Final Report of the International Commission on the - Minority Rights ...

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1. Issue a notice signed by you in your capacity as military commander <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> city <strong>of</strong> Iasi, based on <strong>the</strong> existing government orders, adding: “In light <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> state <strong>of</strong> war...if anyone opens fire from a building, <strong>the</strong> house is to be surrounded by soldiers and all its inhabitants arrested, with <strong>the</strong> exception <strong>of</strong> children. Following a brief interrogation, <strong>the</strong> guilty parties are to be executed. A similar punishment is to be implemented against those who hide individuals who have committed <strong>the</strong> above <strong>of</strong>fenses.” 2. The evacuation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Jewish population from Iasi is essential, and shall be carried out in full, including women and children. The evacuation shall be implemented pachete pachete [batch by batch], first to Roman and later to Targu-Jiu. For this reason, you are to arrange <strong>the</strong> matter with <strong>the</strong> Ministry <strong>of</strong> Interior and <strong>the</strong> county prefecture. Suitable preparations must be made. Before <strong>the</strong>se orders were issued, an understanding was reached with <strong>the</strong> commander <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German army corps (<strong>the</strong> Wehrmacht) in Iasi about <strong>the</strong> methods to be employed against <strong>the</strong> Jews. But Colonel Lupu was unable to control <strong>the</strong> situation and faithfully carry out Antonescu’s order, and was <strong>the</strong>refore stripped <strong>of</strong> his post on July 2, 1941. During his court-martial by <strong>the</strong> Fourth Army Corps in January 1942, <strong>the</strong> order he had received from <strong>the</strong> Marshal and his deputy, Mihai Antonescu, came to light. The expulsion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Jews from Moldavia was part <strong>of</strong> a larger plan, influenced by <strong>the</strong> belief <strong>of</strong> Ion and Mihai Antonescu in <strong>the</strong> German army’s ultimate victory, which would also encompass <strong>the</strong> physical extermination <strong>of</strong> Jews from Bessarabia and Bukovina. The first step <strong>of</strong> this plan, according to Ion Antonescu’s order to General Steflea, <strong>the</strong>n chief <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> army general staff, was to “identify all Yids, communist agents, or <strong>the</strong>ir sympathizers, by county [in Moldavia]” so that <strong>the</strong> Ministry <strong>of</strong> Interior could track <strong>the</strong>m, restrict <strong>the</strong>ir freedom <strong>of</strong> movement, and ultimately dispose <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m when and how Ion Antonescu chose. The second step was to evacuate Jews from all villages in Moldavia, and to intern some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m in <strong>the</strong> Targu-Jiu camp in sou<strong>the</strong>rn Romania. The final step was to provide grounds for <strong>the</strong>se actions by transforming Iasi’s Jews into potential collaborators with "<strong>the</strong> Soviet enemy," <strong>the</strong>reby justifying retaliatory action against rebels who had not yet rebelled. To achieve this, Antonescu issued a special order, which was relayed by <strong>the</strong> security police (Sigurantza) to police headquarters in Iasi on June 27, 1941: “Since Sigurantza headquarters has become aware that certain Jews have hidden arms and ammunition, we hereby request that you conduct thorough and meticulous searches in <strong>the</strong> apartments <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Jewish population….” On <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> Antonescu’s order to General Steflea, directives were issued to <strong>the</strong> Ministry <strong>of</strong> Interior, which commanded <strong>the</strong> gendarmerie and police, and <strong>the</strong> Ministry <strong>of</strong> Propaganda, headed by Mihai Antonescu. These directives were <strong>the</strong>n translated into an actual plan <strong>of</strong> operation by military command structures (Military Cabinet and Section Two) and <strong>the</strong> SSI in coordination with <strong>the</strong> two ministries. Antonescu’s second order to Colonel Lupu to evacuate all 45,000 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> city’s Jews and his authorization to execute any Jew "who attacked <strong>the</strong> army," in effect gave <strong>the</strong> gendarmerie and police carte blanche to torture and murder Jews and to evacuate thousands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m by rail to sou<strong>the</strong>rn Romania. The SSI, by order <strong>of</strong> Antonescu and <strong>the</strong> General Staff, established a special unit shortly after Antonescu’s meeting with Hitler on June 11, 1941. Operation Echelon No. 1 (Esalonul I Operativ)—also known as <strong>the</strong> Special Echelon—consisted <strong>of</strong> some 160 people, including auxiliary personnel, selected from <strong>the</strong> most talented, reliable, and daring members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> SSI. Their assignment was to “protect <strong>the</strong> home front from acts <strong>of</strong> espionage, sabotage, and terror.” The Echelon left Bucharest for Moldavia on June 18, accompanied by a Romanian-speaking <strong>of</strong>ficer from <strong>the</strong> Intelligence Service <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German army, Major Hermann Stransky, who served as liaison between <strong>the</strong> Abwehr and <strong>the</strong> SSI. On June 26, antisemitic agitation in <strong>the</strong> local press suddenly intensified. At <strong>the</strong> same time, <strong>the</strong> police were flooded with reports from Romanians claiming that Jews were signalling enemy aircraft, hiding paratrooper agents, holding suspicious ga<strong>the</strong>rings, and <strong>the</strong> like. The emergence <strong>of</strong> this psychosis was no
accident; it was contrived by <strong>the</strong> Section Two and <strong>the</strong> Special Echelon. The scheme behind <strong>the</strong> pogrom was explained in advance to <strong>the</strong> 14th Division headquarters and <strong>the</strong> commanders <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> police and gendarmerie. On June 26, against a backdrop <strong>of</strong> threats issued in <strong>the</strong> local press by General Stavrescu, commander <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 14th Division, Romanian soldiers (many <strong>of</strong> whom were inebriated) began to break into Jewish flats near <strong>the</strong>ir camps on <strong>the</strong> outskirts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> city. Although some who joined in <strong>the</strong> rioting or looting were former Legionnaires and <strong>the</strong>ir followers as well as supporters <strong>of</strong> Cuza’s antisemitic movement, most were civilians who armed <strong>the</strong>mselves or were given weapons in advance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> anti- Jewish actions. O<strong>the</strong>r signs <strong>of</strong> impending violence included <strong>the</strong> mobilization <strong>of</strong> young Jews to dig huge ditches in <strong>the</strong> Jewish cemetery about a week before <strong>the</strong> pogrom and <strong>the</strong> marking with crucifixes <strong>of</strong> “houses inhabited by Christians.” The next stage <strong>of</strong> preparation began on June 27, when authorities <strong>of</strong>ficially accused <strong>the</strong> Jews <strong>of</strong> responsibility for Soviet bombings. All heads <strong>of</strong> administration in Iasi convened at <strong>the</strong> palace <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> prefect—ostensibly to reach decisions regarding law and order—to deploy <strong>the</strong> forces that were to participate in <strong>the</strong> pogrom. False attacks on soldiers were <strong>the</strong>n organized to rouse <strong>the</strong> soldiers’ anger and create <strong>the</strong> impression <strong>of</strong> a Jewish uprising and <strong>the</strong> need for strict measures against it. Jewish "guilt" was thus already a fait accompli. At 9:00 p.m. on June 28, an air alert was sounded and several German aircraft flew over <strong>the</strong> city, one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m signaling with a blue flare. Shots were immediately heard throughout <strong>the</strong> city, chiefly from <strong>the</strong> main streets where army units marched <strong>the</strong>ir way to <strong>the</strong> front. The numerous shots fired wherever <strong>the</strong>re were soldiers posted in full battle dress created <strong>the</strong> impression <strong>of</strong> a great battle, and Romanian military men accompanied by armed civilians began <strong>the</strong>ir attack on wealthy Jews residing in <strong>the</strong> center city where <strong>the</strong> false shootings had taken place. Pillaging, rape and murder <strong>of</strong> Jews began in <strong>the</strong> outskirts <strong>of</strong> Iasi on <strong>the</strong> night <strong>of</strong> June 28/29. Groups <strong>of</strong> thugs broke into <strong>the</strong>ir homes and terrorized <strong>the</strong>m. The survivors were taken to police headquarters (<strong>the</strong> Chestura). Organizers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> pogrom, such as General Stavrescu, reported that <strong>the</strong> “Judeo-communists” and Soviet pilots, whose planes had been shot down, had opened fire on <strong>the</strong> Romanian and German soldiers. In response, Romanian troops and gendarmes “surrounded <strong>the</strong> buildings from which <strong>the</strong> shots had been fired, along with entire neighborhoods, and evacuated those arrested—men, women and children—to police headquarters. The guilty were also executed on <strong>the</strong> spot by <strong>the</strong> German/Romanian forces that captured <strong>the</strong>m.” Romanian <strong>of</strong>ficials who were ei<strong>the</strong>r unaware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> plan or knew only part <strong>of</strong> it, recounted <strong>the</strong> start <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> pogrom differently. For example, Nicolae Captaru, Prefect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Iasi county, who had no knowledge <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> plan, reported to <strong>the</strong> Ministry <strong>of</strong> Interior: “There are those who believe that <strong>the</strong> shots were <strong>the</strong> act <strong>of</strong> organized individuals seeking to cause panic among <strong>the</strong> army units and civilian population....According to <strong>the</strong> findings ga<strong>the</strong>red thus far, it has been shown that certain individuals are attempting to place <strong>the</strong> blame on <strong>the</strong> Jews <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> city with <strong>the</strong> aim <strong>of</strong> inciting <strong>the</strong> Romanian army, <strong>the</strong> German army, and also <strong>the</strong> Christian population against <strong>the</strong> Jews in order to provoke <strong>the</strong> mass murder <strong>of</strong> Jews.” Those participating in <strong>the</strong> manhunt launched on <strong>the</strong> night <strong>of</strong> June 28/29 were, first and foremost, <strong>the</strong> Iasi police, backed by <strong>the</strong> Bessarabia police and gendarmerie units. O<strong>the</strong>r participants were army soldiers, young people armed by SSI agents, and mobs who robbed and killed, knowing <strong>the</strong>y would not have to account for <strong>the</strong>ir actions. The implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Iasi pogrom consisted <strong>of</strong> five basic elements: (1) spreading rumors that Jews had shot at <strong>the</strong> army; (2) warning <strong>the</strong> Romanian residents <strong>of</strong> what was about to take place; (3) fostering popular collaboration with <strong>the</strong> security forces; (4) marking Christian and Jewish homes; and finally (5) inciting rioters to murder, rape, and rob. Similar methods were used in <strong>the</strong> pogrom plotted and carried out by Romanian units in Dorohoi one year earlier in July 1940. In addition to informing on Jews, directing soldiers to Jewish homes and refuges, and even breaking into homes <strong>the</strong>mselves, some Romanian residents <strong>of</strong> Iasi also took part in <strong>the</strong> arrests and humiliation
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Final Repo
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Germany’s war against the
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which includes reputed experts led
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BACKGROUND AND PRECURSORS TO THE HO
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against which antisemites in <stron
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declaring in the p
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them. Thus, he con
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We must organize ourselves for a wa
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ureaucracy of wart
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this direction by Nicolae C. Paules
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promising leader of</strong
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organized a tariff and tax strike.
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Legion of
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less so in Romanian society as a wh
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This ambiguous, self-contradictory
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The Gigurtu government began to con
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The Case of Român
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Cuza’s argument that it is possib
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Românesc,” Sociologie Româneasc
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Page 41 and 42: European states, notably Romania an
Page 43 and 44: Germany's immediate interests at <s
Page 45 and 46: eligious communities, the</
Page 47 and 48: counterpart, “when [he] first met
Page 49 and 50: de Istorie şi Arheologie, “A. D.
Page 51 and 52: Romania. Muler to Luthe</st
Page 53 and 54: demands on territorial revisions an
Page 55 and 56: military mission to come to Romania
Page 57 and 58: High Command, informing the
Page 59 and 60: The Jews and the R
Page 61 and 62: Romanian army. Thus, in Ciudei in <
Page 63 and 64: antisemitism in Romanian society an
Page 65 and 66: Ibid., fond Micro-films, roll I.II,
Page 67 and 68: manifestations of
Page 69 and 70: power, as this power colonized West
Page 71 and 72: attraction, many Jews resettled in
Page 73 and 74: to defend itself; hence its support
Page 75 and 76: about the Holocaus
Page 77 and 78: Nichifor Crainic, “Dupa douazeci
Page 79 and 80: Isaia Tolan, “Revizuirea incetate
Page 81 and 82: X. Y. Z., “Rezolvarea problemei e
Page 83 and 84: andom searches and arrests, robberi
Page 85 and 86: Bucharest Prefectura. Almost two th
Page 87 and 88: epression was not ordered by Antone
Page 89: from villages and small towns. On J
Page 93 and 94: The second train to leave Iasi for
Page 95 and 96: care of th
Page 97 and 98: "premilitary," were also placed at
Page 99 and 100: according to the o
Page 101 and 102: Tighina Agreement On August 30, Tra
Page 103 and 104: elieved Transnistria would be occup
Page 105 and 106: the 331,000 Ukrain
Page 107 and 108: those inside to take the</s
Page 109 and 110: [longer] move.” After several wee
Page 111 and 112: eappear a few seconds later and sig
Page 113 and 114: operation and that “some
Page 115 and 116: Bukovina and Bessarabia. Einsatzkom
Page 117 and 118: other things, <str
Page 119 and 120: Berezovka district and burn <strong
Page 121 and 122: them in exchange f
Page 123 and 124: transport of 2,000
Page 125 and 126: Bulgarian, Turkish, Italian, or Swi
Page 127 and 128: were at least 122,000 Jews. Bukovin
Page 129 and 130: Wilhelm Hoettl, The Secret Front: T
Page 131 and 132: Ancel, Documents, vol. 2: no. 136,
Page 133 and 134: Carp, Cartea neagra, vol. 3: pp. 30
Page 135 and 136: Gosudartsveni Archiv Odeskoi Oblast
Page 137 and 138: Cable from the Mil
Page 139 and 140: 1-1087, p. 114; list of</st
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Ibid. “Rezolvarea problemei evrei
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child’s birth, would be considere
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Indeed, the system
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Romanianization instead of<
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The Cultural Ghettoization
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The Status of Jewi
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give up any radios able to send and
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Conclusions The anti-Jewish legisla
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L.A., no. 99, p. 344. Trei ani de g
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moral, social, and intellectual nee
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gradually, in reality the</
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except being defined as a Jew. I be
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egulate and authorize, under <stron
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y Lecca: Jews were privileged, and
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through the activi
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oth as a cry of re
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After coming to power, the<
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and then to send <
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their non-evacuate
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villages of <stron
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Return of Roma Sur
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(in many cases, the</strong
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in Romania. History and Contemporar
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THE ROLE OF ION ANTONESCU IN THE PL
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December 16, 1941, meeting
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me from carrying out the</s
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did not do it because…the
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more ironically, this leader’s wa
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THE HOLOCAUST IN NORTHERN TRANSYLVA
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Others 22 968 Magy
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ultimatum but also consented to <st
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military, political, and psychologi
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command over the g
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Huedin. The Jews of</strong
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authorities set up two ghettos in <
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Secuilor counties was carried out i
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the procedure foll
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deportation trains per day. While E
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Deportation Trains from Nor
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Câtcău Kackó Ciuc Csík Ciucea C
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Rona de Sus Felsöróna Rozavica Ro
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Bözödújfalu Bezidu Nou Budfalva
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Nagysajó Şieu (Bistrita-Nasaud Co
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(Indictment of Naz
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Randolph L. Braham, comp. and ed. (
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perceived by a significant part <st
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Romanian government not to adopt <s
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still alive in the
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the Jews who worke
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We have been informed that various
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church bells announce the</
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Mitropolit pleaded with Mihai Anton
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Pozdnyakova, Yefrosiniya Starostina
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Ibid., pp. 224-225. Ibid., pp. 46-4
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the examined cases
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escape with negligible punishment;
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immense scale, enslaved millions <s
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means. The “ethnic Christian stat
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it is evident that the</str
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face să pară evident că victimel
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viaţă, 100 milioane lei amendă
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Articolul 15 al Convenţiei de armi
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members accepted as authoritative s
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camp in January 1945, for several m
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Beginning in the 1
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such access was strictly supervised
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enefit from translation into Englis
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furthermore, he ha
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lucrative Jewish business ever,”
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deaths of thousand
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Treptow who was residing in Romania
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Finally, it must b
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A.) Integral Negationism Although <
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other genocides re
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mankind, such as wars; the<
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age of 44, only on
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After deploring the</strong
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Michael Shafir, “Ex Occidente Obs
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See, for example, Giurescu who make
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Randolph L. Braham, Romanian Nation
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Mediafax, March 18, 2002, Monitorul
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See Ibidem, pp. 3, 54-55. Ibidem, p
Page 305 and 306:
Radu Theodoru, Mareşalul, Editura
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egained from the U
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was a record of an
Page 311 and 312:
secondary school use. Those institu
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including erecting statues, mountin
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