Final Report of the International Commission on the - Minority Rights ...

Soviet occupants. There can be no doubt that <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union heavily influenced <strong>the</strong> outcome <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
justice process and that some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> indictment counts had little in common with actual facts.
Paradoxically enough, however, it is also at Moscow’s door that one must lay <strong>the</strong> blame for <strong>the</strong>
prosecution’s inability to charge many <strong>of</strong> those figuring on its initial lists <strong>of</strong> suspected war criminals.
Some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> suspects were by now fighting on <strong>the</strong> Allied side (for example General Nicolae Stavrescu,
one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> masterminds <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Iasi pogrom <strong>of</strong> June 1941, who would none<strong>the</strong>less eventually be tried for
<strong>the</strong> role he played in <strong>the</strong> pogrom); o<strong>the</strong>rs were turncoats protected by Moscow and even became
prosecutors <strong>the</strong>mselves (Major Iorgu Popescu, for example, who had killed a Jewish student while
investigating him under <strong>the</strong> previous regime, was now named public prosecutor in <strong>the</strong> trial <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Iasi
pogrom perpetrators, and Ana Pauker herself advised against making a case <strong>of</strong> his past); or <strong>the</strong> Soviet
Union simply neglected to deliver documents attesting to <strong>the</strong> atrocities committed on <strong>the</strong> territories it had
re-annexed, despite repeated promises to do so “with <strong>the</strong> next plane.” Meanwhile, many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> suspects
managed to escape abroad. This would not stop Moscow from soon accusing <strong>the</strong> (at that time still not
fully communist) government <strong>of</strong> not hunting war criminals sufficiently hard. And indeed, though <strong>the</strong>
People’s Tribunals were disbanded in 1946, trials in connection with “crimes against peace” and o<strong>the</strong>r
war-linked charges would continue in <strong>the</strong> following years on <strong>the</strong> base <strong>of</strong> law no. 291 <strong>of</strong> 1945, which
provided for sanctioning those guilty <strong>of</strong> war crimes or “crimes against peace” stipulating sentences <strong>of</strong>
between fifteen years and life imprisonment.
A final note on <strong>the</strong> postwar trials and collaboration: Jews were also sent before <strong>the</strong> People’s Tribunal
for war crimes and collaboration. The most famous involved <strong>the</strong> leadership <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Antonescu-era Jewish
Central (Centrala Evreilor), established on January 11, 1942, which had acted as a sort <strong>of</strong> Judenrat.
Nandor Gingold, a converted Jew, who was chairman <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Central, received a life sentence to hard labor
on February 18, 1946, while his associates Matias Grünberg (alias Willman), A. Grossman-Grozea, and
Jack Leon were sentenced to terms between twelve and twenty years in prison. “Gingoldism” would
eventually be turned by <strong>the</strong> country’s new communist rulers into <strong>the</strong> penchant <strong>of</strong> “Fascism” when it came
to refer to political adversaries within <strong>the</strong> Jewish community (at that stage, not-yet-communized),
although <strong>the</strong> term “Jewish Fascism” was also <strong>of</strong>ten used. The remainder <strong>of</strong> this chapter will focus on <strong>the</strong>
crimes committed against Jews in <strong>the</strong> postwar trials.
The Trial <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Major Figures <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Ion Antonescu Government
The trial took place in Bucharest, not Nuremberg, following <strong>the</strong> commitment made by <strong>the</strong> new
Romanian government to <strong>the</strong> Allies in <strong>the</strong> armistice agreement signed in Moscow on September 12, 1944;
namely, to arrest war criminals and to dissolve and prevent <strong>the</strong> re-emergence <strong>of</strong> pro-Nazi and fascist
organizations. In this context, it should be noted that, unlike o<strong>the</strong>r fascist leaders, Antonescu had nei<strong>the</strong>r a
party nor a fascist organization to support him: he disbanded <strong>the</strong> Iron Guard, which had backed him, as
early as January 1941, following its attempt to seize power.
Generally speaking, steps towards denazification in Romania, such as <strong>the</strong> abrogation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> racist and
antisemitic legislation characteristic <strong>of</strong> a fascist-totalitarian state, were implemented very slowly. The
earliest legislation on <strong>the</strong> subject <strong>of</strong> bringing war criminals and those responsible for <strong>the</strong> catastrophe in
Romania to justice was promulgated as late as January 20, 1945. War criminals were defined as those
who treated prisoners-<strong>of</strong>-war and hostages in a manner contrary to <strong>the</strong> dictates <strong>of</strong> international law;
ordered or perpetrated acts <strong>of</strong> cruelty or liquidations in war zones; ordered or initiated <strong>the</strong> establishment
<strong>of</strong> ghettoes, internment, and forced labor camps; carried out deportations for political or racial reasons;
ordered or carried out collective or individual repression, relocation, and deportation <strong>of</strong> persons for
extermination; perpetuated <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> forced labor for <strong>the</strong> purpose <strong>of</strong> extermination.
The laws as formulated and interpreted enabled many minor war criminals to evade incarceration or to