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the Husserlian idea of phenomenology as a “descriptive science,” which aims at exploringthe “essence” of things, is transformed by Heidegger into a “hermeneutics of facticity.”Thus the postulate concerning the description of ‘things from themselves’ now meansnothing less than to describe them from the perspective of their own “way of being,” i.e.,the way in which Dasein encounters them and interprets them in his understanding.It would be difficult to imagine a more anti-Husserlian concept of phenomenology. Forit implies that the phenomenologist must start with the description/interpretation of hisfactual relationship to Being, a relationship that has been given up on by the author ofIdeas, for methodological reasons. In other words, the phenomenologist must, inHeidegger’s view, start with Dasein’s “fact” of being in the world, and not with the presumedideal “essence” of this world, which is achievable only by a methodical denial ofthe very fact of being-in-the-world. Heidegger would then have to say that Husserl cuthimself off, right from the start, from having access to “things” as they really showthemselves ‘from themselves’ to whoever is looking at them.The phenomenologist then has to stay where “things” have always been, without needfor suspending his or her belief in the existence of the world, with the result that theattitude of intuitive insight will be inflicted upon “them (things)” instead. For it isprecisely due to that attitude that they are not able to experience the most original andhermeneutic evidence of Being as given (die Gegebenheit) and as always alreadyunderstood by them. It is hard to imagine a greater difference in the understanding of theword “phenomenology.”***Heidegger’s conviction that a properly phenomenological description/interpretation shouldstart with the analytic of the factual way in which Dasein is related to Being, prompts himto describe/interpret -- as his first move -- Dasein’s way of being. This description/interpretation,while relying on the assumption that Dasein fundamentally understands Being,takes the form of systematically exploring his successive existential structures, whichmake this understanding possible.And yet, at the point where Heidegger reaches the ultimate existential structure, whichhe calls “temporality” (Zeitlichkeit), and tries to disclose its relationship with Being, hiswhole phenomenological undertaking undergoes a radical change. He identifies a problemwith the fundamental feature of this structure in zeitigen, that is to say, in its permanentself-differentiation in relation to itself and with respect to Being. How, then, is one to describethe relationship of Dasein with Being, since its structure characterizes a permanentinfraction that points beyond itself? The phenomenological description of this circularrelationship cannot proceed further, since there is no “deeper” existential structure underlyingit. The temporality of Dasein can only be described by exploring his circular connectionwith Being, in which they permanently displace one another even while referringto each other. Heidegger, who in his analytic of Dasein proceeds in the manner adoptedby the classical, transcendental scheme, now has to admit to helplessness, in this matter.He says that his existential interpretation of Dasein “is constantly getting eclipsed unawares”11 and that consequently “everything is haunted by the enigma of Being.” 1211Heidegger, Being and Time, 444; idem, Sein und Zeit, 392. “[...] gerät ständig unversehens in denSchatten.”12Heidegger, Being and Time, 444.254