[Andrzej_Wiercinski_(ed ... - WordPress.com

And on the next page:Here the spirit is not in or alongside nature; rather, nature is itself drawn into thespiritual sphere. Also, the ego is then no longer an isolated thing alongside other suchthings in a pregiven world; in general, the serious mutual exteriority of ego-persons,their being alongside one another, ceases in favor of an inward being-for-one-anotherand mutual interpenetration. 27Perhaps the extension of a radical historical Selbstbesinnung requires such a level ofsubjectivity, since it requires that all exteriority can in principle be organized within onesingle subjective economy. But with this move, phenomenology also clearly starts outfrom a position where it can refer to entirely fulfilled intuitions. Certainly this ultimatesubjectivity, towards which the individual reflection points, can not remain anything elsethan an infinite idea. For how could the individual reflecting ego possibly claim to haveintuited history from a viewpoint that encompasses every -- essentially alien -- perspective?The problem of history is essentially related to the problem of the other. The analysesof intersubjectivity, on which Husserl spent so much time, clearly indicate that even theclaim to perform analysis from within the constituting stream of transcendental subjectivity,must admit an important limit. This limit is formally articulated within phenomenologywith the idea of the appresentability of the other. But in terms of content, it marksan indefinite horizon of uncertainty, pertaining not only to the actual content of the subjectivityof the other person in their bodily presence, but also to every culturally generatedobject. And this includes history as it is inherited, in the form of written documents of ourspiritual ancestors.Husserl, in one way acknowledges this, indeed he provides the formal tools forexpressing the situation. Yet in his own desire to deepen the scope of his phenomenology,he reaches out beyond the limits which he himself has articulated. In a sense, he experiencedthis inner conflict in himself. We have the -- often quoted -- pessimistic fragment,included as an appendix to The Crisis, which begins with the saying that philosophy asscience is a dream which is over. 28 There again, Husserl defends the importance of historicalreflection but, at the same time, he seems to seriously doubt that any historicalinterpretation can ever reach beyond the level of “poetic invention.” And yet, this very uncertaintycan be accommodated, as when he says, a bit further down:Let us be more precise. I know of course, what I am striving for under the title ofphilosophy, as the goal and field of my work. And yet I do not know. What autonomousthinker has ever been satisfied with this, his ‘knowledge’? For what autonomousthinker, in his philosophizing life, has ‘philosophy’ ever ceased to be an enigma? 29This humble expression seems to speak against the grander claim found in the otherparts of The Crisis, and particularly the Vienna lecture. Should one seek a reconciliation?Or must not perhaps the range and applicability of phenomenological analysis remain uncertain?Beyond the apparent tensions built into Husserl’s understanding of history as both27Ibid., 298.28Ibid., 394. One should of course be aware, which Carr also points out in his introduction, that thestatement about the end of philosophy as a science does not imply a self-evaluation on Husserl’s part. Thecontext indicates that he is there talking about the spiritual situation in general. The more personal pessimistictone appears further down in the text.29Ibid.245