it means inviting a being to plan instead of living. In this sense, the “prevalence of thefuture” is always a sign of nihilism. 61Marcel addresses his preferences to the past rather than to the future. In this preferencethere are, obviously, no Romantic tones, but there is a consideration of the past as thewhole of the existential experiences which constitute the being who, here and now, I am.The profound memory of the past also allows a grasp, through the confrontation with mypresent, of my “being on the move.” Therefore, such dynamics constitute the starting pointof second degree reflection. 62Nevertheless, according to Marcel, neither the future nor the past are the truly authenticexistential dimension. The past, in fact, can always be “immobiliz<strong>ed</strong>” and “frozen,” andthe more we immobilize the past, the more the future appears as a past ante litteram, apast for anticipation. The past can be grasp<strong>ed</strong> in its profoundness only by linking it to thepresent, to that I, who, thanks to that past, is ‘I am’ hic et nunc. The present is, therefore,the most authentic temporal dimension: “There is not and there cannot be other origin oftime if not the present.” 63 Only the present owns, in fact, that feature of concreteness whichallows me to plan myself authentically, whereas the past and the future have to be consider<strong>ed</strong>simply as a support and a reinforcement of it. Of course, also the present must notbe “frozen,” but rather liv<strong>ed</strong> like “time on the move.” Only by planning a sense thatbegins from the present can we avoid the risk of nihilism.Such a process, in its ambiguity, constantly happens in the personal intimacy of everyone.The memories (i.e., everything I have been) represent the object which my present Iinterprets, while addressing them to my future I. It is the “being on the move” of thepresent which allows second degree reflection; and it is always a time lag which allowsfor a reflection, a reflection which can be consider<strong>ed</strong> a process of interpretation.At this point, it is important to note the relevance of Josiah Royce’s thought inMarcel’s development of this dynamic. An interpretation is real, according to Royce, onlyif the interpreters, i.e., the <strong>com</strong>municating subjects, constitute a real and concrete <strong>com</strong>munity,that is, only if the object does not remain extraneous, but is participat<strong>ed</strong> in by theinterpreters. And it is important that this happen, especially if the interpretative processoccurs in the intimacy of my I, because if the I who I am hic et nunc remains unconnect<strong>ed</strong>with everything which I have been and which leads me to be what I am, if itdoes not really participate in that heritage of memories, then my future I will also beexclud<strong>ed</strong> from it, outlining a process of total alienation. 64Marcel makes use of Royce’s theory of interpretation, but transfers it into a pureexistentialist context. By using another notion introduc<strong>ed</strong> by Royce, 65 he emphasizes thatwhat is demand<strong>ed</strong>, in the exercise of second degree reflection and in the interpretiveprocess, is an act of loyalty to this concreteness. The penalty for a lack of loyalty to concretenessis the relapse into first degree reflection: the concept will “get cold” and willbe<strong>com</strong>e again an “empty container,” without any concrete relationship with reality. To be“witness of concreteness” means precisely to recognize the second degree reflection andthe fallibility of any concept which it shows, and to accept it consciously. 66The fre<strong>ed</strong>om of accepting or refusing second degree reflection presents two inseparableaspects. An ontological aspect: as it is a relationship with Being, my existence is a part61See Gabriel Marcel, Homo Viator (Paris: Aubier, éd. Montaigne, 1945). The “prevalence of future”is one of Marcel’s criticisms of Heidegger.62Marcel, The Mystery of Being, 1: 194-195.63Marcel, Journal, September 15, 1915.64See Josiah Royce, The World and the Individual (New York: MacMillan, 1900).65See Josiah Royce, Philosophy of Loyalty (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1999).66See Marcel, The Mystery of Being, 1: 170.66
thereof. And an ethical aspect: that relationship is also, especially in its failures, theoriginal interpretation of the truth. Moreover, such an ethical aspect of second degreereflection is link<strong>ed</strong> with a constant attention to a theme which Marcel, in the Journal,label<strong>ed</strong> “the question of totality” and which, later, can be identifi<strong>ed</strong> with the pursuit of atheoretic space where it can be possible to conceive an universal clearly personal but notexclusively subjective. In this sense, the privilege of universality is peculiar also tophilosophy, and springs from an element which prec<strong>ed</strong>es every experience and which isat the origin of it: that “new imm<strong>ed</strong>iate” which, for Marcel, is existence. This is whyMarcel introduces second degree reflection: whereas first degree reflection tends to“freeze” the universal beyond every concreteness deriving from existence, the concreteuniversal, which constitutes the aim of Marcel, restores the connection between existenceand concept, returning concreteness to concept. Precisely for this reason, this universal canbe<strong>com</strong>e visible only in these intersubjective, historical and concrete experiences whichactualize it. 67 This is a clearly personal universal, as it roots in “my” concrete and particularexistence, in “my” unique and unrepeatable look at the world; at the same time,this universal is not exclusively subjective, as it has not an unique “center” -- we can say, instead,that there are as many centers as “existent looks.” Therefore, only intersubjectivity --a term which, without doubt, Marcel assumes from Husserl or, in any case, from thephenomenological movement -- guarantees that “convergence of looks” which constitutesthe concrete universality. 68In his paper Gabriel Marcel and Phenomenology, Ricoeur writes:Thus for Husserl the concept of subjectivity is divid<strong>ed</strong> between a de jure universality,which fulfills its epistemological function of final justification, and a de facto singularityresulting from its thoroughly temporal constitution. It is the paradox that gave rise tothe question of intersubjectivity. If the subject must be the final foundation and if thesubject must be singular, there remains only one possibility: a kind of collegial or ecumenicalfoundation in which the virtually unlimit<strong>ed</strong> <strong>com</strong>munity of subjects carries theweight of universality.Less concern<strong>ed</strong> with founding the sciences than with justifying human existence,Marcellian thinking attempts to escape from the choice between the universal and theparticular by adopting an “interm<strong>ed</strong>iary level,” which is illustrat<strong>ed</strong> by aesthetic experience.69Clearly, the aesthetic experience is not limit<strong>ed</strong> to what is usually consider<strong>ed</strong> a “workof art.” In some way, the experience of second degree reflection is an aesthetic experience,precisely because it is, essentially, an interpretative act. There is, in Marcel, an attemptof neither renouncing the concept -- though, as we said, this concept is an “overturn<strong>ed</strong>”concept, to the point that it loses every abstractness and reconquers the concreteness lostin the abstraction -- nor the possibility of the universality connect<strong>ed</strong> with the concept.Through a keeping distance from the imm<strong>ed</strong>iate, where time plays a fundamental role,second degree reflection succe<strong>ed</strong>s in grasping, or at least in having a look at what eludesfirst degree reflection: second degree reflection reaches its aim precisely when it showsus the failure of reason.67For a general introduction of this topic, see Pagano, La dimensione dell’universalità e l’esperienzaermeneutica, 67-68.68See the Conclusion of Marcel, The Mystery of Being, particularly 171-172.69Ricoeur, “Gabriel Marcel and Phenomenology,” 480-481.67
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various forms of idealist philosoph
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self-givenness (Selbstgegebenheit)
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It must be admitted in this regard
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If our analysis is correct, the “
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The esthesiology of the senses of t
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in certain cases, together with the
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what the touched hand recognizes wh
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heart; a presence where a lived tak
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conceives it, not on the basis of n
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Merleau-Ponty, a form, a relation o
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out in “Eye and Mind.” So, let
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God creates, or better, draws, a
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the “there,” the “one same sp
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free to function more purely as a p
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close grasp of the sleight of the h
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understood both as discursive thoug
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While Henry thus questions “the m
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is able to persist in the undergoin
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“remember,” but not as I would
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intentionally structured self-consc
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life can ultimately be defined in i
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4. THE SUBJECTIVE BODY AND THE IDEA
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and the represented body (the combi
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The Oversight of Life’s OneselfTh
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more than externality and its unfol
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effort if this effort gives rise to
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manifest in the self-givenness of l
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Transcendental affectivity 71 is th
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The pursuit of health, strongly rei
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each the prey of their own pathos.
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According to views held by Gadamer
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and writing - the tools which human
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or disclosedness (Erschlossenheit)
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exclusively from his own point of v
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the same direction as practical wis
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of ‘art’ which still stands bef
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Gadamer’s approach, however, is n
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of biology and physiology, or they
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IV.PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOMENTS IN THE
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Therefore, I would like to concentr
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classical Greek tradition of thinki
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This uneasiness in human beings, wh
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appears in the way of its appearanc
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We can sense such a philosophical d
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the act of interpreting, except whe
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phenomenological development. The p
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II.A Liberation, With a Meeting in
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denken lässt -, sondern das Leben:
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Sinn” 17 and, following this: “
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Wenn ich dieses Buch sehe, sehe ich
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Der christlich-jüdische Gott ist d
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3. A “BETTER” OR JUST “ANOTHE
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if we have two persons, a master an
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V.THE ARCHEOLOGY OF HERMENEUTIC PHE
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cosmic world, and Nietzschean nihil
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absolute lawgiver to any possible
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solitude.” 26 If there is a “hi
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of reason, as far as the single hum
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transcendental reason, 46 pure rati
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and properties of sensible phenomen
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In clear distantiation from his own
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2. HISTORY AS THE OTHER -- NOTES ON
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precisely the accomplishment of phe
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ought as such into the present, it
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educed state. As soon as the reflec
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explicitly in the Vienna lecture, w
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the task and the very environment o
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stood “from itself.” As a resul
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makes possible the further interpre
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of Being -- already grown into Bein
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the Husserlian idea of phenomenolog
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into the openness of Being, it diff
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We now need to quote a second, well
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“knowledge about the world.” In
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Husserl’s ConversionsTheological
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And this proved, probably, to be a
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Husserl’s Reflective Phenomenolog
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to beings of the same nature. But t
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worldlessness of Husserl’s intent
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According to Aristotle, intellectio
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6. RIGOR AND ORIGINARITY: THE TRANS
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The latter, the nonessential princi
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that, for Husserl, every act is ind
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not forget what Husserl meant by a-
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things, we shall comprehend by intu
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something,’ is not merely there (
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epoché in Husserl become a hermene
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When Heidegger characterizes world-