strong>ed</strong> by means of an encounter with the text is in fact the readerhimself, who necessarily experiences himself and is given to himself originally as theundergoing of an “internal ordeal.” 29As Audi explains, the self’s original experience of itself is that it is given to itself inan “irremissible passivity” that for the self is the experience of the self’s being absolutelyoverwhelm<strong>ed</strong> by itself in the face of its own ontological “excessiveness.” 30 For Henry,original human self-manifestation is an experience of self as a trial always alreadyundergone; it is precisely this “agonic” character of human self-manifestation that is thesource of the human subject’s ipseity or “I-ness.” It is this “agonic” ipseity, furthermore,that constitutes the “specific difference” between human reality and everything else thatis not human. 31My experience of being given to myself as myself in a radical passivity in which I amoverwhelm<strong>ed</strong> by my own ontological excessiveness is something of which I am alwaysalready aware. As self-aware, I do not simply “know the truth”; rather, I am the Truth ina participat<strong>ed</strong> manner with respect to the divine Ipseity. I am identically “the primordialtruth,” from which I am consciously estrang<strong>ed</strong> only in a contingent and surmountablemanner. The Truth that I am, as something from which I can be consciously estrang<strong>ed</strong>,is always also something to which I can also be consciously reunit<strong>ed</strong>. The excessive andviolent character of the Henryian text is intend<strong>ed</strong> precisely to help me “remember” myselfin a consciously achiev<strong>ed</strong> reunion of intentionality and affectivity. The “agonic” characterof my own original experience of self-givenness is something which I can in fact28EL, 312. Cf. CMV, 311-12: “Aussi, nous proposerions volontiers de <strong>com</strong>prendre le corpus detextes auxquels cette étude s’est intéressée <strong>com</strong>me relevant d’une protreptique d’un genre nouveau: cestextes, en cela fidèles à la tâche phénoménologique bien <strong>com</strong>prise, et malgré l’apparence de paradoxe, sontmoins descriptifs qu’indicatifs ou même prescriptifs: ils indiquent une tâche, et même—et c’est là leurspécificité dans le domaine phénoménologique—une épreuve, à laquelle le lecteur doit s’exposer.”29Cf. IAT, 38. The original French phrase employ<strong>ed</strong> by Henry, which Emanuel translates as an“internal ordeal,” is “épreuve intérieure.” Cf. CMV, 51. Thus do we have additional confirmation ofSebbah’s thesis that the Henryian “épreuve de soi” is an “experience of self” that is also a trial or ordeal.The concept of “ordeal” plays a very important role in CMV, since through it Henry accounts for (1) thenon-ecstatic transcendence that obtains within God himself, (2) the non-ecstatic transcendence of God withrespect to human reality, and (3) the possibility of human reality’s misuse of its fre<strong>ed</strong>om in order to sinand turn away from the God upon whom it remains radically dependent. Cf. ibid., 256ff and 318-19.30Cf. Audi, REP, 162. Continuing to <strong>com</strong>ment on Rousseau’s understanding of amour de soi in itsradical distinction from amour-propre, and <strong>com</strong>paring this distinction to that of Henry between immanenceand transcendence, Audi writes: “Qu’est-ce qui en nous atteste de cette passivité-la? Nous disions àl’instant: la passivité du moi à l’égard de soi est un débordement absolu. De par son débordementexpansif, cette passivité se révèle à jamais plus forte que tout.” This theme of the self as a trial to beundergone, on account of the ontological excessiveness that characterizes the Being of the ego, pervadescontemporary French “theological phenomenology.” Cf. also Jean-Louis Chrétien, The Unforgettable andthe Unhop<strong>ed</strong> For, trans. Jeffrey Bloechl (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 119, hereafter UU:“This almost unbearable test that a person be<strong>com</strong>es for himself is relat<strong>ed</strong> not at all to evil or sin, but tothe excess of a human being over himself, an excess of what one is and can be over what one can thinkand <strong>com</strong>prehend. . . .”31Chrétien also evokes the theme of the agon with respect to that which is properly human. Cf. UU,96. Speaking of human fidelity to God as a properly human act, Chrétien says that such fidelity “alwayshas, in its very peace, something violent and agonistic about it.”145
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various forms of idealist philosoph
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self-givenness (Selbstgegebenheit)
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It must be admitted in this regard
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down and all the way back.” 51 Fo
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Heidegger characterized his own pro
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Heidegger’s transcendental-existe
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perceived world” (PP, 25), Merlea
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in the unreflected, in “perceptio
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Nor would Merleau-Ponty have had an
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a way that we do not all crash into
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“I think” but in “the dialogu
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in existence a “super-abundance o
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crucial “other” in our becoming
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to its being grounded in terms of b
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(“History is this quasi-‘thing
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manner (statistical or regression a
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and they are such, precisely becaus
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interpreted the world, and that the
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is not rationalist or idealist in t
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title Herbert Spiegelberg gave to h
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II.TOWARD A TELOS OF SIGNIFYING COM
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published in Being and Having. 12 T
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inside me which makes me able to re
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or is not existence something that
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ReflectionPhilosophical thought is
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attempt at unification, the reflect
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thereof. And an ethical aspect: tha
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According to Ricoeur, “It is here
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the most meaningful contemporary sw
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ival hermeneutics that we perceive
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more pronounced recoil whereby the
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these structures throughout the who
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By seeking a deeper unity of Dasein
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folds a pre-given set of possibilit
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of experience is correlated to a pa
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explanations of causal events in th
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accept one argument over another. A
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a subtle dialectic between argument
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or warrant an assertion. Such fulfi
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This uneasiness in human beings, wh
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appears in the way of its appearanc
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We can sense such a philosophical d
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the act of interpreting, except whe
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phenomenological development. The p
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II.A Liberation, With a Meeting in
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denken lässt -, sondern das Leben:
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Sinn” 17 and, following this: “
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Wenn ich dieses Buch sehe, sehe ich
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Der christlich-jüdische Gott ist d
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3. A “BETTER” OR JUST “ANOTHE
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if we have two persons, a master an
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V.THE ARCHEOLOGY OF HERMENEUTIC PHE
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cosmic world, and Nietzschean nihil
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absolute lawgiver to any possible
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solitude.” 26 If there is a “hi
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of reason, as far as the single hum
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transcendental reason, 46 pure rati
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and properties of sensible phenomen
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In clear distantiation from his own
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2. HISTORY AS THE OTHER -- NOTES ON
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precisely the accomplishment of phe
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ought as such into the present, it
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educed state. As soon as the reflec
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explicitly in the Vienna lecture, w
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the task and the very environment o
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stood “from itself.” As a resul
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of Being -- already grown into Bein
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the Husserlian idea of phenomenolog
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into the openness of Being, it diff
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We now need to quote a second, well
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“knowledge about the world.” In
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Husserl’s ConversionsTheological
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And this proved, probably, to be a
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Husserl’s Reflective Phenomenolog
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to beings of the same nature. But t
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worldlessness of Husserl’s intent
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According to Aristotle, intellectio
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The latter, the nonessential princi
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that, for Husserl, every act is ind
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not forget what Husserl meant by a-
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things, we shall comprehend by intu
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something,’ is not merely there (
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epoché in Husserl become a hermene
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When Heidegger characterizes world-