A History of English Language

A history of the english language 266
signify to tie, in like manner as to untie signifies to loose. To what purpose is it then, to
retain a term, without any necessity, in a signification the reverse of that which its
etymology manifestly suggests?” 41
Fortunately, the third consideration, occasionally made the basis on which questions of
grammar were decided, the example of the classical languages, and especially of Latin,
was not so commonly cited. It is true that Johnson is quoted as saying, “It is, seriously,
my opinion, that every language must be servilely formed after the model of some one of
the ancient, if we wish to give durability to our works.” 42 Such an attitude derived in part
from concerns with universal grammar, which Harris defines as “that grammar, which
without regarding the several idioms of particular languages, only respects those
principles, that are essential to them all.” 43 Harris was more interested in the
philosophical problems involving language than in any practical applications that
discussions of those problems might have. 44 There were other grammarians with more
normative goals who found it natural to turn descriptive comparisons into prescriptive
rules, especially since most of the ideas of universal grammar were derived from the
literary traditions of Latin and Greek. In the course of the eighteenth century a fairly
definite feeling grew up that there were more disadvantages than advantages in trying to
fit English into the pattern of Latin grammar, and though its example was called upon by
one even so late as Noah Webster and is occasionally appealed to even today, this
approach to grammatical questions was fortunately not often consciously employed. The
interest in universal grammar for its own sake waned during the following century, and it
was not until the mid-twentieth century that the works of Wilkins, Harris, and other
philosophically oriented grammarians in England and France were revived as precursors
of generative approaches to linguistic analysis (see § 255).
202. The Doctrine of Usage.
In the latter half of the eighteenth century we find the beginnings of the modern doctrine
that the most important criterion of language is usage. Sporadic recognition of this
principle is encountered in the previous century, doubtless inspired by the dictum of
Horace that “use is the sole arbiter and norm of speech.” Thus John Hughes, who quotes
the remark of Horace, says in his essay Of Style (1698) that “general acceptation…is the
only standard of speech.” In the fifty years following, Dennis, Johnson, and Chesterfield
spoke to the same effect. In the Plan of his dictionary, Johnson said, “It is not in our
power to have recourse to any estab-
41
Ibid., I, 398.
42
Leonard, Doctrine of Correctness, p. 50.
43
Hermes (1751), p. x.
44
Ibid., pp. 293–96.