and the represent<strong>ed</strong> body (the <strong>com</strong>bination of forces, actions, affections, frailties). Theliving knowl<strong>ed</strong>ge of life, in its original appearance, would be thought about by Heideggerin his early Freiburg Courses, deliver<strong>ed</strong> between 1919 and 1923, in terms of Erlebnis orliv<strong>ed</strong>, 12 and subsequently, after 1920, as the practical affective dimension of the experienceof life in terms of Befindlichkeit and Stimmung, starting from the reading of Aristotle. 13The essentially affective knowl<strong>ed</strong>ge of life, proper to all that is liv<strong>ed</strong>, is not only characteriz<strong>ed</strong>by a certain passivity but also, and mainly, by the absence of distance thatseparates the cognizant subject from the object known within theoretical knowl<strong>ed</strong>ge,because to live something is to be it. Erlebnis does not mean the contemplation of anexternal process nor an “inner” or “psychological” process pertaining to subjectivity orconsciousness, since the liv<strong>ed</strong> knows no internal nor external, i.e., my life is only livingto the extent that it lives in a world, has a world, which is but the world I have and livein. 14 Experience being a vital, historical process, its intelligibility does not depend on themere observation of facts but on the blending of memory and expectation, as Dilthey hadalready argu<strong>ed</strong>. The ideality of meaning cannot, therefore, be assign<strong>ed</strong> to a transcendentalsubject because it <strong>com</strong>es from the liv<strong>ed</strong>. The experience that offers itself to the subject isfound<strong>ed</strong> on meaningfulness and experiential nexus. Therefore, epistemic consciousnesssimply continues the thought initiat<strong>ed</strong> in the experience of life, since it is previouslysituat<strong>ed</strong> in its vital nexus and finds in it the reference of its own being. Science cannot,therefore, replace the ground on which it is itself root<strong>ed</strong>, i.e., the sensus <strong>com</strong>munis (Vico),the ground for all ability and legitimacy to think and act (ability to judge). The sensus<strong>com</strong>munis, or “<strong>com</strong>mon understanding” (der gemeine Verstand), is decisively characteriz<strong>ed</strong>by the ability to judge, so judgement is not a concept creat<strong>ed</strong> by reflective consciousnessbut inde<strong>ed</strong> a sense of judgement similar to the sensitive judgements that, despite beingform<strong>ed</strong> with some certainty, are not however logically demonstrable. Life itself is theorigin and fundament both of the objectivity of scientific knowl<strong>ed</strong>ge and the philosophicalreflection to arrive at the truth: the link between Life and knowl<strong>ed</strong>ge is, therefore, anoriginary given, since consciousness is always incorporat<strong>ed</strong> in history, in society, in economy,in technique and in culture. Since Dilthey, subject/consciousness and object/naturecease to be regions of the Metaphysica Specialis; instead they designate concrete circlesof phenomena, layers of facts, which concrete man describes and observes according tohis position in the world, his experiential, cognitive and volitive attitude. The liv<strong>ed</strong> body(corps vécu) re-establishes the importance of the phantasmic, suffering body in the faceof the dissect<strong>ed</strong> body.Heidegger’s analysis of the structure of man’s way of being meant the over<strong>com</strong>ing ofa monadological and self-sufficient concept of man, rooting human essence in the connectionwith the other and others, in tradition, within the framework of societies and theirinstitutions as significant m<strong>ed</strong>iations of language. The work of rationalization and systematizationof the world, therefore, can only be explain<strong>ed</strong> by the hermeneutics of facticityin its capacity to analyze the previous way of being-there of the being in the world, thereason why Heidegger does not talk about the subject as something separat<strong>ed</strong> from theworld but about Dasein -- something that is relat<strong>ed</strong> to and inseparable from the world. Forits facticity, the subject in its hermeneutic experience returns in the guise of the object,12Martin Heidegger, Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie, GA 56/57, <strong>ed</strong>. Bernd Heimbüchel (Frankfurta.M.: Klostermann, 1987), 63-67.13Here it is no longer the concept of life that enables existence (Dasein) to be thought, but thebeing-for-death, the ontological difference that brings about anguish.14Cf. Martin Heidegger, Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Einführung in diephänomenologische Forschung (Wintersemester 1921/22), GA 61, <strong>ed</strong>. Walter Bröcker und Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1985), 86.154
as there will be no point in creating alternative horizons of sense or of personal orcollective fulfillment, if these are not appropriable by those for whom they are design<strong>ed</strong>.The phenomenology of the temporality of perception leads inevitably to the assumptionof the historicity of all experience at the level of the world of life. Human reality revealsitself as structurally dynamic as Life, or the relationship incarnat<strong>ed</strong> from the self with thethings that surround it. What is originary is the relationship mark<strong>ed</strong> by temporality (thenew way of being 15 ), “since man, revealing himself to be a being fundamentally orient<strong>ed</strong>toward the future….”; i.e., an unmade being, who only lives through plans and hopes. Thehuman experience of the meaning of the world is the openness of the being: man issituat<strong>ed</strong> “in the openness of the being,” he lives project<strong>ed</strong> into the future and not in thepresent, he is originally a practical being that, through language, memory and his abilityto pr<strong>ed</strong>ict/anticipate, plans and directs all his activity (praxis) towards a concrete, historicaland unfinish<strong>ed</strong> existential dimension. The excessive or future, possible and linguisticdimension of the human way of being breaks out against the egological and monadologicalmodels of the person, taking down the historic-ontological premises of the monadological-modernconcept of self-consciousness and its filiation from the Greek metaphysical-cosmologicalmodel of considering the real as a given thing. 16 In turn, th<strong>ed</strong>ecisive contribution of Psychoanalysis to the de-construction of the cogito reveal<strong>ed</strong> a profoundstructure similar to that of the object libido. 17 The linguisticity that crosses the wholeenigma of the body imposes on Western contemporary thought 18 the non-identificationof the body as an objective thing, as a thing that one has and uses. The body is fiction,a set of mental representations that are prepar<strong>ed</strong>, dissolv<strong>ed</strong>, reconstruct<strong>ed</strong> at the will of thesubject’s history and the m<strong>ed</strong>iation of social-symbolic discourse. The body is liv<strong>ed</strong> fromwithin as a myself. It is in the word, in the action, that the self is present as a person, inflesh and blood, and it is through it, as belonging to a given culture, that man constituteshimself as the bearer of a vision of the world and things. As the body takes on multiplesignifications, in a symbolic universe, this humanizes itself, also constituting itself as afundamental possibility for man’s expression and fulfillment in the language of the world.The absolute non-identity of the self with the body is a consequence of human nature asexcess in relation to every potential of the organic body; an excess that manifests itself inthe thought, in the will, in the fre<strong>ed</strong>om that express and fulfill themselves in corporality.The body thus incarnates the order of the symbolic, 19 reviving the Humboltzian connectionof language (energeia) as vision and constitution of the world, in which the originaryhumanity of language simultaneously means the originary linguality of the being-in-theworldof man. 20 Consequently, language is m<strong>ed</strong>iation and not an instrument (reflectiveor conceptual) of the self- and re-awareness of the subject as a tense unity of organic andsymbolic systems within the historical and <strong>com</strong>munitarian relationship that it establisheswith the other.15Silva, “Corpo Vivido: do corpo-objecto ao corpo-consciente,” 65.16Maria Luísa Portocarrero da Silva, “Retórica e apropriação na hermenêutica de Gadamer,” Separata(da) Revista Filosófica de Coimbra 5, no. 3 (1994): 113.17Michel Henry, “La pratique psychanalytique ne cesse de vérifier le primat de l’irreprésentable quidétermine la représentation et par exemple la prise de conscience,” in idem, La Barbarie, 163. Cf. Ricœur,Le Conflit des interprétations, 22.18Cf. Gabriel Marcel, Être et avoir (Paris, 1951), 225-226.19Ricœur, Le Conflit des interprétations, 159.20Gadamer, Le Problème de la conscience historique, 531.155
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various forms of idealist philosoph
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self-givenness (Selbstgegebenheit)
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It must be admitted in this regard
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down and all the way back.” 51 Fo
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Heidegger characterized his own pro
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Heidegger’s transcendental-existe
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perceived world” (PP, 25), Merlea
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in the unreflected, in “perceptio
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Nor would Merleau-Ponty have had an
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a way that we do not all crash into
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“I think” but in “the dialogu
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in existence a “super-abundance o
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crucial “other” in our becoming
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to its being grounded in terms of b
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(“History is this quasi-‘thing
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manner (statistical or regression a
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and they are such, precisely becaus
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interpreted the world, and that the
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is not rationalist or idealist in t
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title Herbert Spiegelberg gave to h
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II.TOWARD A TELOS OF SIGNIFYING COM
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published in Being and Having. 12 T
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inside me which makes me able to re
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or is not existence something that
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ReflectionPhilosophical thought is
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attempt at unification, the reflect
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thereof. And an ethical aspect: tha
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According to Ricoeur, “It is here
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the most meaningful contemporary sw
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ival hermeneutics that we perceive
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more pronounced recoil whereby the
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these structures throughout the who
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By seeking a deeper unity of Dasein
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folds a pre-given set of possibilit
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of experience is correlated to a pa
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explanations of causal events in th
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accept one argument over another. A
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a subtle dialectic between argument
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or warrant an assertion. Such fulfi
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the assertive vehemence of the hist
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positions of the subject. For memor
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attestation slips a plurality, most
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What confidence in the word of othe
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From where, perhaps, the place of t
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II.A Liberation, With a Meeting in
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denken lässt -, sondern das Leben:
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Sinn” 17 and, following this: “
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Wenn ich dieses Buch sehe, sehe ich
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Der christlich-jüdische Gott ist d
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3. A “BETTER” OR JUST “ANOTHE
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if we have two persons, a master an
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V.THE ARCHEOLOGY OF HERMENEUTIC PHE
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cosmic world, and Nietzschean nihil
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absolute lawgiver to any possible
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solitude.” 26 If there is a “hi
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of reason, as far as the single hum
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transcendental reason, 46 pure rati
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and properties of sensible phenomen
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In clear distantiation from his own
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2. HISTORY AS THE OTHER -- NOTES ON
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precisely the accomplishment of phe
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ought as such into the present, it
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educed state. As soon as the reflec
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explicitly in the Vienna lecture, w
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the task and the very environment o
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stood “from itself.” As a resul
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makes possible the further interpre
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of Being -- already grown into Bein
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the Husserlian idea of phenomenolog
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into the openness of Being, it diff
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We now need to quote a second, well
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“knowledge about the world.” In
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Husserl’s ConversionsTheological
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And this proved, probably, to be a
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Husserl’s Reflective Phenomenolog
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to beings of the same nature. But t
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worldlessness of Husserl’s intent
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According to Aristotle, intellectio
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6. RIGOR AND ORIGINARITY: THE TRANS
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The latter, the nonessential princi
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that, for Husserl, every act is ind
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not forget what Husserl meant by a-
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things, we shall comprehend by intu
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something,’ is not merely there (
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epoché in Husserl become a hermene
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When Heidegger characterizes world-