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a subtle dialectic between argumentation and conviction, which has no theoretical outcomebut only the practical outcome of the arbitration of moral judgment in situation.” 15Argumentation is a particular, sometimes formalized, practice in which participants clarifytheir convictions in order to resolve conflicts and reach understanding. Argumentationnever stands above our convictions or conventions, but instead is the “critical agencyoperating at the heart of convictions.” 16In The Just (2000), Ricoeur continues to advance a theory of interpretation andargumentation in the context of legal interpretation and decision-making. Ricoeur concurswith Habermas that the “thesis of a potential agreement at the level of an unlimited andunconstrained community” forms the horizon of universal consensus before which “we areto place the formal rules of every discussion claiming correctness.” 17 Argumentation,however, is dialectically related to interpretation. The rules governing discussion go handin hand with a prior meaning-giving context in which the interpretations of our needs andinterests occur.The notion of an ideal discourse situation offers a horizon of correctness for alldiscourse where the participants seek to convince each other through argument. The idealis not just anticipated, it is already at work. But we must also emphasize that the ideal canbe inserted into the course of a discussion only if it is articulated on the basis of alreadypublic expressions of interests, hence of needs marked by prevailing interpretations concerningtheir legitimacy. 18The relationship between facts and norms in general is a dialectic interpretation andargumentation. Ricoeur goes on to say that the principle of universalization, “onlyprovides a check on the process of mutual adjustment between the interpreted norm andthe interpreted fact. In this sense, interpretation is not external to argumentation. It constitutesits organon.” 19 Claims like these strain the credibility of Ricoeur’s prior claimto avoid creating super-systems that would encompass them both.Narrative-Evidence and Communicative RationalityWhen Ricoeur’s reflections on truth are taken together, we have a model of theinterpretation and validation of claims raised about human actions involving evidence,narration, and argumentation. Unlike the hermeneutic philosophies of Heidegger andGadamer, Ricoeur’s theory of truth entails the argumentative vindication of claims underthe presupposition of unconstrained communication. But unlike the universal pragmaticsof Habermas, Ricoeur’s theory of truth presupposes not only the prior interpretation of thesubject of discussion within a broader, interpretive context, but also the prior experiencesparticipants bring to discussion. It includes the very descriptive, narrative, testimonialexperiences that a consensus theory of truth forbids. If we were to construct a model oftruth and validity from Ricoeur’s scattered remarks on the subject, we could draw ahermeneutic arc that would have one end anchored in phenomenological experience,passing through a narrative interpretation, anchored at the other end in communicativerationality. The path of the arc from phenomenology to hermeneutics is old route that doesnot need to be revisited here. The more interesting paths are those that connect an15Paul Ricoeur, Oneself As Another (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 287.16Ibid., 288.17Paul Ricoeur, “Interpretation and/or Argumentation,” in idem, The Just, trans. David Pellauer(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 117.18Ibid., 119.19Ibid., 122.90
argumentative theory of truth as validity with a phenomenological theory of evidence andwith a narrative theory of truth as manifestation.The path linking Husserl to Habermas through Ricoeur is the more reconstructive ofthe two. It starts by noting that, Habermas’s theory of communicative competencepresupposes the reflective awareness of the individual participants in communicativeaction to raise and test implicit validity claims. Even though the theory defines truth interms of the modes of argumentation competent speakers engage in together, it still makesreference to the perspectives of the participants in communication who reflectivelythematize the validity claims of one another, who are oriented to mutual recognition, whoindividually and collectively have learned how to communicate competently, and whomust be motivated to accept the force of the better argument. In fact, communicativerationality is, in part, defined in terms of the experience speakers and actors have whenengaged in such discourse. In order to understand an expression, the interpreter must“bring to mind” the reasons with which a speaker would defend its validity; we must be“open,” “committed,” and “motivated” to reach understanding. Such subjective expressionsand first-person descriptions are neither foreign nor inimical to communicative rationality.Establishing truth is a function of the reasons I can offer to support my claim and theideal conditions under which my claim is accepted. But the formal procedures for reachingagreement in rational discourse say nothing about the content of the agreement. There islittle or no connection between the objectivity of experience and the truth of agreed-uponpropositions. So long as there is mutual, rational agreement, there is no way to mediateconflicting interpretations other than through further rational argumentation. From aphenomenological perspective, the consensus theory of truth entailed by the theory ofcommunicative rationality lacks an adequate theory of evidence. Habermas recognizes thelacuna in a consensus theory of truth, but claims that he is only specifying the idealconditions that must be satisfied in order for there to be any rational agreement. The ideaof truth is transcendental and universally binding; the content of truth is historical andcontingent. He explains that the criteria of truth lie at a different level than the idea ofredeeming validity-claims. In other words, Habermas claims only to specify the proceduralconditions for establishing validity, not to specify the criteria for ascertaining truth. Whatcounts as a good reason is something that depends on standards about which it must bepossible to argue. Nevertheless, Habermas confesses that he regards as “justified theadmonition that I have hitherto not taken the evidential dimension of the concept of truthadequately into account.” 20If a theory of evidence is not incompatible with a consensus theory of truth, and ifHabermas already acknowledges the legitimacy of reflective, first-person descriptions ofexperience, then perhaps it is possible to reconcile a phenomenological theory of evidencewith a pragmatic theory of truth. Ricoeur’s model of textual interpretation as a movementfrom guess to validation and from explanation to comprehension traces the path from(individual) experience to (collective) argumentation. Following Ricoeur and Habermas,if we recognize the necessity of the perspectives of the participants in discourse, who mustbe motivated to accept the better reason, then we can see how subjective experiencecontributes to intersubjective experience. The relevant subjective experience for thevalidation of a truth claim is the experience of evidence. Achieving consensus byredeeming validity claims discursively presupposes that the participants achieve evidentexperience that they test, validate and corroborate with one another. Evidence is thegradual fulfillment of the intentionalities necessary to confirm a guess, validate a claim20Jürgen Habermas, “Reply to My Critics,” in idem, Habermas: Critical Debates, ed. John B.Thompson and David Held (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1982), 275.91
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various forms of idealist philosoph
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self-givenness (Selbstgegebenheit)
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It must be admitted in this regard
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down and all the way back.” 51 Fo
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Heidegger characterized his own pro
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Heidegger’s transcendental-existe
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perceived world” (PP, 25), Merlea
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in the unreflected, in “perceptio
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Nor would Merleau-Ponty have had an
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a way that we do not all crash into
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“I think” but in “the dialogu
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in existence a “super-abundance o
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crucial “other” in our becoming
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to its being grounded in terms of b
Page 42 and 43: (“History is this quasi-‘thing
Page 44 and 45: manner (statistical or regression a
Page 46 and 47: and they are such, precisely becaus
Page 48 and 49: interpreted the world, and that the
Page 50 and 51: is not rationalist or idealist in t
Page 52 and 53: title Herbert Spiegelberg gave to h
Page 55: II.TOWARD A TELOS OF SIGNIFYING COM
Page 59 and 60: published in Being and Having. 12 T
Page 61 and 62: inside me which makes me able to re
Page 63 and 64: or is not existence something that
Page 65 and 66: ReflectionPhilosophical thought is
Page 67 and 68: attempt at unification, the reflect
Page 69 and 70: thereof. And an ethical aspect: tha
Page 71 and 72: According to Ricoeur, “It is here
Page 74 and 75: the most meaningful contemporary sw
Page 76 and 77: ival hermeneutics that we perceive
Page 78 and 79: more pronounced recoil whereby the
Page 80 and 81: these structures throughout the who
Page 82 and 83: By seeking a deeper unity of Dasein
Page 84 and 85: folds a pre-given set of possibilit
Page 86 and 87: of experience is correlated to a pa
Page 88 and 89: explanations of causal events in th
Page 90 and 91: accept one argument over another. A
Page 94 and 95: or warrant an assertion. Such fulfi
Page 96 and 97: the assertive vehemence of the hist
Page 98 and 99: positions of the subject. For memor
Page 100 and 101: attestation slips a plurality, most
Page 102 and 103: What confidence in the word of othe
Page 104 and 105: From where, perhaps, the place of t
Page 106 and 107: Sans le correctif du commandement d
Page 108 and 109: life), Rembrandt proposes an interp
Page 110 and 111: only as a place made for oneself as
Page 113: III.THE HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY O
Page 116 and 117: consolidated by terming it an “un
Page 118 and 119: If our analysis is correct, the “
Page 120 and 121: The esthesiology of the senses of t
Page 122 and 123: in certain cases, together with the
Page 124 and 125: what the touched hand recognizes wh
Page 126 and 127: heart; a presence where a lived tak
Page 128 and 129: conceives it, not on the basis of n
Page 130 and 131: Merleau-Ponty, a form, a relation o
Page 132 and 133: out in “Eye and Mind.” So, let
Page 134 and 135: God creates, or better, draws, a
Page 136 and 137: the “there,” the “one same sp
Page 138 and 139: free to function more purely as a p
Page 140 and 141: close grasp of the sleight of the h
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understood both as discursive thoug
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While Henry thus questions “the m
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is able to persist in the undergoin
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“remember,” but not as I would
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intentionally structured self-consc
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life can ultimately be defined in i
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4. THE SUBJECTIVE BODY AND THE IDEA
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and the represented body (the combi
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The Oversight of Life’s OneselfTh
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more than externality and its unfol
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effort if this effort gives rise to
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manifest in the self-givenness of l
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Transcendental affectivity 71 is th
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The pursuit of health, strongly rei
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each the prey of their own pathos.
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According to views held by Gadamer
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and writing - the tools which human
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or disclosedness (Erschlossenheit)
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exclusively from his own point of v
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the same direction as practical wis
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of ‘art’ which still stands bef
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Gadamer’s approach, however, is n
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of biology and physiology, or they
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IV.PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOMENTS IN THE
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Therefore, I would like to concentr
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classical Greek tradition of thinki
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This uneasiness in human beings, wh
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appears in the way of its appearanc
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We can sense such a philosophical d
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the act of interpreting, except whe
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phenomenological development. The p
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II.A Liberation, With a Meeting in
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denken lässt -, sondern das Leben:
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Sinn” 17 and, following this: “
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Wenn ich dieses Buch sehe, sehe ich
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Der christlich-jüdische Gott ist d
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3. A “BETTER” OR JUST “ANOTHE
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if we have two persons, a master an
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V.THE ARCHEOLOGY OF HERMENEUTIC PHE
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cosmic world, and Nietzschean nihil
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absolute lawgiver to any possible
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solitude.” 26 If there is a “hi
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of reason, as far as the single hum
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transcendental reason, 46 pure rati
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and properties of sensible phenomen
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In clear distantiation from his own
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2. HISTORY AS THE OTHER -- NOTES ON
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precisely the accomplishment of phe
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ought as such into the present, it
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educed state. As soon as the reflec
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explicitly in the Vienna lecture, w
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the task and the very environment o
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stood “from itself.” As a resul
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makes possible the further interpre
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of Being -- already grown into Bein
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the Husserlian idea of phenomenolog
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into the openness of Being, it diff
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We now need to quote a second, well
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“knowledge about the world.” In
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Husserl’s ConversionsTheological
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And this proved, probably, to be a
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Husserl’s Reflective Phenomenolog
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to beings of the same nature. But t
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worldlessness of Husserl’s intent
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According to Aristotle, intellectio
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6. RIGOR AND ORIGINARITY: THE TRANS
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The latter, the nonessential princi
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that, for Husserl, every act is ind
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not forget what Husserl meant by a-
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things, we shall comprehend by intu
Page 286 and 287:
something,’ is not merely there (
Page 288 and 289:
epoché in Husserl become a hermene
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When Heidegger characterizes world-
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