Final Report of the International Commission on the - Minority Rights ...

<strong>the</strong>m in exchange for food. Request approval in principle and permission for <strong>the</strong> county <strong>of</strong> Berezovka to
give us a certain number <strong>of</strong> Yids from <strong>the</strong> camp at Mostovoye, since we do not have enough. We wish to
send those who refuse to work, <strong>the</strong> suspicious, and <strong>the</strong> useless.” Alexianu authorized <strong>the</strong> transfer <strong>of</strong>
deportees from Mostovoye, Slivina, and Vapniarka. Everyone knew <strong>the</strong>se Jews would never return.
Ano<strong>the</strong>r project was <strong>the</strong> construction <strong>of</strong> a new bridge over <strong>the</strong> Bug, linking sou<strong>the</strong>rn Transnistria with
<strong>the</strong> Reichskommissariat Ukraine. The Romanian segment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> bridge connected Trihaty and <strong>the</strong> town <strong>of</strong>
Ochakov, and construction was entrusted to German firms from <strong>the</strong> Reich. Work began in spring 1943
and concluded that December. Four thousand Jews, mostly deportees from Romania, were turned over to
SS squads and held in three camps on <strong>the</strong> Romanian side <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bug (Trihaty, Varvarovka, and
Kolosovka) and two on <strong>the</strong> German side (Kurievka and Matievka). Initially, <strong>the</strong> Germans requested 1,500
“civilian workers”; Antonescu himself decided to provide Jews. The Romanians dispatched Jewish youth
and craftsmen from <strong>the</strong> counties that still actually had Jews: Moghilev, Tulchin, Balta, Jugastru, and
Rybnitsa. Balta released more than 800 Jews to <strong>the</strong> Germans: 700 unskilled workers and 130
pr<strong>of</strong>essionals. Moghilev sent several “shipments,” totaling 829 Jews. Tulchin supplied 1,000-2,000 and
o<strong>the</strong>rs as needed.
Even <strong>the</strong> county <strong>of</strong> Golta was asked, in a letter from <strong>the</strong> governor, to place at <strong>the</strong> Germans’ disposal
“all [remaining] Gypsies aged 20-40” along with all able-bodied Jews. In October 1943, approximately
2,000 Jews were still alive in Golta; <strong>the</strong> administration mobilized only fifty, as “<strong>the</strong> rest [were] sick and
crippled.” The Romanian Railway Authority in Transnistria handed over 400 “fit and healthy” Jews
recruited from <strong>the</strong> ghettos to maintain its Juralevka-Tulchin line. The administration ordered that “<strong>the</strong>se
Jews shall be made available to Einsatzgruppe Russland/Süd.” After a medical exam, <strong>the</strong>y were handed
over to <strong>the</strong> gendarmes. That October, a gendarmerie representative transferred <strong>the</strong>m to <strong>the</strong>
Sonderkommando in Varvarovka, and <strong>the</strong>y proceeded to lay railroad tracks between Kolosovka and
Trihaty. By early December, about 100 “strong” laborers remained. The Railway Authority engineer who
had approved <strong>the</strong>ir departure two months earlier now requested that <strong>the</strong> survivors undergo an immediate
physical examination “by a certified Romanian physician, and that all <strong>the</strong> sick and those unequipped to
withstand <strong>the</strong> winter be returned to whichever ghetto <strong>the</strong>y had come from,” with o<strong>the</strong>rs sent in <strong>the</strong>ir place.
Romanian and German Plans to Eliminate <strong>the</strong> Jews from Regat
and Sou<strong>the</strong>rn Transylvania
From February 1941 to August 23, 1944, <strong>the</strong> lives <strong>of</strong> Romanian Jews depended solely on <strong>the</strong> wishes
<strong>of</strong> Antonescu and his assessment <strong>of</strong> how <strong>the</strong> Jewish presence could serve Romanian national interests.
With <strong>the</strong> arrival in April 1941 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Nazi advisor for Jewish affairs, Gustav Richter, <strong>the</strong> approach to <strong>the</strong>
“Jewish question” in Romania changed. In his first report, Richter, outlined future policy options; but he
did so without taking into account <strong>the</strong> character <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> country to which he had been sent, <strong>the</strong> personality
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Romanian dictator, and <strong>the</strong> special relationship between Hitler and Antonescu. He also did not
realize <strong>the</strong> extent <strong>of</strong> German dependence on Romanian oil and wheat.
German Ambassador von Killinger informed Berlin at <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> August 1941 that Antonescu had
concentrated 60,000 Jewish men from <strong>the</strong> Regat for forced labor and that he intended to send <strong>the</strong>m to <strong>the</strong>
east “to areas just now occupied.” This information seriously worried German authorities responsible for
<strong>the</strong> annihilation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Jews. It was <strong>the</strong> first hint that Antonescu was determined to immediately solve <strong>the</strong>
Jewish problem in <strong>the</strong> Regat, too. According to an internal memo <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German Foreign Ministry sent to
a director <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Reichsbank, it was decided that deporting all Romanian Jews would hurt Romania’s
economy and <strong>the</strong> commitments <strong>the</strong> country had taken on vis-à-vis <strong>the</strong> Reich, since Jews still held key
positions in <strong>the</strong> economy. Moreover, “Aryanization” was still in its early stages, and many Romanians
had been drafted. It went on to warn that deporting <strong>the</strong> Jews would “have a deleterious effect on <strong>the</strong>