[Andrzej_Wiercinski_(ed ... - WordPress.com

We can sense such a philosophical disposition also in Gadamer’s project of aphilosophical hermeneutics, as expressed in his book Truth and Method, and in the essaysthat followed it. According to the thesis advanced by his most consistent interpreter, JeanGrondin, Gadamer should have translated the Heideggerian historical-being intotradition. 13I think that this “translation” was successful only because it was able to connect theproblematic of historicity with the problem of language. This connection, namely, makespossible a thorough understanding of tradition, which doesn’t merely fall on us (like rain),but rather is also assigned to us (as a task). Gadamer established his philosophicalperception of the notion of tradition on the principle of the Wirkungsgeschichte. From aterminological point of view, we are really close to the concept of historicity, towardwhich we are striving here. It also appears that the proposal for a “hermeneuticcomplement” of philosophy (mentioned above) had something to do with Gadamer’s“singularization” of the “universal aspect of hermeneutics.”The universality of the hermeneutic aspect, which Gadamer brings forward in hisproposition “Being that can be understood is language,” doesn’t only concern philosophicalhermeneutics in the strictest sense, but also contemporary philosophy as a whole.Here, one could take as an example the question regarding the terms for the possibilityof interpretation, the description of phenomena, ideological criticism, the disclosure of thestructures through an analysis of the act of speaking, etc. Paul Ricoeur developed hisphilosophical hermeneutics as a confrontation within contemporary philosophy betweenthe mainstream philosophies that already differentiated themselves from one anotherthrough the models of interpretation on offer in them. Could these models be raised to auniversal level? The universalization of the hermeneutic aspect certainly conceals in itselfcertain theoretical pitfalls. Therefore, we only accept Gadamer’s conception of “Wirkungsgeschichte”(active historicity) with substantial reserve. Namely, that the universalizationof hermeneutics is only viable if it is built up on a universal anthropological basis. However,Gadamer doesn’t try to consider this critically as such. If we defend this thesis, alongsidewith Gadamer, namely that humanity is essentially dependent on tradition, then sucha reflection becomes absolutely necessary. It doesn’t suffice to only make a reference toHusserl’s concept of the living-world or to Heidegger’s concept of “Dasein.” If we do so,we should also accept their view on history, which would still make the above-mentionedhermeneutic complements necessary.There is a second reason that explains why we cannot accept Gadamer’s philosophicalhermeneutics as a hermeneutic complement as such, without examining it critically.Indeed, Gadamer discusses the concept of tradition, but in doing so, he crucially does notlinger long enough on the concept of historical negativity, which, if one follows Nietzsche,this tradition brings along with itself, or to which it is at least vulnerable. In the long run,nihilism is a state of mind, toward which tradition pushes us.Therefore, I think it would make sense to mention two other philosophers, whosephilosophical orientations are known to be post-modern. They have already dealt intensivelywith Gadamer, Husserl, Heidegger and Nietzsche, with regard to historicity. I havein mind the names of Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo.13»Die Überlieferung – das ‘Seins-geschick’ – wird als Sinnerschlossenheit und Wahrheitsquelleanerkannt. Erst diese Einsicht Gadamers ermöglicht die Anerkennung des Wahrheitsanspruchs derTradition und mithin ein neues Verhältnis zu ihr. Man merke dabei die hermeneutische Wendung derOntologie Heideggers: Das Seinsgeschick wird von jetzt an als Tradition aufgefasst.« Jean Grondin, “ZurEntfaltung eines hermeneutischen Wahrheitsbegriffs,” in idem, Der Sinn für Hermeneutik (Darmstadt:Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1994), 45.198