Final Report of the International Commission on the - Minority Rights ...

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<strong>the</strong> war Romania remained a sovereign state, but committed itself more and more to dependence on its new ally, which initially had seemed so overwhelmingly powerful. Romania delivered its raw materials and put its army at Germany's disposal, <strong>the</strong>reby helping to keep <strong>the</strong> German war machine going. Moreover, Nazi Germany insisted that Romania sign an agreement granting extensive autonomy to <strong>the</strong> German minority in Romania. Thus, <strong>the</strong> ethnic Germans, in effect, erected a small state within <strong>the</strong> state. This de facto territorial entity was built directly by <strong>the</strong> Reich and followed <strong>the</strong> Nazi model; and in 1943 Romania was forced to allow ethnic Germans to join <strong>the</strong> Waffen-SS instead <strong>of</strong> being drafted into <strong>the</strong> Romanian army . In a parallel to German maneuvers removing <strong>the</strong> German minority from Romanian sovereignty, Nazi-Germany also attempted to gain control over <strong>the</strong> Jewish life in Romania, with <strong>the</strong> intention <strong>of</strong> destroying Romanian Jewry. From spring 1941, Gustav Richter, diplomat and member <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA; Reich Main Security Office), was active in Bucharest. His job was to ensure that all regulations regarding Romania's Jews were to be formulated in accordance with <strong>the</strong> German example. In strict conformity to German directives, <strong>the</strong> Romanian Jews were to be exterminated. Antonescu and Germany When Antonescu came to power in September 1940, it was not obvious that he would be Berlin’s favorite. The Nazis identified him as a potential leader through <strong>the</strong>ir Embassy in Bucharest; yet <strong>the</strong> German ambassador’s endorsement <strong>of</strong> Antonescu was accompanied by a cautionary note: Antonescu had criticized <strong>the</strong> Munich Conference and Anglo-French appeasement. Never<strong>the</strong>less, when Antonescu’s Romania joined <strong>the</strong> Axis on November 23, 1940, Antonescu showed unabashed commitment to “<strong>the</strong> German option”. The vision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Antonescu regime was that <strong>of</strong> a Romania able to retrieve its lost territories and participate in <strong>the</strong> new international order planned by <strong>the</strong> Tripartite Pact. In his plea against German support for a Ukrainian state or for Bulgarian territorial claims, Vice-President <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Council <strong>of</strong> Ministers Mihai Antonescu added to this vision a racial element during his meeting with Hitler on November 27, 1941: “For me, <strong>the</strong> greatest challenge <strong>of</strong> European reconstruction is <strong>the</strong> solving <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Slav problem”; to ensure an enduring peace, it was necessary to “link <strong>the</strong> German action against <strong>the</strong> Slavs with <strong>the</strong> one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Latin race; our position vis-à-vis <strong>the</strong> Slavs must not be toned down by hesitation and any policy viewed at <strong>the</strong> isolation, neutralization or occupation <strong>of</strong> Slav territories may be considered legitimate.” Mihai Antonescu fur<strong>the</strong>r added that German support for Ukrainian and Bulgarian claims would be tantamount to an injustice to Romania and <strong>the</strong> Romanian people, which “is and was anti-Slav, just as it has always been anti-Semite.” This rhetoric was well received by Hitler, who used <strong>the</strong> opportunity to declare that <strong>the</strong>re was space in Europe only for Germanic and Latin “races” and that <strong>the</strong>se two races needed to work toge<strong>the</strong>r against <strong>the</strong> Slavs and promised Mihai Antonescu that Romania could “grab as much (territory) in <strong>the</strong> East as it please[d],” as long as Romanian settlers were sent to help win “<strong>the</strong> common fight against <strong>the</strong> Slavic race”. Yet, Hitler made no firm promises to support <strong>the</strong> return <strong>of</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Transylvania to Romanian sovereignty. Romania, Germany and <strong>the</strong> <strong>Final</strong> Solution “The Jewish problem” or <strong>the</strong> treatment <strong>of</strong> Jews in Romania was nei<strong>the</strong>r an issue nor <strong>the</strong> core <strong>of</strong> a conflict or cause for dissent between Germany and <strong>the</strong> National-Legionary government. It had no impact on <strong>the</strong> stance <strong>of</strong> Nazi Germany with regard to <strong>the</strong> leaders <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Legionary regime in Romania. In <strong>the</strong> beginning, Berlin viewed <strong>the</strong> Legionary <strong>of</strong>fensive against Jewish property and <strong>the</strong> Jews <strong>the</strong>mselves as characteristic <strong>of</strong> a fascist revolution in Romania similar to that which had taken place in Germany. At <strong>the</strong> two meetings between Marshal Ion Antonescu and Hitler (November 22-23, 1940 and January 14, 1941), <strong>the</strong> treatment <strong>of</strong> Jews was not even addressed seriously. Romania's complex political situation and
Germany's immediate interests at <strong>the</strong> time—preparations for war with <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union and <strong>the</strong> campaign in <strong>the</strong> Balkans—constituted <strong>the</strong> backdrop for a special Romanian-German relationship. The Nazi government (Hitler, <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry and von Ribbentrop, and <strong>the</strong> German military mission and Embassy in Bucharest) was chiefly interested in Romania's resources—primarily wheat, produce, and oil—and in subordinating <strong>the</strong> Romanian Army to <strong>the</strong> Reich in <strong>the</strong> upcoming war. The antisemitic policy, which was already central to <strong>the</strong> ideology <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> new Romanian fascist government, was <strong>of</strong> less interest to <strong>the</strong> Germans. Ano<strong>the</strong>r reason <strong>the</strong> “Jewish problem” was a matter <strong>of</strong> only secondary importance was that at <strong>the</strong> time <strong>the</strong> objectives and proportions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>Final</strong> Solution” had not yet been clearly formulated; <strong>the</strong> Nazis, <strong>the</strong>refore, did not pressure Romania into adopting <strong>the</strong>ir policies. Some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> antisemitic propaganda in <strong>the</strong> Romanian press was financed by <strong>the</strong> German Embassy in Bucharest through bribing journalists and newspapers and by providing financial support to <strong>the</strong> two antisemitic parties, <strong>the</strong> National-Christian Party <strong>of</strong> Octavian Goga and A.C. Cuza and <strong>the</strong> Iron Guard. On August 15, 1940, Porunca Vremii (Order <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Times), <strong>the</strong> semi-<strong>of</strong>ficial newspaper <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> antisemitic movement, stated: “any attempt at streng<strong>the</strong>ning Romania will fail as long as <strong>the</strong> Jewish problem in Romania is not solved according to <strong>the</strong> wonderful German model.” In conformity with <strong>the</strong> Nazi model, <strong>the</strong> solution implied a “staunch repression” and “expulsion” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Jews from Romania. This is but one example out <strong>of</strong> hundreds <strong>of</strong> similar newspaper items. The Legionnaires believed, and <strong>the</strong>y were not entirely incorrect, that <strong>the</strong>ir movement had <strong>the</strong> full support <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Nazis and that <strong>the</strong> Reich's guarantees <strong>of</strong> Romania's crippled borders after June-August 1940 were warranted by <strong>the</strong> existence <strong>of</strong> a fascist regime in Romania. On <strong>the</strong> last day <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rebellion (January 23, 1941), when <strong>the</strong> Romanian army indiscriminately killed armed Legionnaires, <strong>the</strong>ir semi<strong>of</strong>ficial paper Cuvântul (The Word) warned Antonescu that <strong>the</strong> destruction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Legionary movement would threaten <strong>the</strong> very existence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Romanian state and Romanian sovereignty: “Only <strong>the</strong> existence in Romania <strong>of</strong> a national movement similar to <strong>the</strong> National-Socialist and fascist ones guarantees our future.” Antonescu also believed that <strong>the</strong> Legionnaires had <strong>the</strong> full trust and support <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Germans. It appeared that in <strong>the</strong> minds <strong>of</strong> Hitler and <strong>the</strong> Nazis, “Romania cannot be ruled in opposition to <strong>the</strong> Iron Guard.” On October 15, 1940, Antonescu sent a special envoy, Valer Pop, known for his pro- German feelings, to Berlin and declared his readiness “for close political, economic, and military cooperation with Germany.” He <strong>the</strong>n invited a German military mission to Romania to train <strong>the</strong> Romanian Army and consolidate <strong>the</strong> border defense. The German <strong>of</strong>ficers, led by General Tippelskirch, who visited Romania were favorably impressed by <strong>the</strong> Conducator (Leader) but not <strong>of</strong> his deputy, Horia Sima, and reported as much to Berlin. In January 1941, during <strong>the</strong> struggle between Antonescu and <strong>the</strong> Iron Guard, <strong>the</strong> Führer was obliged to choose between two potential partners <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Reich. Hitler favored Antonescu, although <strong>the</strong> Iron Guard was <strong>the</strong> ideological counterpart to Nazi Germany, because Antonescu exerted firm control over his army and upheld Romania’s economic commitments to <strong>the</strong> Reich. At <strong>the</strong> January 14, 1941, meeting with Antonescu, Hitler basically granted him a free hand to crush <strong>the</strong> Legionnaires. Even before that meeting, it was clear that those with a military role in Berlin supported Antonescu: Hitler, <strong>the</strong> Wehrmacht generals who met with Antonescu, <strong>the</strong> head <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> military delegation in Bucharest, various economic <strong>of</strong>fices, and <strong>the</strong> representative in Bucharest, Wilhelm Fabrizius. Himmler and all <strong>of</strong> his organizations as well as Goebbels, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, supported <strong>the</strong> Iron Guard. On January 24, Goebbels, who did not know that <strong>the</strong> battle had already been decided, wrote in his diary: “In Romania, nothing is clear yet. The Legionnaires are continuing <strong>the</strong>ir revolt, and Antonescu has issued orders to shoot <strong>the</strong>m. The Führer, for his part, says that he wants an agreement with a state and not with an ideology. Still, my heart is with <strong>the</strong>m.” Several days later, after learning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Legionnaires’ defeat, Goebbels added in his diary: “Am with <strong>the</strong> Führer. He continues to support Antonescu, since he
Page 1 and 2: Final Repo
Page 3 and 4: Germany’s war against the
Page 5 and 6: which includes reputed experts led
Page 7 and 8: BACKGROUND AND PRECURSORS TO THE HO
Page 9 and 10: against which antisemites in <stron
Page 11 and 12: declaring in the p
Page 13 and 14: them. Thus, he con
Page 15 and 16: We must organize ourselves for a wa
Page 17 and 18: ureaucracy of wart
Page 19 and 20: this direction by Nicolae C. Paules
Page 21 and 22: promising leader of</strong
Page 23 and 24: organized a tariff and tax strike.
Page 25 and 26: Legion of
Page 27 and 28: less so in Romanian society as a wh
Page 29 and 30: This ambiguous, self-contradictory
Page 31 and 32: The Gigurtu government began to con
Page 33 and 34: The Case of Român
Page 35 and 36: Cuza’s argument that it is possib
Page 37 and 38: Românesc,” Sociologie Româneasc
Page 39 and 40: ole in the early 1
Page 41: European states, notably Romania an
Page 45 and 46: eligious communities, the</
Page 47 and 48: counterpart, “when [he] first met
Page 49 and 50: de Istorie şi Arheologie, “A. D.
Page 51 and 52: Romania. Muler to Luthe</st
Page 53 and 54: demands on territorial revisions an
Page 55 and 56: military mission to come to Romania
Page 57 and 58: High Command, informing the
Page 59 and 60: The Jews and the R
Page 61 and 62: Romanian army. Thus, in Ciudei in <
Page 63 and 64: antisemitism in Romanian society an
Page 65 and 66: Ibid., fond Micro-films, roll I.II,
Page 67 and 68: manifestations of
Page 69 and 70: power, as this power colonized West
Page 71 and 72: attraction, many Jews resettled in
Page 73 and 74: to defend itself; hence its support
Page 75 and 76: about the Holocaus
Page 77 and 78: Nichifor Crainic, “Dupa douazeci
Page 79 and 80: Isaia Tolan, “Revizuirea incetate
Page 81 and 82: X. Y. Z., “Rezolvarea problemei e
Page 83 and 84: andom searches and arrests, robberi
Page 85 and 86: Bucharest Prefectura. Almost two th
Page 87 and 88: epression was not ordered by Antone
Page 89 and 90: from villages and small towns. On J
Page 91 and 92: accident; it was contrived by <stro
Page 93 and 94:
The second train to leave Iasi for
Page 95 and 96:
care of th
Page 97 and 98:
"premilitary," were also placed at
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according to the o
Page 101 and 102:
Tighina Agreement On August 30, Tra
Page 103 and 104:
elieved Transnistria would be occup
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the 331,000 Ukrain
Page 107 and 108:
those inside to take the</s
Page 109 and 110:
[longer] move.” After several wee
Page 111 and 112:
eappear a few seconds later and sig
Page 113 and 114:
operation and that “some
Page 115 and 116:
Bukovina and Bessarabia. Einsatzkom
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other things, <str
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Berezovka district and burn <strong
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them in exchange f
Page 123 and 124:
transport of 2,000
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Bulgarian, Turkish, Italian, or Swi
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were at least 122,000 Jews. Bukovin
Page 129 and 130:
Wilhelm Hoettl, The Secret Front: T
Page 131 and 132:
Ancel, Documents, vol. 2: no. 136,
Page 133 and 134:
Carp, Cartea neagra, vol. 3: pp. 30
Page 135 and 136:
Gosudartsveni Archiv Odeskoi Oblast
Page 137 and 138:
Cable from the Mil
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1-1087, p. 114; list of</st
Page 141 and 142:
Ibid. “Rezolvarea problemei evrei
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child’s birth, would be considere
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Indeed, the system
Page 147 and 148:
Romanianization instead of<
Page 149 and 150:
The Cultural Ghettoization
Page 151 and 152:
The Status of Jewi
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give up any radios able to send and
Page 155 and 156:
Conclusions The anti-Jewish legisla
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L.A., no. 99, p. 344. Trei ani de g
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moral, social, and intellectual nee
Page 161 and 162:
gradually, in reality the</
Page 163 and 164:
except being defined as a Jew. I be
Page 165 and 166:
egulate and authorize, under <stron
Page 167 and 168:
y Lecca: Jews were privileged, and
Page 169 and 170:
through the activi
Page 171 and 172:
oth as a cry of re
Page 173 and 174:
After coming to power, the<
Page 175 and 176:
and then to send <
Page 177 and 178:
their non-evacuate
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villages of <stron
Page 181 and 182:
Return of Roma Sur
Page 183 and 184:
(in many cases, the</strong
Page 185 and 186:
in Romania. History and Contemporar
Page 187 and 188:
THE ROLE OF ION ANTONESCU IN THE PL
Page 189 and 190:
December 16, 1941, meeting
Page 191 and 192:
me from carrying out the</s
Page 193 and 194:
did not do it because…the
Page 195 and 196:
more ironically, this leader’s wa
Page 197 and 198:
THE HOLOCAUST IN NORTHERN TRANSYLVA
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Others 22 968 Magy
Page 201 and 202:
ultimatum but also consented to <st
Page 203 and 204:
military, political, and psychologi
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command over the g
Page 207 and 208:
Huedin. The Jews of</strong
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authorities set up two ghettos in <
Page 211 and 212:
Secuilor counties was carried out i
Page 213 and 214:
the procedure foll
Page 215 and 216:
deportation trains per day. While E
Page 217 and 218:
Deportation Trains from Nor
Page 219 and 220:
Câtcău Kackó Ciuc Csík Ciucea C
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Rona de Sus Felsöróna Rozavica Ro
Page 223 and 224:
Bözödújfalu Bezidu Nou Budfalva
Page 225 and 226:
Nagysajó Şieu (Bistrita-Nasaud Co
Page 227 and 228:
(Indictment of Naz
Page 229 and 230:
Randolph L. Braham, comp. and ed. (
Page 231 and 232:
perceived by a significant part <st
Page 233 and 234:
Romanian government not to adopt <s
Page 235 and 236:
still alive in the
Page 237 and 238:
the Jews who worke
Page 239 and 240:
We have been informed that various
Page 241 and 242:
church bells announce the</
Page 243 and 244:
Mitropolit pleaded with Mihai Anton
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Pozdnyakova, Yefrosiniya Starostina
Page 247 and 248:
Ibid., pp. 224-225. Ibid., pp. 46-4
Page 249 and 250:
the examined cases
Page 251 and 252:
escape with negligible punishment;
Page 253 and 254:
immense scale, enslaved millions <s
Page 255 and 256:
means. The “ethnic Christian stat
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it is evident that the</str
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face să pară evident că victimel
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viaţă, 100 milioane lei amendă
Page 263 and 264:
Articolul 15 al Convenţiei de armi
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members accepted as authoritative s
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camp in January 1945, for several m
Page 269 and 270:
Beginning in the 1
Page 271 and 272:
such access was strictly supervised
Page 273 and 274:
enefit from translation into Englis
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furthermore, he ha
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lucrative Jewish business ever,”
Page 279 and 280:
deaths of thousand
Page 281 and 282:
Treptow who was residing in Romania
Page 283 and 284:
Finally, it must b
Page 285 and 286:
A.) Integral Negationism Although <
Page 287 and 288:
other genocides re
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mankind, such as wars; the<
Page 291 and 292:
age of 44, only on
Page 293 and 294:
After deploring the</strong
Page 295 and 296:
Michael Shafir, “Ex Occidente Obs
Page 297 and 298:
See, for example, Giurescu who make
Page 299 and 300:
Randolph L. Braham, Romanian Nation
Page 301 and 302:
Mediafax, March 18, 2002, Monitorul
Page 303 and 304:
See Ibidem, pp. 3, 54-55. Ibidem, p
Page 305 and 306:
Radu Theodoru, Mareşalul, Editura
Page 307 and 308:
egained from the U
Page 309 and 310:
was a record of an
Page 311 and 312:
secondary school use. Those institu
Page 313:
including erecting statues, mountin
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