Final Report of the International Commission on the - Minority Rights ...

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They were not considered as representatives <strong>of</strong> Jewish interests even when subjectively <strong>the</strong>y were acting as such. By serving <strong>the</strong> interests <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Nazis and Romanian anti-Semitic authorities, <strong>the</strong>y facilitated <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rulers in depriving <strong>the</strong> Jews <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir property; in ejecting tens <strong>of</strong> thousands <strong>of</strong> Jews from <strong>the</strong>ir dwellings; in mobilizing and exploiting manpower and material resources; in humiliating <strong>the</strong> Jewish population; and bringing about <strong>the</strong> rapid impoverishment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Jewish masses. However, this assessment leaves <strong>the</strong> arena wide open for accusations ranging from clamors for death sentences to traitors, to brandings as an opportunistic, servile, effacing fringe-group that subjectively tried to help <strong>the</strong> Jewish community precisely by exploiting its privilege as a sector <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> anti-Semitic establishment. The Center did not become a Judenrat and a Nazi tool as was intended…. The leadership <strong>of</strong> Romanian Jewry, pre-Jewish Central, had <strong>the</strong> possibility to counteract some anti- Jewish measures. Their political power and influence increased at <strong>the</strong> same rate as <strong>the</strong> international situation moved in favor <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Allies, while <strong>the</strong> Jewish Central’s leaders became increasingly isolated. However, it must be emphasized that <strong>the</strong> Jewish Central sought assistance from former Jewish leaders— sometimes for tactical reasons, sometimes out <strong>of</strong> conviction. Whe<strong>the</strong>r directly or indirectly, this helped <strong>the</strong> Jewish population by encouraging cultural life and leading to acts <strong>of</strong> resistance and rescue in <strong>the</strong> face <strong>of</strong> government plans for deportations to Transnistria. Thus, <strong>the</strong> Jewish Central reflected <strong>the</strong> general Romanian policy ambivalence during <strong>the</strong> second part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> war by its subservience to or collaboration with <strong>the</strong> regime, but also by some rescue efforts. Social Assistance and Health Care in Times <strong>of</strong> Oppression Both FUCE and <strong>the</strong> Jewish Central provided social assistance during <strong>the</strong>se times <strong>of</strong> state-organized oppression. An important part was played by <strong>the</strong> Autonomous <strong>Commission</strong> <strong>of</strong> Assistance (CAA), which was established in January 1941.The CAA benefited from <strong>the</strong> beginning from <strong>the</strong> subvention paid by <strong>the</strong> American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, which was allowed to continue its work in Romania during <strong>the</strong> war. During <strong>the</strong> first months <strong>of</strong> its activity, <strong>the</strong> CAA worked to help <strong>the</strong> victims <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Legionary pogrom. Later, in summer 1941, it focused on assisting those evacuated from <strong>the</strong> countryside and small towns and <strong>the</strong> victims <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Iasi pogrom. In late 1941, through <strong>the</strong> efforts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Federation, <strong>the</strong> CAA began helping Jews deported to Transnistria. The authorization was given on December 17, 1941. The <strong>International</strong> Red Cross channeled large sums <strong>of</strong> aid money through CAA to Romania. In January 1943, <strong>the</strong> first delegation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CAA and <strong>the</strong> Social Assistance Department <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Jewish Central went to Transnistria. Their mission was to become acquainted with <strong>the</strong> realities <strong>the</strong>re and to supervise <strong>the</strong> distribution <strong>of</strong> aid. The report drafted by F. Şaraga, head <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> delegation, indicated that (1) all <strong>the</strong> help that was sent through <strong>the</strong> Jewish Central covered only an extremely small part <strong>of</strong> what was necessary; (2) <strong>the</strong> situation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 5,000 orphans was disastrous; (3) <strong>the</strong> whole camp population was underfed, weak, and lacked clo<strong>the</strong>s. The report also indicated that <strong>the</strong> deportees could be saved only by using <strong>the</strong>m in productive jobs and by providing <strong>the</strong>m with more clo<strong>the</strong>s, medicine, and food. But in spite <strong>of</strong> all <strong>the</strong> efforts, <strong>the</strong> help continued to be insufficient. After his return from Transnistria, Filderman wrote a report to <strong>the</strong> prime minister, dated August 8, 1943, describing <strong>the</strong> critical situation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> deportees. Clearly, for <strong>the</strong> leaders <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Romanian Jewish community <strong>the</strong> fate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> deportees in Transnistria represented a constant preoccupation. The efforts to save and aid <strong>the</strong> Jews <strong>the</strong>re were part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> overall struggle for survival. The Jewish community worked to supply healthcare for Jewish work detachments since no government subsidy was <strong>of</strong>fered at any time. Because Jews were barred from using Romanian hospitals, and because Jewish hospitals and health centers as well as personal and community ownership had been Romanianized, it was crucial for <strong>the</strong> Jews living under <strong>the</strong> Antonescu regime to receive <strong>the</strong> aid supplied
through <strong>the</strong> activities <strong>of</strong> social and medical assistance carried out by <strong>the</strong> Jewish Central and o<strong>the</strong>r social assistance-granting civil society institutions. The Repatriation <strong>of</strong> Jews Deported to Transnistria As <strong>the</strong> front neared Romanian territory, Jewish leaders and Filderman, in particular, made more and more efforts to enable <strong>the</strong> return <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Transnistria deportees. Thus, on January 2, 1943, Filderman pleaded with <strong>the</strong> government to save <strong>the</strong> two- to sixteen-year-old orphans by sending <strong>the</strong>m to Cernauti. He argued that <strong>the</strong>se children could not possibly be blamed for any crimes and that given <strong>the</strong>ir poor health, emigration was not a viable solution. He also asked Ion and Mihai Antonescu that Jewish deportees originally from <strong>the</strong> Old Regat and Dorohoi be repatriated, as <strong>the</strong>re was a high risk that most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m would die. The issue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> repatriation <strong>of</strong> deportees was high on Filderman’s agenda after his return from Transnistria. Thus, on August 4, 1943, he informed General Vasiliu about <strong>the</strong> plight <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> deportees from Dorohoi, Darabani, and Herta who were interned in <strong>the</strong> Moghilev camp. On September 23, 1943, he asked Vasiliu for <strong>the</strong> Jews in Transnistria to be moved away from <strong>the</strong> German army’s paths <strong>of</strong> retreat. Filderman sent a memorandum to Vasiliu and Mihai Antonescu on October 12, 1943, explaining that many innocents had died in <strong>the</strong> camps, and on November 17, 1943, he was informed that Antonescu had ordered <strong>the</strong> concentration <strong>of</strong> all deportees in Vijnita, where <strong>the</strong> Jewish Central was asked to build barracks for <strong>the</strong>m (<strong>the</strong> decision was unfortunate as <strong>the</strong> allocated room was too small to accommodate all deportees). On November 24, Filderman submitted a list to <strong>the</strong> Council <strong>of</strong> Ministers <strong>of</strong> localities where <strong>the</strong> repatriated could be resettled: Jews from <strong>the</strong> Old Regat and sou<strong>the</strong>rn Transylvania were to return to <strong>the</strong>ir homes; those suspected <strong>of</strong> dangerous political liaisons were to be interned in an Old Regat camp; Jews from Dorohoi and sou<strong>the</strong>rn Bukovina were to be resettled in county capitals; and those from Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Bukovina were to be resettled in Cernauti, Strojinet, Gura Humorului, and Siret. <strong>Final</strong>ly, <strong>the</strong> memorandum suggested that Bessarabian Jews be resettled in <strong>the</strong> towns <strong>of</strong> Chişinău, Bălţi, and Soroca, while healthy people could be sent to o<strong>the</strong>r towns. Special proposals were drafted on family reunification, and <strong>the</strong> government was asked to pay <strong>the</strong> transportation costs <strong>of</strong> repatriation. On February 25, 1944, Filderman was received at <strong>the</strong> Ministry <strong>of</strong> Interior, where he asked once again for <strong>the</strong> repatriation <strong>of</strong> all deportees, presenting <strong>the</strong> issue as a matter <strong>of</strong> life and death. He argued against <strong>the</strong> charge that <strong>the</strong> Romanian population in Bessarabia and Bukovina was hostile to repatriation by explaining that this argument unfairly associated <strong>the</strong> Jewish population with a group <strong>of</strong> agitators and speculators and that in Dorohoi <strong>the</strong> Romanian population welcomed <strong>the</strong> return <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> deportees. Partial repatriation began in <strong>the</strong> second half <strong>of</strong> December 1943. On December 20, <strong>the</strong> 6,053 Jewish inhabitants <strong>of</strong> Dorohoi who survived deportation were sent back to <strong>the</strong>ir hometown. On March 6, 1944, 1,846 children <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> over 5,000 orphans were repatriated. Filderman sent a note to <strong>the</strong> government on March 11, 1944, <strong>of</strong>fering humanitarian reasons (over half <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> deportees had passed away in two years) and pointing out <strong>the</strong> economically beneficial aspects <strong>of</strong> repatriation as well as politically positive outcomes (e.g., <strong>the</strong> Soviets could not use <strong>the</strong> Romanian Jewish deportees). Antonescu ordered general repatriation in March 1944, yet <strong>the</strong> decision came too late to organize <strong>the</strong> repatriation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> last group <strong>of</strong> deportees, which happened to be <strong>the</strong> most numerous. Only <strong>the</strong> following categories <strong>of</strong> deportees were repatriated by train: inhabitants <strong>of</strong> Dorohoi, orphan children, <strong>the</strong> 500 political prisoners from <strong>the</strong> Vapniarka camp, and former internees in Grossulovo. Between March 17 and March 30, 1944, <strong>the</strong> CAA and delegates from <strong>the</strong> Jewish Central’s Department for Assistance, toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> Romanian authorities, also organized <strong>the</strong> repatriation <strong>of</strong> 2,538 people from different camps and ghettos in Transnistria. The fate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> remaining tens <strong>of</strong> thousands <strong>of</strong> deportees left in Transnistria is difficult to know. In a letter to Mihai Antonescu, Filderman expressed his regret for <strong>the</strong> failure to
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Final Repo
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Germany’s war against the
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which includes reputed experts led
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BACKGROUND AND PRECURSORS TO THE HO
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against which antisemites in <stron
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declaring in the p
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them. Thus, he con
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We must organize ourselves for a wa
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ureaucracy of wart
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this direction by Nicolae C. Paules
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promising leader of</strong
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organized a tariff and tax strike.
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Legion of
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less so in Romanian society as a wh
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This ambiguous, self-contradictory
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The Gigurtu government began to con
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The Case of Român
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Cuza’s argument that it is possib
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Românesc,” Sociologie Româneasc
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ole in the early 1
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European states, notably Romania an
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Germany's immediate interests at <s
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eligious communities, the</
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counterpart, “when [he] first met
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de Istorie şi Arheologie, “A. D.
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Romania. Muler to Luthe</st
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demands on territorial revisions an
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military mission to come to Romania
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High Command, informing the
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The Jews and the R
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Romanian army. Thus, in Ciudei in <
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antisemitism in Romanian society an
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Ibid., fond Micro-films, roll I.II,
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manifestations of
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power, as this power colonized West
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attraction, many Jews resettled in
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to defend itself; hence its support
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about the Holocaus
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Nichifor Crainic, “Dupa douazeci
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Isaia Tolan, “Revizuirea incetate
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X. Y. Z., “Rezolvarea problemei e
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andom searches and arrests, robberi
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Bucharest Prefectura. Almost two th
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epression was not ordered by Antone
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from villages and small towns. On J
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accident; it was contrived by <stro
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The second train to leave Iasi for
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care of th
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"premilitary," were also placed at
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according to the o
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Tighina Agreement On August 30, Tra
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elieved Transnistria would be occup
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the 331,000 Ukrain
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those inside to take the</s
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[longer] move.” After several wee
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eappear a few seconds later and sig
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operation and that “some
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Bukovina and Bessarabia. Einsatzkom
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Page 123 and 124: transport of 2,000
Page 125 and 126: Bulgarian, Turkish, Italian, or Swi
Page 127 and 128: were at least 122,000 Jews. Bukovin
Page 129 and 130: Wilhelm Hoettl, The Secret Front: T
Page 131 and 132: Ancel, Documents, vol. 2: no. 136,
Page 133 and 134: Carp, Cartea neagra, vol. 3: pp. 30
Page 135 and 136: Gosudartsveni Archiv Odeskoi Oblast
Page 137 and 138: Cable from the Mil
Page 139 and 140: 1-1087, p. 114; list of</st
Page 141 and 142: Ibid. “Rezolvarea problemei evrei
Page 143 and 144: child’s birth, would be considere
Page 145 and 146: Indeed, the system
Page 147 and 148: Romanianization instead of<
Page 149 and 150: The Cultural Ghettoization
Page 151 and 152: The Status of Jewi
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Page 155 and 156: Conclusions The anti-Jewish legisla
Page 157 and 158: L.A., no. 99, p. 344. Trei ani de g
Page 159 and 160: moral, social, and intellectual nee
Page 161 and 162: gradually, in reality the</
Page 163 and 164: except being defined as a Jew. I be
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Page 167: y Lecca: Jews were privileged, and
Page 171 and 172: oth as a cry of re
Page 173 and 174: After coming to power, the<
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Page 177 and 178: their non-evacuate
Page 179 and 180: villages of <stron
Page 181 and 182: Return of Roma Sur
Page 183 and 184: (in many cases, the</strong
Page 185 and 186: in Romania. History and Contemporar
Page 187 and 188: THE ROLE OF ION ANTONESCU IN THE PL
Page 189 and 190: December 16, 1941, meeting
Page 191 and 192: me from carrying out the</s
Page 193 and 194: did not do it because…the
Page 195 and 196: more ironically, this leader’s wa
Page 197 and 198: THE HOLOCAUST IN NORTHERN TRANSYLVA
Page 199 and 200: Others 22 968 Magy
Page 201 and 202: ultimatum but also consented to <st
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Page 209 and 210: authorities set up two ghettos in <
Page 211 and 212: Secuilor counties was carried out i
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Page 215 and 216: deportation trains per day. While E
Page 217 and 218: Deportation Trains from Nor
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Câtcău Kackó Ciuc Csík Ciucea C
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Rona de Sus Felsöróna Rozavica Ro
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Bözödújfalu Bezidu Nou Budfalva
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Nagysajó Şieu (Bistrita-Nasaud Co
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(Indictment of Naz
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Randolph L. Braham, comp. and ed. (
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perceived by a significant part <st
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Romanian government not to adopt <s
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still alive in the
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the Jews who worke
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We have been informed that various
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church bells announce the</
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Mitropolit pleaded with Mihai Anton
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Pozdnyakova, Yefrosiniya Starostina
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Ibid., pp. 224-225. Ibid., pp. 46-4
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the examined cases
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escape with negligible punishment;
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immense scale, enslaved millions <s
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means. The “ethnic Christian stat
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it is evident that the</str
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face să pară evident că victimel
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viaţă, 100 milioane lei amendă
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Articolul 15 al Convenţiei de armi
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members accepted as authoritative s
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camp in January 1945, for several m
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Beginning in the 1
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such access was strictly supervised
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enefit from translation into Englis
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furthermore, he ha
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lucrative Jewish business ever,”
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deaths of thousand
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Treptow who was residing in Romania
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Finally, it must b
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A.) Integral Negationism Although <
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other genocides re
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mankind, such as wars; the<
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age of 44, only on
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After deploring the</strong
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Michael Shafir, “Ex Occidente Obs
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See, for example, Giurescu who make
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Randolph L. Braham, Romanian Nation
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Mediafax, March 18, 2002, Monitorul
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See Ibidem, pp. 3, 54-55. Ibidem, p
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Radu Theodoru, Mareşalul, Editura
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egained from the U
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was a record of an
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secondary school use. Those institu
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including erecting statues, mountin
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