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demand something impossible? Does his concept of phenomenology not defy the veryessence of phenomenological description as conceived by Husserl?Heidegger maintains that quite the opposite is the case. In Being and Time, and in hislectures from the twenties, he underscores again and again that his “analytic of Dasein”still represents the true descriptive (phenomenological) method. Yet his understanding ofthis concept differs from Husserl’s in that he maintains that the phenomenological descriptiondoes not so much understand the described thing adequately, but rather, interprets it(auslegt). Hence his assertion that “the meaning of phenomenological description as amethod lies in interpretation.” 4The Husserlian postulate concerning the adequate, transparent description of theappearance of things, described as per original, essential insight [Wesensanschauung], hasbeen transformed here into postulating an understanding that realizes itself as interpretation(die Auslegung).This radical transformation of the very procedure of the phenomenological methodresults, first of all, from the fact that Heidegger conceives of the described “thing” in avery different way than does Husserl. As Pöggeler writes, Heidegger’s phenomenologyhat nicht auszugehen von der “Anschauung,” wenn diese Anschauung gedacht wird alsAnschauung von “Objekten,” sondern vom “Verstehen.” Die “Beschreibung” darf nichtals Beschreibung von Objektartigem, von dinglich Seiendem gefaßt werden, sondernmuß vom Verstehen geleitet sein. 5The transformation of the described “thing” that now becomes a “thing” of understanding,implies a new stance taken up toward it by the phenomenologist. The one who describesthe “thing” relates to it as always already open to it, that is to say, he or she “understand” the“thing” when it is already “affected” by him or her. Consequently, the described “thing”cannot be treated by them simply as the object of their description (noemat), since thisimplies and makes possible the very way in which it is described. This difference resultsfrom the fact that the “thing” is conceived by Heidegger neither as the way in which theobjects of the outer world appear in the consciousness of the phenomenologist, nor as thestructural component of consciousness itself; the “thing” is the very “meaning of Being”that is always already understood/interpreted by the Dasein that describes it:The λóγος of the phenomenology of Dasein has the character of a ερµηευειν, throughwhich the authentic meaning of Being, and also those basic structures of Being whichDasein itself possesses, are made known to Dasein’s understanding of Being. The phenomenologyof Dasein is a hermeneutic in the primordial signification of this word,where it designates this business of interpreting. 6To describe these “things,” then, means (for Heidegger) to explore the basic existentialstructures of Dasein and thus prepare for the interpretation of the “meaning of Being.”This type of description, which progresses as the analytic of Dasein -- which, in turn,4Heidegger, Being and Time, 61. “Der methodische Sinn der phänomenologischen Deskription istdie Auslegung.” Idem, Sein und Zeit, 37.5Otto Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers (Pfullingen: Neske, 1963), 68.6Heidegger, Being and Time, 61-62. “Der λóγος der Phänomenologie des Daseins hat den Charakterdes ερµηευειν, durch das dem zum Dasein selbst gehörigen Seinsverständnis der eigentliche Sinn vonSein und die Grundstrukturen seines eigenen Seins kundgegeben werden. Phänomenologie des Daseinsist Hermeneutik in der ursprünglichen Bedeutung des Wortes, wonach es das Geschäft der Auslegung bezeichnet.”Idem, Sein und Zeit, 37.249