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something,’ is not merely there (Dasein), but also constitutes a ‘task.’ 53 The task ofphenomenology is thus placing the phenomenon up front, it consists in discovering thephenomenon in its unveiledness (in dessen Unverhülltsein).Secondly, obtaining the realm of originary science as the main duty of hermeneuticalphenomenology cannot be derived from somewhere else. It must ground itself on itself.This shows another fundamental feature of the circularity of originary science.Circularity refers then to originary science’s own groundwork. This is to be understoodas a principium and not as principium, in the way particular science does. 54 Inasmuchas science is featured as life, it is then featured as self-contained, as Heidegger did in thewinter semester of 1919.All of Heidegger’s later work would then be based upon this determining focus. It caneasily be seen how important this would become for Heidegger, even in his first lecture.With regard to method, we are standing at a crossroads that will be decisive for whetherphilosophy as such is to live or die, at an abyss opening up before Nothingness, thatis, the nothingness of total realism/reality, or we will succeed in taking a leap intoanother world, or, to be precise, into this world for the first time. 55This might resemble Kierkegaard, or even Husserl’s transcendental method. However,what Heidegger means refers to the radical character of his views: either we remain in thetheoretical view, which has guided Western philosophy, or else we leap toward theunveiled pre-theoretical realm through a radical opening. The latter can give philosophylife, that is, it can save her from the agonizing state in which she lies, owing to the reignof the theoretical. This idea of the life or death of philosophy is shown to Jaspers as well,in a letter written in 1922:Either we take philosophy seriously, with its potential for principled/primary scientificresearch, or we have a self-understanding as scientifically-minded human beingscapable of a most grievous lapse, in that we play around with casually picked upconcepts and dabble in undefined trends, working only with our bare needs in mind. 5653Martin Heidegger, “Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles,” Dilthey-Jahrbuch 6(1989): 257.54GA56/57, 24. Heidegger explicitly deals, in the Winter Semester lectures of 1928-1929, with thisissue, that is, how philosophy should define itself. The concept of scientific philosophy is thus put intoquestion, which might be understood in a metaphorical way, as in a ‘rounded circle.’ The circle is notrounded, as something rounded is simply a failed adjustment attempting roundness proper. Besides, thecircle is round by definition, it perfectly represents the idea of something round. “Concerning theexpression ‘scientific philosophy,’ a quality that does not belong to philosophy is being attributed to it:philosophy is more than a science; something scientific, which belonged to philosophy from the start, isattributed to it. Philosophy is more originary than science, as every science is rooted in philosophy. Theysprouted from philosophy.” GA27, 16. In this case, Heidegger rejects from the start every interpretationof philosophy that might try to see it as a science. However, what Heidegger remarks in his KNS–Lectures as originary science, is to be understood in a completely different way. The concept of ‘originaryscience’ (Ursprungswissenschaft) is grounded in the fact that philosophy is essentially a kind of originarybeing of every individual science.55GA56/57, 63: “Wir stehen an der methodischen Wegkreuzung, die über Leben oder Tod derPhilosophie überhaupt entscheidet, an einem Abgrund: entweder ins Nichts, d.h. der absolutenSachlichkeit, oder es gelingt der Sprung in eine andere Welt, oder genauer: überhaupt erst in die Welt.”56Heidegger-Jaspers Briefwechsel, 28: “Entweder wir machen Ernst mit der Philosophie und ihrenMöglichkeiten als prinzipieller wissenschaftlicher Forschung, oder wir verstehen uns als wissenschaftlicheMenschen zur schwersten Verfehlung, dass wir in aufgegriffenen Begriffen und halbklaren Tendenzenweiterplätschern und auf Bedürfnisse arbeiten.”284