Merleau-Ponty, a form, a relation of figure and ground (fond), a whole. (SB 101/91) Hereis the definition Merleau-Ponty provides of a whole: a whole is an inde<strong>com</strong>posable unityof internal, reciprocal determinations, meaning that if one of the parts changes, then thewhole changes and, if all the parts change but still maintain the same relations amongthem, then the whole does not change. (SB 50/47) In other words, not being the sum ofits parts, the whole is not an aggregate; there are no partes extra partes, no parts outsideof one another, and therefore the whole, the relation of figure and ground, is alwaysambiguous. (Cf. SB 138/127)Now, the second conceptual scheme for understanding this ambiguous or mix<strong>ed</strong>relation of parts and whole <strong>com</strong>es from the beginning of his 1952 “Indirect Language andthe Voices of Silence.” 14 It is well known, of course, that in “Indirect Language and theVoices of Silence” Merleau-Ponty introduces Saussure’s linguistics into French philosophy.Thanks to Saussure, we know that linguistic signs such as phonemes reciprocallydetermine one another by means of “diacritical differences.” The reciprocal determination,which refers us back to the Gestalt, implies that Saussure cannot base language on asystem of positive ideas. Due to the fact that Saussure is rejecting any other sense thanthe diacritical sense of signs, he must, according to Merleau-Ponty, be rejecting two waysof conceiving the whole and therefore two ways of conceiving the parts in relation to thewhole. On the one hand, Merleau-Ponty tells us that the whole of language cannot be “theexplicit and articulat<strong>ed</strong> whole of the <strong>com</strong>plete language as it is record<strong>ed</strong> in grammars anddictionaries.” (S 50/39) On the other, the whole of a language cannot be “a logical totalitylike that of a philosophical system, all of whose elements can be (in principle) d<strong>ed</strong>uc<strong>ed</strong>from a single idea.” (S 50/39) Instead, as Merleau-Ponty says, “The unity [Saussure] istalking about is a unity of coexistence, like that of the sections of an arch which shoulderone another. In a whole of this kind, the learn<strong>ed</strong> parts of language have an imm<strong>ed</strong>iatevalue as a whole.” (S 50/39, my emphasis) Merleau-Ponty’s <strong>com</strong>parison of the part-wholerelation to that of the sections (les éléments) of an arch (une voûte) is illuminating.Clearly, if you change one stone, the arch falls; or, if you change all the stones butmaintain the relations between them, then you still have the arch. The arch is not a mereaggregate of stones. Because the stones “shoulder” (s’épaulent) each other, each stone“has an imm<strong>ed</strong>iate value as a whole”; each stone, in other words, is a “total part.” (Cf.OE 17/124) But this <strong>com</strong>parison implies that each stone, or, more precisely, each part,being a total part, is different from the whole and yet is identical to it. This sameness ofidentity and difference defines Merleau-Ponty’s mixturism; inde<strong>ed</strong>, in “Descartes’s Ontologyand Contemporary Ontology,” Merleau-Ponty says that “the visible opens upon aninvisible which is its relief or its structure and where the identity is rather non-difference.”(NC 1959-61, 195) To anticipate, we should note that sameness of identity and differenceis precisely how Foucault defines the modern reflection on finitude: “towards a certainthought of the Same – where Difference is the same thing as Identity” (vers une certainepensée du Même – où la Différence est la même chose que l’Identité).” (MC 326/315,Foucault’s capitalization)In light of this definition of the modern reflection on finitude, it is not surprising thatthe third conceptual scheme for Merleau-Ponty’s mixturism <strong>com</strong>es from his 1956“Everywhere and Nowhere.” Here, Merleau-Ponty calls today’s science “small rationalism”(le petit rationalisme), and any consideration of his view of science must start here.shall return to this critique below. See Merleau-Ponty, Notes de cours, 1959-1961, 229.14Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Le langage indirect et les voix du silence,” in idem, Signes (Paris:Gallimard, 1960); English translation by Richard C. McCleary as “Indirect Language and the Voices ofSilence,” in Signs (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1964). Hereafter all essays in Signes willbe cit<strong>ed</strong> by the abbreviation S, with reference first to the French <strong>ed</strong>ition, then to the English translation.128
Modern science or small rationalism takes its operations as absolute. (S 185/147) Today’sscience has be<strong>com</strong>e absolute by means of working on indices, models, and variables thatit has made for itself. In contrast, what Merleau-Ponty calls “large rationalism” (le grandrationalisme), which is the philosophy of the Seventeenth Century, in a word, Cartesianism,takes its science and its artifices or techniques as relative, relative to somethinglarger, to God or to the “infinite infinite” or to the “positive infinite.” Merleau-Ponty callsthe positive infinite “the secret of large rationalism.” The positive infinite is not numericalindefiniteness; rather, the positive infinite contains everything within itself: “every partialbeing directly or indirectly presupposes [the positive infinite] and is in return really oreminently contain<strong>ed</strong> in it.” 15 (S 187/149) Every part being eminently contain<strong>ed</strong> in Godmeans that all beings resemble God. Or, there is a relation of analogy between thecreatures and the creator. Resembling God, every partial being would have to be a totalpart. With large rationalism, we are very close to Merleau-Ponty’s own thought, 16 andwe have already not<strong>ed</strong> that the concept of the mixture <strong>com</strong>es from Descartes.Inde<strong>ed</strong>, in “Everywhere and Nowhere,” Merleau-Ponty expresses some nostalgia forlarge rationalism, telling us that large rationalism is “close to us.” But, most importantly,he says that large rationalism is the “interm<strong>ed</strong>iary through which we must go in order toget to the philosophy that rejects large rationalism.” I do not think it is an exaggerationto say that “Eye and Mind” is Merleau-Ponty’s precise attempt to go through thisnecessary interm<strong>ed</strong>iary of large rationalism to the philosophy that is oppos<strong>ed</strong> to it. 17 In“Eye and Mind,” Merleau-Ponty is trying to make today’s science and its thought, whichhe calls “operationalism,” relative once more to something other and larger than itself. Inother words, he is trying to make us understand that “small rationalism” (which again ismodern science) belongs to a “heritage”; (S 186/148) small rationalism is a “fossil” of the“living ontology” found in large rationalism. But, we cannot return to large rationalism;instead, its living ontology has to be “translat<strong>ed</strong>.” In “Everywhere and Nowhere,”Merleau-Ponty says that “Descartes said that God is conceiv<strong>ed</strong> of but not understood byus, and that this ‘not’ express<strong>ed</strong> a privation and a defect in us. 18 The modern Cartesiantranslates: the infinite is as much absence as presence, which makes the negative and thehuman enter into the definition of God.” (S 189/150, Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis) In aword, the translation makes the finite enter into God. Then the living ontology of largerationalism be<strong>com</strong>es the ontology of “sentir,” the ontology of sensibility that we see laid15Deleuze begins his examination of Spinoza by referring to this passage from Merleau-Ponty. SeeGilles Deleuze, Spinoza et le problème de l’expression (Paris: Minuit, 1968), 22; English translation byMartin Joughin as Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza (New York: Zone Books, 1990), 28. It is alsoclear that this distinction between positive infinite and the indefinite maps onto Hegel’s distinctionbetween the good infinite and bad infinite, but Merleau-Ponty never mentions it.16See Renaud Barbaras, who clearly sees the connection between Merleau-Ponty and Leibniz; idem,The Being of the Phenomenon (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2004), 229-234.17While all <strong>com</strong>mentators have not<strong>ed</strong> the relation of “Eye and Mind” to Descartes, no one, as faras I know, has present<strong>ed</strong> its central thesis as being about the heritage of large rationalism. In particular,see Hugh J. Silverman, “Cézanne’s Mirror Stage,” in Johnson, <strong>ed</strong>., The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader,262-277, especially 265; also Véronique Fóti, “The Dimension of Color,” in ibid., 293-308, especially296-97; also François Cavallier, Premières leçons sur L’Œil et l’esprit de M. Merleau-Ponty (Paris:Presses Universitaires de France, 1998), 38-46. In particular, none of the <strong>com</strong>mentators systematizeMerleau-Ponty’s analysis of Descartes’s Optics. Galen Johnson’s introduction to “Eye and Mind” in TheMerleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader, while excellent in many regards, does not mention Descartes, 35-55.18In Les mots et les choses, Foucault describes the exact relation to the infinite that Merleau-Pontyhere is describing. Foucault says that the relation to the infinite in the Classical epoch (Cartesianism), wasa “negative relation.” See MC 327/316.129
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various forms of idealist philosoph
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self-givenness (Selbstgegebenheit)
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It must be admitted in this regard
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down and all the way back.” 51 Fo
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Heidegger characterized his own pro
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Heidegger’s transcendental-existe
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perceived world” (PP, 25), Merlea
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in the unreflected, in “perceptio
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Nor would Merleau-Ponty have had an
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a way that we do not all crash into
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“I think” but in “the dialogu
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in existence a “super-abundance o
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crucial “other” in our becoming
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to its being grounded in terms of b
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(“History is this quasi-‘thing
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manner (statistical or regression a
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and they are such, precisely becaus
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interpreted the world, and that the
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is not rationalist or idealist in t
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title Herbert Spiegelberg gave to h
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II.TOWARD A TELOS OF SIGNIFYING COM
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published in Being and Having. 12 T
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inside me which makes me able to re
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or is not existence something that
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ReflectionPhilosophical thought is
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attempt at unification, the reflect
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thereof. And an ethical aspect: tha
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According to Ricoeur, “It is here
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the most meaningful contemporary sw
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ival hermeneutics that we perceive
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more pronounced recoil whereby the
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the same direction as practical wis
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of ‘art’ which still stands bef
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Gadamer’s approach, however, is n
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of biology and physiology, or they
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IV.PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOMENTS IN THE
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Therefore, I would like to concentr
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classical Greek tradition of thinki
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This uneasiness in human beings, wh
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appears in the way of its appearanc
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We can sense such a philosophical d
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the act of interpreting, except whe
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phenomenological development. The p
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II.A Liberation, With a Meeting in
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denken lässt -, sondern das Leben:
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Sinn” 17 and, following this: “
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Wenn ich dieses Buch sehe, sehe ich
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Der christlich-jüdische Gott ist d
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3. A “BETTER” OR JUST “ANOTHE
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if we have two persons, a master an
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V.THE ARCHEOLOGY OF HERMENEUTIC PHE
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cosmic world, and Nietzschean nihil
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absolute lawgiver to any possible
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solitude.” 26 If there is a “hi
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of reason, as far as the single hum
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transcendental reason, 46 pure rati
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and properties of sensible phenomen
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In clear distantiation from his own
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2. HISTORY AS THE OTHER -- NOTES ON
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precisely the accomplishment of phe
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ought as such into the present, it
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educed state. As soon as the reflec
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explicitly in the Vienna lecture, w
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the task and the very environment o
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stood “from itself.” As a resul
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of Being -- already grown into Bein
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the Husserlian idea of phenomenolog
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into the openness of Being, it diff
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We now need to quote a second, well
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“knowledge about the world.” In
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Husserl’s ConversionsTheological
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And this proved, probably, to be a
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Husserl’s Reflective Phenomenolog
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to beings of the same nature. But t
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worldlessness of Husserl’s intent
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According to Aristotle, intellectio
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6. RIGOR AND ORIGINARITY: THE TRANS
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The latter, the nonessential princi
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that, for Husserl, every act is ind
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not forget what Husserl meant by a-
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things, we shall comprehend by intu
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something,’ is not merely there (
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epoché in Husserl become a hermene
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When Heidegger characterizes world-