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these structures throughout the whole of Dasein’s Being is not decisively comprehendeduntil the existentialia are correlated with the structures that define Dasein’s comportmenttoward beings, including itself, namely, those which are constitutive of the “there,” understanding,states of mind, and discourse. The deepened inclusivity of Heidegger’s hermeneuticsfurther emphasizes the importance of affirming the priority of the understandingof Being within the existential analytic. The ontological focus for hermeneutics emergessimply by recalling that understanding is itself a primary component within the disclosednessof the “there,” and that it is in the process of considering the existential constitutionof the “there” that the issue of interpretation first emerges. From this hermeneutic situationarises the clue for discovering not only that interpretation is a radicalization of Dasein’scapacity for self-disclosure, but that, as mentioned before, disclosedness encompassesDasein’s Being as care. Heidegger’s so-called critique of philosophical anthropology infavor of this quick move from the comprehension of the Being of Dasein to interpretation,allows him to pass over, to move quickly from, the ontic to the ontological, thus takingthe short cut to the ontology of Dasein.But this short cut to ontology overlooks a possible distinction between the essential andexistential aspects of man’s being as a synthesis of the finite and infinite. 16 By dwellingon and emphasizing the statement in Being and Time: that “The ‘essence’ of Dasein lies inits existence,” 17 the longer way is precluded by this very stress on the essence as existence.For, even if man’s essence or way of Being is to exist, and if understanding is constitutiveof his Being as Dasein, this existence can still be looked at and analyzed from the point ofview of its concreteness. Thus, Ricoeur’s long way does not entail so much a denial ofthe existentiality or the ontology of Dasein as much as it is corrective by pausing in adetour to reflect on some existential aspects before indulging Heidegger’s prejudice towardthe prior necessity of ontological reflection. Thus, Heidegger’s short way prejudices theissue in favor of his own short way at the expense of clear advantages to the longer way,which pauses to reflect on certain existential dimensions that are not essential to humanbeing. This long way, in distinguishing certain existential dimensions from essentialaspects of human being, affords a great advantage in dealing with human evil. Yet thisdetour to human existence can profit from Heidegger’s myopic view, as will be seen.Hence, let us now turn to the further analysis of Heidegger’s shorter way to ontologythrough his brand of hermeneutics, in order to set the stage for this gain from Heidegger’sway.To address interpretation in this Heideggerian way as a phenomenon is to becomeresponsive to a movement which already oversees the deeper integration of all the componentsof Dasein’s Being and brings to the forefront its own initial dependence on theadvance comprehension of existence, which is ontological at the expense of ontic aspectsof existence. An opportunity is thereby created for arriving at the disclosedness ofexistence precisely as it takes shape in the interpreter him or herself. Interpretation, then,allows the self to relate directly to the possibilities which are housed in the forecomprehension;this appropriative process, which is directed from the center of Dasein’spotentiality to be, implicitly establishes the interpreter’s own entrance into the truth priorto any attempt at conceptualization.This ontological emphasis is further reinforced by the fact that any view of “language”is governed by the advance comprehension of existence in such a way that the analysisturns to address the constitution of Dasein in order to discover the capacity for speech.Implicitly, interpretation involves articulating whatever has already been comprehended,16Note that Being is capitalized in the context of Heidegger’s reference to Dasein’s Being process,and not for a more ontic aspect of the synthesis of the finite and infinite.17Heidegger, Being and Time, 67.78