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the same direction as practical wisdom, when refined, but we tend to follow them unreflectingly.26 Practical wisdom and moral virtues are therefore mutually reinforcingtraits, necessary in the quest for good living (eudaimonia) in Aristotle’s philosophy.Phronesis and the Hermeneutics of MedicineAmong the last books to be published by Gadamer before his death in 2002 was his ownannotated translation of Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics -- that is, precisely the bookthat deals with phronesis. 27 This fact is yet another sign of the importance of this conceptfor Gadamer’s philosophy. It is thus clear that Gadamer intended his hermeneutics to bea practical philosophy in the Aristotelian sense, and it is also clear that practical, phroneticwisdom is to be considered a hermeneutic virtue. Accordingly, phronesis is the mark ofa good hermeneut and, maybe in particular, of a good medical hermeneut -- the doctor.What does it mean in this context? And what conclusions can we draw, in the case ofmedicine, from such a strong link between Aristotle’s concept of practical, moral wisdomand Gadamer’s hermeneutics?Phronesis, for Aristotle, is not a particular moral virtue in the manner in which fidelity,compassion, justice, courage, temperance or integrity are (as mentioned above). It is,rather, an intellectual ability; however, as such, it informs the moral virtues in specificsituations, allowing the possessor of these virtues to make moral judgements. Phronesisis therefore in a sense a moral ability (despite being counted among the intellectual virtuesby Aristotle), since it deals with practical decisions in situations in which not only abstracttruths but also the concrete good are the matter at hand. The phronimos -- the wise man --knows the right and good thing to do in this specific situation; in the case of medicine wewould say that he knows the right and good thing to do for this specific patient at thisspecific time. This cannot be learnt merely by applying universal theoretical principles,but only through long experience in concrete, practical matters of life.Let us now connect the concept of phronesis with hermeneutics, in the way that Gadamerenvisages, and by extension with clinical hermeneutics. The first thing worth noting is thatGadamer’s reference to phronesis makes clear that applied hermeneutics does not indicatean application of universal rules. Medical hermeneutics is thus not applicative in the sensethat universal, methodological rules are applied to a concrete situation. Rather, the hermeneuticsof medicine is grounded in the meeting between doctor and patient -- a meetingin which the two different horizons of medical knowledge and lived illness are broughttogether in an interpretative dialogue for the purpose of determining why the patient is illand how he can be treated. This was one of the main points above: medical practice is notapplied science, but rather interpretation through dialogue in the service of the patient’shealth. Within this interpretative pattern, science is made use of in various ways, but thepattern itself is not deductively (or inductively) nomologic in the natural-scientific sense.The appropriation of phronesis at the heart of (medical) hermeneutics can also beviewed as a critique of applied (medical) ethics. The idea that ethical principles can somehowbe applied to the clinical situation by health-care personnel is strongly countered by the26It is not surprising that, as virtue ethics has been disinterred from the catacombs of ancientphilosophy and has attracted new interest in the medical field -- thanks, in particular, to the works ofAlasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, and Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma, The Virtues in MedicalPractice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) -- phronesis has come to be regarded, by several writers,as the defining trait of a good physician.27Hans-Georg Gadamer, Aristoteles, Nikomachische Ethik VI: Herausgegeben und übersetzt vonHans-Georg Gadamer (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1998).178