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makes possible the further interpretation of Being -- does not aim at the adequateapprehension of how things appear to Dasein, but arises as a direct account of how Daseinunderstands “the thing” called Being.Consequently, Heidegger transforms the Husserlian idea of phenomenology, as anadequate description of how things are given (appear) in the consciousness of the one whodescribes them, into a “phenomenology of Dasein,” who always already understandsBeing, and whose understanding of his own being results directly from an interpretationof Being. In this sense, phenomenology really is hermeneutics, since its “description” consistsin the interpretation of Dasein’s understanding of Being. If, then, for Husserl, themeaning of “the thing” is identical with the way in which it is given in the consciousnessof the phenomenologist, and could therefore be adequately described by him or her, forHeidegger, the meaning of “the thing” is identical with the “meaning of Being,” whichis always already understood by Dasein, and could only be hermeneutically interpreted(ausgelegt).By analogy, if for Husserl the phenomenological description of “the thing” representsthe transformed form of transcendental cognition (in which the transcendental ego playsthe role of being the fundamental condition of possibility), then, as Pöggeler writes:Heidegger setzt an die Stelle des transzendentalen Ichs das Leben in seiner Tatsächlichkeit.Dieses “faktische” Leben ist Leben in einer Welt; es ist letzlich “historisch” und“versteht” sich “historisch.” So wird die Geschichte zum Leitfaden der phänomenologischenForschung. 7The notion of factuality (Faktizität) refers to the way in which Dasein exists in theworld as always already understanding its own being. This presupposes that if one triesto describe adequately the way of being that appertains to Dasein, one should not resort tosophisticated methods like the “phenomenological reduction,” which guarantees the essentialityof one’s insights: it is sufficient to apprehend the factual way in which Dasein relatesto itself and to the world. Precisely in this sense, the phenomenology of Dasein isthe “hermeneutics of facticity” that is based on its understanding of Being, and its propertheme -- as it will show itself in the last chapters of Being and Time -- is the historicityof the way of being of Dasein.Let us sum up these considerations. For Husserl, the best guarantee for a trulyphenomenological description is the essential insight (Wesensanschauung) of things, which“makes clear” how they are given to consciousness (i.e., the postulate of adequate descriptionthat preserves the originality of their being-given). In contrast, I have tried to demonstratethat Heidegger maintains that what underlies the relation of Dasein to the world, isits a priori understanding of Being, through which understanding the Dasein also interprets.According to Husserl, a phenomenologist first perceives and originally apprehends thethings as given to his or her consciousness, then tries to describe this understanding adequately,which presupposes that his or her description adheres to the things like “a shirt[clings] to a wet back.” For Heidegger, on the contrary, the “original” apprehension of the‘thing’ of Being realizes itself as its understanding by Dasein and results in its interpretation(Auslegung). The interpretation of Being is not an additional activity superimposedby the phenomenologist on the understanding of Being, it is not even a modificationof this understanding, but is precisely the way in which the understanding of Beingrealizes itself. If, then, Heidegger shares with Husserl the assumption that there is no gapbetween the original phenomenological apprehension of things and the language in which7Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, 70.250