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cultural worlds and, as such, turns back again into these world-cultures. There is not oneculture, but there are different cultures, which we can indeed experience from a perspectiveon the world which is complementary. We would like to show that a certainflexibility of interpretation is inherent in this uniform point of view. It also constitutes thespecific historicity of philosophy and defines the philosophical sense of tradition. Thephilosophical notion of tradition (Latin translation: to endow, to hand over, to bestow)involves the aspect of a transcendental passing-over between the Unity and Diversity ofthe world.In recent times the concept of tradition itself has become one of the most doubtfulconcepts, not only in philosophy, but also in the humanities in general. Indeed, thequestionability of knowledge regarding what is human as such emerges through thatconcept. Postmodernists increasingly tend to move on toward a post-tradition. This doesnot mean that we don’t appreciate tradition anymore, but on the contrary, tradition iseverywhere held out as either an archetype or as a substitute. It essentially deals with thefact that man understands his own nature less and less on the basis of the events oftradition, in such a way that humanity, as a historical outcome, will transfer “one personinto the other person.” Thus, the integrative idea of the human being has not onlyperished, but the differences between humans are also disappearing ever more rapidly. Aconviction is being created to the effect that the transmission of the nature of the humanbeing and of humanity, in terms of the historical tradition, can, and should be replaced bya technological reproduction of humanity. Everything points to the fact that thisreproduction, which includes the biological and also the cognitive constituents of humanbeings, will take undreamt of proportions in the future. Thus, one must raise the onlylegitimate question that comes to one’s mind: what brings along this progress for ahumanity that formed itself through, and within, tradition? Does that represent humanity’send? Thus, talking about the “historical ends” already assumes a certain understanding ofhistoricity.It would be counterproductive to try to vigorously defend this understanding with atradition, and with concepts that took form through it: history, culture, and the humanities.Doing so would not amount to a philosophical defense of tradition at all, but only to buildan ideological refuge for a humanistic traditionalism. At this point, one must pose thefollowing question, which seems to be the most adequate to us: whether this radical wayof putting tradition into question does not force us, rather, to consider carefully thesignificance of tradition.Today everyone can bear witness to the catastrophic social consequences brought aboutby the ideologically directed abolition of tradition within “real socialism.” What if“tradition” still contained a concealed side in addition to its bared and often criticized side,which could assert itself precisely during a period of radical criticism of the notion oftradition? Thus, the latter already seems to represent a meaningful task for philosophy, inconnection with its phenomenological-hermeneutic element. Philosophy thus develops itsown notion of tradition in the course of its intermediation between Unity and Diversity.One can observe the historical effect of the latter through the fact that philosophy canexpress itself in different languages that aren’t necessarily European, without losing itsuniversal aspect. 3In our century, the latter affirmation is especially valid for phenomenological philosophy,which was created out of the idea of a philosophy that would refer itself directly to the3See also Edmund Husserl, “La filosofia come lingua europea,” in idem, Crisi e rinascita dellacultura europea, ed. Renato Cristin (Venezia: Marsilio, 1999), 7-26.191