Final Report of the International Commission on the - Minority Rights ...

<strong>of</strong> his requests were rejected, except for a personal promise from Hitler guaranteeing <strong>the</strong> borders <strong>of</strong>
Romania. Ribbentrop asked Mihai Antonescu to honor <strong>the</strong> commitment he had given in writing to
Eichmann’s emissary in Romania—to turn over <strong>the</strong> Jews <strong>of</strong> Romania to <strong>the</strong> Nazis. At <strong>the</strong> same time, <strong>the</strong>
Romanian demands were rebuffed one by one, and even <strong>the</strong> promises by Keitel and Hitler to provide
arms remained empty. Moreover, Mihai Antonescu returned without any promise about <strong>the</strong> future <strong>of</strong>
Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Transylvania. Romania had given everything and received nothing. Hungary gave only a part <strong>of</strong>
her army and had not yet turned over its Jews.
Mihai Antonescu’s meeting with Hitler in Vinnitsa, Ukraine, on September 22-23, approached
military issues as well as <strong>the</strong> deportation <strong>of</strong> Romanian Jews. Mihai Antonescu felt this meeting was so
important that he decided to forgo its protocol. The German minutes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se talks reveal that Ribbentrop
requested that Mihai Antonescu continue <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> exterminating <strong>the</strong> Jews, as he had in <strong>the</strong> past.
Mihai Antonescu met three times with Ribbentrop in Vinnitsa, where <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> hastening <strong>the</strong>
annihilation came up explicitly, and he did not reject <strong>the</strong> <strong>Final</strong> Solution. It was at <strong>the</strong>se same meetings,
however, that his faith in Germany’s ability to win <strong>the</strong> war was shaken.
Later, in a government meeting held on October 13, 1942, Mihai Antonescu announced a change in
policy regarding <strong>the</strong> Jews: transports <strong>of</strong> Jews across <strong>the</strong> Dniester were to be suspended. On <strong>the</strong> surface it
seemed that Mihai Antonescu—in saying that “one must act systematically”—had adopted Richter’s
suggestions word for word; in fact, he meant something completely different. Antonescu referred instead
to <strong>the</strong> revocation <strong>of</strong> authority to deport Jews by <strong>the</strong> General Staff, Ministry <strong>of</strong> Interior, and all o<strong>the</strong>r
<strong>of</strong>fices that had dealt with <strong>the</strong> Jews, <strong>the</strong>ir property, and <strong>the</strong>ir labor. Words such as deportation,
evacuation, and transport would henceforth disappear from <strong>of</strong>ficial communiqués.
The link between <strong>the</strong> cessation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> deportations to Transnistria and <strong>the</strong> suspension <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
deportation to Poland was put in writing by <strong>the</strong> deputy director-general <strong>of</strong> Antonescu’s cabinet, Gheorghe
Basarabeanu, on November 4, 1942, in a note to <strong>the</strong> Romanian Railway Administration (CFR). In
response to a query from <strong>the</strong> head <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CFR as to whe<strong>the</strong>r or not <strong>the</strong> Jews <strong>of</strong> Romania would be
deported to <strong>the</strong> General Gouvernement, Besarabeanu replied: “At <strong>the</strong> Ministers’ Council <strong>of</strong> October 13,
1942, we decided to stop <strong>the</strong> deportation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Jews.” The plan’s suspension resulted not from some
latent humanity but from <strong>the</strong> realization that German and Romanian interests no longer coincided: <strong>the</strong>
Romanian army was in a difficult position at Stalingrad, and—despite all material (food, oil, natural
resources) and human sacrifices—Hitler would never return Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Transylvania to Romania.
Romania, it seemed, had given everything and received nothing, while Hungary had given little, had not
yet renounced its Jews, but had retained Transylvania.
The Situation <strong>of</strong> Jews Living Abroad
The Romanian Foreign Ministry suffered from <strong>the</strong> legal chaos emerging from <strong>the</strong> contradictory
instructions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Antonescu administration concerning <strong>the</strong> legal status <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Romanian Jews living
abroad. According to international convention, Romanian consulates were expected to protect Romanian
citizens abroad, regardless <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir “nationality.” In May 1941 this protection was withdrawn from <strong>the</strong>
Jews whose citizenship had been “revised” as well as from Jews born in Bessarabia and Nor<strong>the</strong>rn
Bukovina (now held by <strong>the</strong> USSR); in summer 1942 Romania backtracked and once again treated Jews
born in Bessarabia and Bukovina as its citizens.
In January 1942, Romanian Jews in Amsterdam had to declare <strong>the</strong>ir assets before <strong>the</strong> upcoming
deportations. The Romanian Consulate requested instructions on February 12 and learned that General
Vasiliu opposed <strong>the</strong>ir repatriation. In March, Romanian citizens <strong>of</strong> Jewish ancestry in Germany and
Austria were forced to wear <strong>the</strong> yellow star under orders from <strong>the</strong> Gestapo. This discriminatory measure
applied to Croatian and Slovak (not to mention German and Austrian) Jews, but not to Hungarian,