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The latter, the nonessential principle of the unity of sciences, can be twofold: on theone hand it consists in the unity of the thing. Here, truth would relate to “one and thesame objectivity (Gegenständlichkeit) or to one and the same genre.” 9 As such, scienceswould not explain anything through groundwork, but rather, they would merely describesomething. They would be descriptive sciences inasmuch as their “descriptive unity wasdetermined by the empirical unity of an object or set of objects.” 10On the other hand, a nonsensical principle might arise “from a unitary valuing interest[aus einem einheitlichen wertschätzenden Interesse].” “This therefore constitutes thebelonging together (Zusammengehörigkeit) of truth-content or unity within the realm ofnormative disciplines.” 11This truth/unity constitutes theory. From this perspective, philosophical inquiry into theconditions of possibility of science becomes the question after the conditions of possibilityof general theory, that is, of theoretical knowledge as such. 12 Owing to that, philosophicalinquiry is actually a form of meta-theorizing, or a theory of theory. This ‘theoryof theory’ idea is only possible through a “completely different revisiting of forms andlaws, and of the theoretical links of the level of knowledge they belong to.” 13 “A pure logicwould be hence something to clear up the idea of theory.” 14This attempt, as shown in the Prolegomena, will be continued by Husserl in theIntroduction to the second book of the LU, without, in this case, staying with the questionafter the essence of theory but with the possibility of knowledge in general. 15c) Phenomenology Characterized as Groundwork for Particular SciencesIn his introduction to the second book of the LU, Husserl clearly points out the scopeof phenomenology: “Pure phenomenology shows a field of neutral research upon whichdiverse sciences are rooted.” 16 We have already indicated that, even though phenomenologyis presented in LU as a phenomenology of life-experiences (Erlebnis), it ought not to bemistaken for psychology. Instead, it should be understood as a purely eidetic science. Thatis how the analysis points toward logical ideas and not toward psychic acts.The task of setting up a more detailed characterization of phenomenology as such isfueled by the analysis regarding theory and the essence of science that was done in theprolegomena. But the limits set in the Prolegomena only started a push forward, due tothe development of pure logic as a mathesis universalis: “the great task of clearing up anddistinguishing, in a theoretical and congnitive way, logical ideas, concepts and norms,arises.” 17Yet clarity and distinction are not to be found within theoretical explanations ordescriptions, as they indeed are in particular sciences. Phenomenology ought to be “ascience standing on a fundamental basis.” 18 The theoretical-cognitive task of reflexivephenomenology turns up instead well before any given descriptive or explicative sciencedoes.9Hua XVIII, A 235.10We can also refer to these sciences as concrete, or, following Kries, ontological.11Hua XVIII, A 236.12Ibid., A 237.13Ibid., A 243.14Ibid., A 254.15See Rudolf Bernet, Iso Kern, and Eduard Marbach, Edmund Husserl, 2d rev. ed. (Hamburg:Meiner Verlag, 1996), 50ff.16Hua XIX/1, A 4.17Ibid., A 7.18Hua V, 139.276