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transcendental reason, 46 pure rationality, on the other hand, is necessarily characterized,both by an internal history and the relatedness to other egos, who appear to him, in a way,to be irreducible to theoretic intentionality. When considered from this perspective, thehistory of mankind is no longer a series of philosophically neutral, factual events. Byintegrating the different forms of finite teleology (art, religion, regional sciences, politicalstructures, etc.) into the open horizon of an asymptotic ideal of rationality, Husserl doesmore than trace back the regionalized historical manifestations of the spirit to theircommon source. What is in question here, is not the mere extensional generality of theguiding principle of history, but its formal a priori necessity. Husserl’s interpretation ofhuman history as the gradual breakthrough of the ideal of transcendental reason is notlimited to what the progressive unfolding of thought has in fact been like, within theboundaries of European culture and philosophy, but is essentially concerned with whathuman reason ought to be, as seen from the absolute viewpoint of its ultimate ethical andpractical fulfillment. Hence, the facticity of the past is no longer something thattranscendental phenomenology is entitled to neglect or to parenthesize. Historicalphenomena have to be considered, not as perceptible empirical facts, but as factualinstances of an only apperceptible but ethically obligatory, transcendental ideal.As we have already pointed out, this concept of a “hidden” aspect of history bears astrong resemblance to the gnostic dualism between a “foreground” and a “background”dimension of historical events. This formal analogy, however, is no longer valid where thefuture dynamics of history are concerned. As Husserl sees it, the “hidden” aspect of philosophicalhistory is not essentially and permanently hermetic. Indeed, his interpretation ofhistory as the gradual coming-to-light of a universal principle aims at showing this veryprinciple not as a pre-given, ineluctable law, but as an idea constituted by transcendentalreason itself. 47 Knowing what constitutes the hidden motor of history is not a matter ofan inexplicable personal “call” or “illumination,” coming from outside and setting therecipient apart from the non-illuminated masses, once and for all. With Husserl, the distinctionbetween those “who know” and those who do not is not ontologically founded butmerely functional. Although initially articulated only by Husserl himself, and then onlyby a small following of phenomenologists, his insight into the secret, transcendentalmotivation within the history of occidental philosophy is considered to be potentiallyattainable by every human being, since it consists in nothing beyond an articulation of thegenerative structures of reason -- by reason itself, when considered from the viewpoint ofits final perfection.The main difference between this approach and that of the earlier Husserl concerns theconcrete determination of “absoluteness” and “infinity,” with which transcendental reasonis now credited: whereas in Ideas I the carrying-out of the epoché -- by individualphilosophers was considered to be the only requirement for bringing out the unvaryingstructures of virtually any, even the divine rationality, 48 the later Husserl no longer placesthe infinite telos of absolute rationality within reach of the transcendentally singularized,philosophical subject. Once the essence of rationality is located not only in the subjectpoleof noetic activity but also in the noematic object-pole of the historical intentionalityof human consciousness, the idea of transcendental phenomenology itself requires aprogressive, inter-subjective realization in the sphere of a virtually perfect, rationalcommunity. As Husserl himself puts it: “I, isolated as I am in my finiteness, cannot getfar in knowing infinities. Philosophy is a task of infinite cognition within the infinitude of46See Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften, 230.47See Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie,Ergänzungsband. Texte aus dem Nachlaß, 234.48See Husserl, Ideen zur einer reinen Phänomenologie, 92. 351.230