Final Report of the International Commission on the - Minority Rights ...

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demonstrate that <strong>the</strong> stereotype that would have <strong>the</strong> Jews as having played a key role in <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> Communist East European takeovers is lacking any empirical basis and is little o<strong>the</strong>r than a political myth with antisemitic undertones. Fascist political formations and political regimes <strong>of</strong> fascist type had incessantly fostered <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>me <strong>of</strong> Judeo-Bolshevism in <strong>the</strong>ir propaganda and, after 1989, <strong>the</strong> focus <strong>of</strong> attention on Jewish PCR members and leaders had been widely used in Eastern Europe in order to obfuscate <strong>the</strong> contribution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ethnic majority. It is accurate to assert that Jewish adherence to Communist parties has been relatively elevated in <strong>the</strong> initial phase <strong>of</strong> communism. Yet <strong>the</strong> assertion must be amended by several caveats. The anti-fascist, egalitarian, and humanist communist message transformed <strong>the</strong> Communist parties into a refuge for ethnic minorities. Against <strong>the</strong> background <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> political atmosphere <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mid-twentieth century, <strong>the</strong>se parties alone appeared to <strong>of</strong>fer opportunities for salvation and social mobility to <strong>the</strong> marginalized or those persecuted on ethnic grounds. Jews did not adhere to Communism due to <strong>the</strong>ir Jewishness; on <strong>the</strong> contrary, <strong>the</strong>y did so in <strong>the</strong> name <strong>of</strong> internationalism, as a sort <strong>of</strong> identity-strategy that would, <strong>the</strong>y hoped, reduce <strong>the</strong> burden <strong>of</strong> ethnicity. After <strong>the</strong> Communist advent to power, <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> Jews in Communist parties as well as in <strong>the</strong> newly established government institutions mattered less than <strong>the</strong> “visibility” <strong>of</strong> Jews in authority positions, which was something difficult to accept by <strong>the</strong> local masses and elites, imbued as <strong>the</strong>y were with antisemitic stereotypes. The situation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Jews in <strong>the</strong> Communist bloc changed dramatically in <strong>the</strong> 1950s, once Stalinist antisemitism became <strong>of</strong>ficial policy. <strong>Final</strong>ly and most importantly, it must be emphasized that <strong>the</strong> advent <strong>of</strong> Communist regimes in Eastern Europe has been a complex process made possible in <strong>the</strong> first place by <strong>the</strong> Soviet military occupation and political pressure, by <strong>the</strong> support or <strong>the</strong> passivity <strong>of</strong> majorities in local populations (irrespective <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir ethnic background), and by <strong>the</strong> international context. This is <strong>the</strong> background against which <strong>the</strong> Holocaust-Gulag comparison is employed—not for a better understanding <strong>of</strong> Nazi and communist crimes, but in order to avoid <strong>the</strong> memorialization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Holocaust or to condition assuming responsibility for it on <strong>the</strong> (chronological and pathological) primacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Gulag. Quite frequently, Nazi policies are being justified as a response to Communism. This type <strong>of</strong> argumentation penetrated academic debate during <strong>the</strong> so-called Historikerstreit (Historians’ Quarrel) in <strong>the</strong> second half <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1980s. Several German historians, <strong>of</strong> whom <strong>the</strong> most prominent was Ernst Nolte, argued that Nazism both emulated communism and was a reaction to it. Viewed from this perspective, <strong>the</strong> Holocaust was also deemed to have been inspired by communist criminal practice, whereas Nazi atrocities were said to be explainable wartime conditions, to have nothing specific about <strong>the</strong>m when compared with o<strong>the</strong>r twentieth-century atrocities. The attempt to “normalize” <strong>the</strong> Holocaust and to lessen <strong>the</strong> indictment against Nazism was promptly amended at <strong>the</strong> time by many important historians, who showed that Nolte had no evidence to back up his hypo<strong>the</strong>ses. As early as <strong>the</strong> 1970s, in response to Nolte’s Germany and <strong>the</strong> Cold War, American historian Peter Gay forged <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> comparative trivialization, which is also used in this chapter, to describe an attempt to bring about <strong>the</strong> “humanization” and <strong>the</strong> elaboration <strong>of</strong> a “sophisticated apology” <strong>of</strong> Nazism by “pointing, indignantly, at crimes committed by o<strong>the</strong>rs.” Unlike Gay, however, <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> comparative trivialization as here employed applies also to non-German (including Romanian) wartime and postwar depictions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Holocaust. A distinction is made among several categories <strong>of</strong> comparative trivialization: (1) <strong>the</strong> competitive comparison, which holds that atrocities worse or at least equal to <strong>the</strong> Holocaust have been committed, and that, consequently, <strong>the</strong> Holocaust does not merit special status; in <strong>the</strong> Romanian case, for example, reference is made to atrocities committed against Romanians by Nazis, Hungarians, and Jews, to atrocities committed against communists by Antonescu, and o<strong>the</strong>rs; (2) <strong>the</strong> banalizing comparison which “normalizes” <strong>the</strong> Holocaust by assimilating it to violent events that regularly occur in <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
mankind, such as wars; <strong>the</strong> Holocaust is presented as a regrettable, yet unsurprising outcome <strong>of</strong> war; (3) <strong>the</strong> parochial comparison in which <strong>the</strong> situation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Jews in Romania is depicted as having been better than <strong>the</strong>ir situation in Nazi Germany or in states subject to similar circumstances; (4) <strong>the</strong> deflective comparison, which considers fascism and <strong>the</strong> Holocaust to be <strong>the</strong> outcomes <strong>of</strong> communism, with <strong>the</strong> latter, in turn, <strong>of</strong>ten being a synonym for Jews according to negationist logic; (5) <strong>the</strong> transactional comparison in which acceptance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> past and fascist crimes is predicated on accepting <strong>the</strong> assumption by Jews <strong>of</strong> responsibility for communist and o<strong>the</strong>r crimes perpetrated in Romania and elsewhere in <strong>the</strong> world. The intellectual and political pr<strong>of</strong>ile <strong>of</strong> those who engage in comparative trivialization is very diverse. One finds in <strong>the</strong> same category strange bedfellows: negationists and extremists alongside personalities whose pr<strong>of</strong>ile is democratic and whose reputation is o<strong>the</strong>rwise excellent. This heterogeneity warrants a separate analysis. For now, suffice it to note that it is an illustration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> exceedingly confused ideological and cultural makeup <strong>of</strong> postcommunist transitions. This sub-chapter merely attempts to depict <strong>the</strong> situation as it stands at <strong>the</strong> moment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> study’s writing; in o<strong>the</strong>r words, it is an inventory listing <strong>the</strong> different forms <strong>of</strong> comparative trivialization by conceptual categories as well as reviewing as fully as possible <strong>the</strong> variety <strong>of</strong> social actors engaged in one form or ano<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong> comparative trivialization. This may explain why personalities <strong>of</strong> high reputation who are on record having deplored <strong>the</strong> Holocaust, yet at o<strong>the</strong>r times have made hazardous and self-contradicting statements are mentioned here. It must be emphasized that <strong>the</strong>ir inclusion is not in any way geared at presenting a global evaluation <strong>of</strong> ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>ir intellectual work or personality; ra<strong>the</strong>r it is aimed at drawing attention to <strong>the</strong> negative impact that risky formulations might have on public opinion and <strong>the</strong> Romanian cultural and political environment. Our scrutiny begins with those negationists who also indulge in Holocaust trivialization. Once more, Pr<strong>of</strong>essor Coja’s pr<strong>of</strong>ile is imminently prominent. He makes use <strong>of</strong> banalizing and parochial comparisons to claim that <strong>the</strong> situation <strong>of</strong> Jews under Antonescu was not as grave as people might believe. In 2002, Coja denounced as “a lie” that Jews were sent to <strong>the</strong> camps in Transnistria “just because <strong>the</strong>y were Jews.” Only two categories <strong>of</strong> Jews ended up in Transnistria: those who were not “Romanian citizens” and had “illegally crossed <strong>the</strong> border,” which was “normal due to wartime conditions,” and “<strong>the</strong> Bessarabian and Bukovinan Jews, who were suspected <strong>of</strong> pro-Soviet sympathies or proved to entertain <strong>the</strong>m.” But such camps, according to Coja, had also existed in <strong>the</strong> United States during <strong>the</strong> war for Japanese suspected <strong>of</strong> non-loyalty to <strong>the</strong> nation. Detainment conditions in Transnistria, according to a letter sent by Coja to former U.S. First Lady Hilary Clinton as representative <strong>of</strong> LICAR and <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Vatra Românească (Romanian Hearth) Union, had been “by far superior to those <strong>the</strong> U.S. and Canadian Japanese had to live in concentration camps set up by <strong>the</strong> Roosevelt administration.” It might be true, Coja conceded that <strong>the</strong> “identification” <strong>of</strong> “traitor-Jews” had been carried out “with a certain amount <strong>of</strong> approximation.” It may have led to <strong>the</strong> inclusion <strong>of</strong> Jews who had been loyal to Romania among those deported, while possibly leaving out non-loyal Jews. The explanation, however, ought to be sought in <strong>the</strong> abnormal wartime conditions: “À la guerre comme à la guerre!” The camps in Transnistria, Coja claimed, “never were extermination camps, since practically any Jew could leave for whatever destination, except Romania proper.” Or, as he put it at <strong>the</strong> 2001 symposium, “those concentration camps (how lugubrious this denunciation sounds!)...were nothing but villages. No barbered wire, no military watch. They only had a few gendarmerie, patrolling only during <strong>the</strong> night, in order to defend <strong>the</strong> Jews against Ukrainian civilians, who, for various reasons, could have acted violently against <strong>the</strong> Jews.” The parochial comparison is widespread due to <strong>the</strong> myth that makes Antonescu and his regime into “saviors <strong>of</strong> Jews.” The argument is based on deliberate misinterpretation (dating back to <strong>the</strong> Communist regime and largely popular in <strong>the</strong> 1990s ) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> reasons that forced <strong>the</strong> regime to change its policies towards Jews and Roma as <strong>of</strong> late 1942. The change, however, was but a tactical and opportunist attempt
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Final Repo
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Germany’s war against the
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which includes reputed experts led
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BACKGROUND AND PRECURSORS TO THE HO
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against which antisemites in <stron
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declaring in the p
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them. Thus, he con
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We must organize ourselves for a wa
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ureaucracy of wart
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this direction by Nicolae C. Paules
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promising leader of</strong
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organized a tariff and tax strike.
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Legion of
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less so in Romanian society as a wh
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This ambiguous, self-contradictory
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The Gigurtu government began to con
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The Case of Român
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Cuza’s argument that it is possib
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Românesc,” Sociologie Româneasc
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ole in the early 1
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European states, notably Romania an
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Germany's immediate interests at <s
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eligious communities, the</
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counterpart, “when [he] first met
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de Istorie şi Arheologie, “A. D.
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Romania. Muler to Luthe</st
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demands on territorial revisions an
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military mission to come to Romania
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High Command, informing the
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The Jews and the R
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Romanian army. Thus, in Ciudei in <
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antisemitism in Romanian society an
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Ibid., fond Micro-films, roll I.II,
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manifestations of
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power, as this power colonized West
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attraction, many Jews resettled in
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to defend itself; hence its support
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about the Holocaus
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Nichifor Crainic, “Dupa douazeci
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Isaia Tolan, “Revizuirea incetate
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X. Y. Z., “Rezolvarea problemei e
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andom searches and arrests, robberi
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Bucharest Prefectura. Almost two th
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epression was not ordered by Antone
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from villages and small towns. On J
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accident; it was contrived by <stro
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The second train to leave Iasi for
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care of th
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"premilitary," were also placed at
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according to the o
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Tighina Agreement On August 30, Tra
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elieved Transnistria would be occup
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the 331,000 Ukrain
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those inside to take the</s
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[longer] move.” After several wee
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eappear a few seconds later and sig
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operation and that “some
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Bukovina and Bessarabia. Einsatzkom
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other things, <str
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Berezovka district and burn <strong
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them in exchange f
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transport of 2,000
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Bulgarian, Turkish, Italian, or Swi
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were at least 122,000 Jews. Bukovin
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Wilhelm Hoettl, The Secret Front: T
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Ancel, Documents, vol. 2: no. 136,
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Carp, Cartea neagra, vol. 3: pp. 30
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Gosudartsveni Archiv Odeskoi Oblast
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Cable from the Mil
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1-1087, p. 114; list of</st
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Ibid. “Rezolvarea problemei evrei
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child’s birth, would be considere
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Indeed, the system
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Romanianization instead of<
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The Cultural Ghettoization
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The Status of Jewi
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give up any radios able to send and
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Conclusions The anti-Jewish legisla
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L.A., no. 99, p. 344. Trei ani de g
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moral, social, and intellectual nee
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gradually, in reality the</
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except being defined as a Jew. I be
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egulate and authorize, under <stron
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y Lecca: Jews were privileged, and
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through the activi
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oth as a cry of re
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After coming to power, the<
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and then to send <
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their non-evacuate
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villages of <stron
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Return of Roma Sur
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(in many cases, the</strong
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in Romania. History and Contemporar
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THE ROLE OF ION ANTONESCU IN THE PL
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December 16, 1941, meeting
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me from carrying out the</s
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did not do it because…the
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more ironically, this leader’s wa
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THE HOLOCAUST IN NORTHERN TRANSYLVA
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Others 22 968 Magy
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ultimatum but also consented to <st
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military, political, and psychologi
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command over the g
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Huedin. The Jews of</strong
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authorities set up two ghettos in <
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Secuilor counties was carried out i
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the procedure foll
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deportation trains per day. While E
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Deportation Trains from Nor
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Câtcău Kackó Ciuc Csík Ciucea C
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Rona de Sus Felsöróna Rozavica Ro
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Bözödújfalu Bezidu Nou Budfalva
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Nagysajó Şieu (Bistrita-Nasaud Co
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(Indictment of Naz
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Randolph L. Braham, comp. and ed. (
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perceived by a significant part <st
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Romanian government not to adopt <s
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still alive in the
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Page 243 and 244: Mitropolit pleaded with Mihai Anton
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Page 247 and 248: Ibid., pp. 224-225. Ibid., pp. 46-4
Page 249 and 250: the examined cases
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Page 253 and 254: immense scale, enslaved millions <s
Page 255 and 256: means. The “ethnic Christian stat
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Page 261 and 262: viaţă, 100 milioane lei amendă
Page 263 and 264: Articolul 15 al Convenţiei de armi
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Page 267 and 268: camp in January 1945, for several m
Page 269 and 270: Beginning in the 1
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Page 283 and 284: Finally, it must b
Page 285 and 286: A.) Integral Negationism Although <
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Page 293 and 294: After deploring the</strong
Page 295 and 296: Michael Shafir, “Ex Occidente Obs
Page 297 and 298: See, for example, Giurescu who make
Page 299 and 300: Randolph L. Braham, Romanian Nation
Page 301 and 302: Mediafax, March 18, 2002, Monitorul
Page 303 and 304: See Ibidem, pp. 3, 54-55. Ibidem, p
Page 305 and 306: Radu Theodoru, Mareşalul, Editura
Page 307 and 308: egained from the U
Page 309 and 310: was a record of an
Page 311 and 312: secondary school use. Those institu
Page 313: including erecting statues, mountin
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