life), Rembrandt proposes an interpretation of himself, and that the work is henceforthorphan<strong>ed</strong> from its author and its context.Just as living speech made room for writing, the work is unglu<strong>ed</strong>, unmoor<strong>ed</strong>, and thereis nothing to look for around or behind it other than the absence of the one that render<strong>ed</strong>in this portrait what he saw of his face, and that he di<strong>ed</strong>. And this portrait, preciselybecause it is orphan<strong>ed</strong> (I would say unmoor<strong>ed</strong>), looks at us today, made of us its contemporaries.It makes us see new resemblances.There is, in the numerous attempts of van Gogh to paint some shoes, the pairssometimes lovingly odd, something that is at the level of a self-portrait. That is theappraisal of Jacques Derrida, in the text of “Restitution”:Dans un autoportrait, on se rend soi-même. À soi-même. … Mais rendre n’a pas lemême sens dans les deux locutions: se rendre en peinture et se rendre quelque choseà soi-même, se payer. … et se rendre à quelqu’un serait pour qui se livre dans uner<strong>ed</strong>dition, un quatrième sens. Van Gogh a rendu ses chaussures, il s’est rendu dans seschaussures, il s’est rendu avec ses chaussures, il s’est rendu à ses chaussures, il s’estrendu ses chaussures. 19What would be the differend between Derrida and Ricoeur? I don’t know. Mourning isnot the same, maybe, but do we ever have the same mourning, and is it not just this thatmakes it irreparable? In La métaphore vive Ricoeur discuss<strong>ed</strong> the deconstruction by whichDerrida, in his Mythologie blanche, sees a western metaphysical bias acting on the wholeof modern philosophical discourse with metaphors that are worn-out, s<strong>ed</strong>iment<strong>ed</strong>, erod<strong>ed</strong>,apparently abolish<strong>ed</strong>, but that conceal themselves of it. 20Le coup de maître, ici, est d’entrer dans le métaphorique, non par la porte de lanaissance, mais, si j’ose dire, par la porte de la mort. Le concept d’usure implique toutautre chose que le concept d’abus que nous avons vu opposer à celui d’usage par lesauteurs anglo-saxons. 21But it is not enough to resuscitate metaphor under a concept, to show its reproductivemechanism: first because, it seems to me, wearing down itself could produce new significations,through the crumbling of semantic spheres, or setting in relief the sense thatemerges in ordinary use. And then there is that which Ricoeur, in a sort of secondaryKantianism, calls “le schématisme de l’attribution métaphorique,” the possibility thatoriginal gaps slip into an old metaphor, reopening it, and to making it say something quitenew; finally because there exists, constantly, always already taking support from thenetwork of s<strong>ed</strong>iment<strong>ed</strong> metaphors, the invention of new living metaphors.Ricoeur’s protest would be that one cannot separate mourning and birth, and that underhistory and forgetting themselves there is life. We can here recall that birth is a decisivephilosophical theme on which Ricoeur rejoins Arendt:must this not be understood as a discreet yet stubborn protest address<strong>ed</strong> to theHeideggerian philosophy of being-toward-death? Should we not see action as “an ever19Jacques Derrida, La Vérité en peinture (Paris: Flammarion, 1978), 435.20“Ce sont les grandes métaphores ontologiques de la présence, de la demeure, du sol, du soleil, verslesquelles se retournent les figures de la philosophie depuis Platon (cit<strong>ed</strong> in Ricoeur, La métaphore vive,367).21Ibid., 362.106
present reminder that men, though they must die, are not born in order to die but inorder to begin”? In this respect, “action… looks like a miracle. (p. 246)The evocation of the miracle of action, at the origin of the miracle of forgiveness,seriously calls into question the entire analysis of the faculty of forgiveness. How can themastery of time be join<strong>ed</strong> to the miracle of natality? It is precisely this question that setsour entire enterprise into motion again and invites us to pursue the odyssey of forgivenessto the center of selfhood. In my opinion, what is lacking in the political interpretation offorgiveness, which assures its symmetry with promising on the same level of exchange,is any reflection on the very active binding propos<strong>ed</strong> as the condition for the act ofbinding.” (p. 636)7. The Faculty of UnbindingForgiveness introduces at once a link, a bond of debt and mourning, and an unbinding,a rupture, the faculty to start over. 22 It is why there is no ne<strong>ed</strong> to raise the birth to thepoint of making it a triumph of life, like an unending process of renewal, which would<strong>com</strong>pletely lack the tragic. 23 The theme of birth appears since Le volontaire etl’involontaire as even more radical than that of death, and <strong>com</strong>pris<strong>ed</strong> at the same time ofthe vigorous joy in the new, and of mourning. Birth is also orphan<strong>ed</strong>, it is a necessaryfacet of all experience, a fundamental limit. And I would quickly point out that the lastpages of Memory, History, Forgetting, which foreground the undecidable character of thepolarity that divides forgetting between the grief-stricken entropy of erasure and the joyfulconfidence in that which he calls the forgetting in reserve, brings this equivocation to itsparoxysm.If we give cr<strong>ed</strong>it to the <strong>com</strong>petence of ordinary beings in the face of time, we will notthen think of mourning without thinking of birth, that is to say the desire to be -- it is herethat the Bergsonianism probably conceals a discreet Spinozism, a deeply affirmativeorientation, approving of the thought of Paul Ricoeur, who ends his book on the notionof life, of in<strong>com</strong>pleteness. But this living continuity that one recovers with the astonishingidea of a forgetting in reserve that he opposes to the forgetting of erasure, to th<strong>ed</strong>iscontinuity of deaths and births, as being of the same strength, does not designatesomething that would be at our disposal (otherwise this would not be of the order offorgetting), but something that arranges us. Moreover: in this respect, there is norepresentation of the past that could be a resurrection of it, that would no doubt requirea finish<strong>ed</strong> work of memory (p. 499) -- mourning is there to separate the past from thepresent and to make room for the future, that is to say for being carefree, for forgettingoneself. Whence <strong>com</strong>es the final Kierkegaardian note.It is inde<strong>ed</strong> a point where one can speak of a still<strong>ed</strong> forgetting, (oubli d vr) andRicoeur then cites the magnificent pages of Kierkegaard on the lilies of the field and thebirds of the sky, who do not work, do not <strong>com</strong>pare, who forget themselves. Thisinsouciance, this unbinding of the care of self, is again a theme of the forgiveness, not22This unbinding is a <strong>com</strong>pletely primary metapolitical theme, hearkening back to the PuritanReformation, on the right of breaking alliances and contracts. At the same time it is a <strong>com</strong>ic theme, atheme of wisdom: thus Ricoeur develops elsewhere more tragic and epic theses, which do not allow usas easily to think the binding of the agent and his act that Badiou attributes to Ricoeur as a Christianconception of the subject. Since then I have explain<strong>ed</strong> this in an article appearing in the Herne journals.23This would also be a mistaken reading of Hannah Arendt.107
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various forms of idealist philosoph
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self-givenness (Selbstgegebenheit)
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It must be admitted in this regard
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down and all the way back.” 51 Fo
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Heidegger characterized his own pro
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Heidegger’s transcendental-existe
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perceived world” (PP, 25), Merlea
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in the unreflected, in “perceptio
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Nor would Merleau-Ponty have had an
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a way that we do not all crash into
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“I think” but in “the dialogu
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in existence a “super-abundance o
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crucial “other” in our becoming
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to its being grounded in terms of b
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(“History is this quasi-‘thing
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manner (statistical or regression a
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and they are such, precisely becaus
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interpreted the world, and that the
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is not rationalist or idealist in t
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title Herbert Spiegelberg gave to h
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II.TOWARD A TELOS OF SIGNIFYING COM
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The Oversight of Life’s OneselfTh
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more than externality and its unfol
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effort if this effort gives rise to
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manifest in the self-givenness of l
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Transcendental affectivity 71 is th
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The pursuit of health, strongly rei
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each the prey of their own pathos.
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According to views held by Gadamer
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and writing - the tools which human
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or disclosedness (Erschlossenheit)
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exclusively from his own point of v
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the same direction as practical wis
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of ‘art’ which still stands bef
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Gadamer’s approach, however, is n
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of biology and physiology, or they
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IV.PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOMENTS IN THE
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Therefore, I would like to concentr
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classical Greek tradition of thinki
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This uneasiness in human beings, wh
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appears in the way of its appearanc
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We can sense such a philosophical d
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the act of interpreting, except whe
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phenomenological development. The p
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II.A Liberation, With a Meeting in
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denken lässt -, sondern das Leben:
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Sinn” 17 and, following this: “
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Wenn ich dieses Buch sehe, sehe ich
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Der christlich-jüdische Gott ist d
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3. A “BETTER” OR JUST “ANOTHE
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if we have two persons, a master an
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V.THE ARCHEOLOGY OF HERMENEUTIC PHE
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cosmic world, and Nietzschean nihil
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absolute lawgiver to any possible
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solitude.” 26 If there is a “hi
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of reason, as far as the single hum
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transcendental reason, 46 pure rati
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and properties of sensible phenomen
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In clear distantiation from his own
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2. HISTORY AS THE OTHER -- NOTES ON
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precisely the accomplishment of phe
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ought as such into the present, it
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educed state. As soon as the reflec
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explicitly in the Vienna lecture, w
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the task and the very environment o
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stood “from itself.” As a resul
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makes possible the further interpre
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of Being -- already grown into Bein
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the Husserlian idea of phenomenolog
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into the openness of Being, it diff
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We now need to quote a second, well
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“knowledge about the world.” In
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Husserl’s ConversionsTheological
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And this proved, probably, to be a
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Husserl’s Reflective Phenomenolog
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to beings of the same nature. But t
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worldlessness of Husserl’s intent
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According to Aristotle, intellectio
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6. RIGOR AND ORIGINARITY: THE TRANS
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The latter, the nonessential princi
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that, for Husserl, every act is ind
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not forget what Husserl meant by a-
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things, we shall comprehend by intu
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something,’ is not merely there (
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epoché in Husserl become a hermene
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When Heidegger characterizes world-