Final Report of the International Commission on the - Minority Rights ...

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needs him for military reasons. That is one point <strong>of</strong> view. But it wasn’t necessary to wipe out <strong>the</strong> Legion.” Himmler’s emissaries in Romania helped <strong>the</strong> commander <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Legionnaires, Horia Sima, and <strong>the</strong> heads <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> movement to escape to Germany. Throughout <strong>the</strong> war years, <strong>the</strong> heads <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Iron Guard remained in Germany under relatively comfortable conditions, albeit with restrictions on <strong>the</strong>ir freedom <strong>of</strong> movement. Sima and his henchmen could serve as an alternative to Antonescu’s regime if something went wrong in Bucharest. In return for <strong>the</strong>ir assistance to <strong>the</strong> Iron Guard, Antonescu forced Himmler’s representatives and Foreign Department <strong>of</strong>ficers as well as known Gestapo agents in <strong>the</strong> country to leave Romania, <strong>the</strong>reby ensuring himself control over domestic matters. It should be noted that Romanian-German cooperation was not only <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> Antonescu's consent to satisfy most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German economic and military demands but also <strong>of</strong> his fear <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> USSR. For almost four years—from September 1940 to August 1944—this fear was greater than his fear Germany. The economic obligations Antonescu accepted increased from month to month and became a heavy burden on Romania's finances and natural resources, particularly grain and oil had to be provided. Yet, something unprecedented for a Nazi ally or satellite country happened in Romania: <strong>the</strong> local pro-Nazi party was forcefully deposed; its active members were arrested, and its leaders were saved from <strong>the</strong> death penalty only by representatives <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National-Socialist Party and <strong>the</strong> Gestapo. Thus, during <strong>the</strong> years <strong>of</strong> Antonescu government, Romania did not actually have a fascist party. After removing <strong>the</strong> Legionary element from power, <strong>the</strong> Antonescu government continued to implement <strong>the</strong> anti-Jewish measures, which aimed primarily at <strong>the</strong> confiscation <strong>of</strong> Jewish property and <strong>the</strong> elimination <strong>of</strong> Jews from <strong>the</strong> national labor market. In January 1941, Hitler and Göring revealed <strong>the</strong>ir plan for <strong>the</strong> invasion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union, Operation Barbarossa, to both Ion and Mihai Antonescu and agreed on <strong>the</strong> participation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Romanian Army in recovering Bessarabia and Bukovina. Mihai Antonescu stated: “Following <strong>the</strong>se talks, Romania's participation in <strong>the</strong> war on <strong>the</strong> side <strong>of</strong> Germany was agreed; we set <strong>the</strong> day, and only we, Marshal Antonescu and I, knew <strong>the</strong> day when Romania and Germany would declare war on Russia.” Several months later, in March, “special emissaries <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Reich and <strong>of</strong> Himmler,” as described by Mihai Antonescu, arrived in Bucharest to discuss <strong>the</strong> fate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Jews in Romania. The emissaries arrived just after <strong>the</strong> suppression <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Iron Guard rebellion, “when <strong>the</strong> political situation was still uncertain.” This was <strong>the</strong> first attempt by Himmler and <strong>the</strong> RSHA to take over “handling” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Jews <strong>of</strong> Romania, done at a critical juncture in <strong>the</strong> relations between <strong>the</strong> two states a time and when a huge German force (680,000 troops) was stationed on Romanian soil. Mihai Antonescu, however, refused to relinquish this control, and it was during this period that he and <strong>the</strong> Germans reached certain understandings regarding <strong>the</strong> deportation and extermination <strong>of</strong> Bessarabian and Bukovinan Jews. The subsequent arrival in Romania <strong>of</strong> SS-Hauptsturmführer Gustave Richter at <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> April 1941 would have grave implications for <strong>the</strong> fate <strong>of</strong> Romanian Jewry. Richter, a special envoy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> RSHA, was an “expert” on “Jewish problems”. In August 1941, believing that Germany stood on <strong>the</strong> brink <strong>of</strong> victory, Mihai Antonescu informed his Cabinet that he had discussed <strong>the</strong> solution to <strong>the</strong> Jewish problem with representatives <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Reich: “I can report to you that I have already conducted intensive negotiations with a high-ranking German representative <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German organizations from Germany with regard to <strong>the</strong> Jewish problem. [They] understand that <strong>the</strong> Jewish problem will ultimately require an international solution, and <strong>the</strong>y wish to help us to prepare this international solution.” On May 16, 1941, in his report to von Killinger, his immediate superior, Richter reported first achievements: 1. All draft laws…from <strong>the</strong> Under-Secretariat <strong>of</strong> State for Romanization will be sent for my confirmation before being seen by…Antonescu. 2. [The dissolution <strong>of</strong>] all Jewish political organizations, associations and unions except for <strong>the</strong> Jewish
eligious communities, <strong>the</strong> blocking <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir bank accounts and confiscation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir property, <strong>the</strong> total interdiction <strong>of</strong>…<strong>the</strong>ir legal or underground activity. Their property would be transferred to <strong>the</strong> future Jewish Center. 3. The creation <strong>of</strong> a Jewish Center <strong>of</strong> legal public character as <strong>the</strong> sole authorized Jewish organization. 4. The obligation to report and declare all Jewish property. 5. The creation <strong>of</strong> an evacuation (Aussiedlung) fund by <strong>the</strong> Under-Secretariat <strong>of</strong> State for Romanization, which would constitute <strong>the</strong> financial resource for <strong>the</strong> coming evacuation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Jews from Romania. This was <strong>the</strong> Richter’s working program—essentially <strong>the</strong> application in Romania <strong>of</strong> “<strong>the</strong> directives for <strong>the</strong> handling <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Jewish problem” (<strong>the</strong> <strong>Final</strong> Solution) as <strong>the</strong>y had been conceived in Berlin shortly before <strong>the</strong> invasion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union. These included <strong>the</strong> incitement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> local population against <strong>the</strong> Jews and <strong>the</strong> toleration <strong>of</strong> violent acts against <strong>the</strong>m; defining what constituted a Jew; forcing Jews to wear distinctive yellow badges; and <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> ghettos. The third paragraph <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se directives explained: “One <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> primary goals <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German measures was supposed to be <strong>the</strong> forceful isolation <strong>of</strong> Jewry from <strong>the</strong> rest <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> population.” Before <strong>the</strong> war with <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union, Romanian-German military relations had already become closer, and <strong>the</strong> joint preparations for war intensified, with Antonescu seeking not only <strong>the</strong> return <strong>of</strong> Bessarabia and Bukovina but also to streng<strong>the</strong>n Romania in <strong>the</strong> face <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “Slavic threat”. Antonescu's June 12, 1941, visit to Munich to finalize <strong>the</strong> details <strong>of</strong> Romanian-German military cooperation had a decisive impact on <strong>the</strong> fate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Jewish population <strong>of</strong> Bessarabia and Bukovina. At that time, under <strong>the</strong> influence <strong>of</strong> his generals, Hitler did not give much credit to <strong>the</strong> operational capability <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Romanian Army, charging it only with <strong>the</strong> “defense <strong>of</strong> Romanian territory against penetration by Russian forces.” At <strong>the</strong> same time, he wished to stress his personal appreciation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Romanian dictator. He <strong>of</strong>fered Antonescu <strong>the</strong> post <strong>of</strong> commander-in-chief <strong>of</strong> both German and Romanian troops in Romanian territories and to provide him with a liaison headquarters under <strong>the</strong> command <strong>of</strong> General Arthur Hauffe, head <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German military mission to Romania. This was not <strong>the</strong> only manifestation <strong>of</strong> trust and appreciation for <strong>the</strong> Romanian dictator. Hitler's translator, Paul Schmidt, stated later that Antonescu “was <strong>the</strong> only foreigner from whom Hitler ever asked military advice when he was in difficulties.” As Mihai Antonescu reminded Ribbentrop, he had reached understandings (Abmachungen) with <strong>the</strong> SS on <strong>the</strong> policy toward <strong>the</strong> Jews <strong>of</strong> Bessarabia, Bukovina and also Transnistria.” Following <strong>the</strong> meeting in Munich, <strong>the</strong> earlier conversations with <strong>the</strong> RSHA delegation, and <strong>the</strong> Abmachungen, <strong>the</strong> Romanian leaders in Bucharest drew up <strong>the</strong>ir own guidelines for <strong>the</strong> military forces and gendarmerie. The fate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bessarabian and Bukovinan Jews was <strong>the</strong>refore quickly decided. Once he returned to Bucharest from Munich, Ion Antonescu—now <strong>the</strong> commander <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Romanian-German troops in sou<strong>the</strong>rn Europe— decided to imitate <strong>the</strong> Nazis and implement his own plan for a <strong>Final</strong> Solution, which he would call “<strong>the</strong> cleansing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land.” Before <strong>the</strong> ethnic cleansing began, Romanian leaders, convinced <strong>of</strong> German victory, made known to <strong>the</strong> inner circle <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> civil administration <strong>the</strong>ir plans regarding <strong>the</strong> Jewish population and Bessarabia and Bukovina, known as <strong>the</strong> “lost provinces.” On June 19, General Ilie Steflea, one <strong>of</strong> Antonescu's reliable senior <strong>of</strong>ficers, communicated to <strong>the</strong> army, by means <strong>of</strong> a confidential circular, Antonescu's order “to identity all Jidani, Communist agents or sympathizers...as <strong>the</strong> Ministry <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Interior must know where <strong>the</strong>y are in order to ban <strong>the</strong>ir movement, and in order to be able to enact whatever orders I may transmit at a given time.” This order echoed instructions issued earlier by Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel to <strong>the</strong> Wehrmacht. In late July 1941, <strong>the</strong> Romanian army quickly deported up to 25,000 Jews to Mogilev in Ukraine, but <strong>the</strong> German army forced <strong>the</strong> Jews back, shooting roughly 12,000 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m. Antonescu sought <strong>the</strong> assistance <strong>of</strong> Ambassador
Page 1 and 2: Final Repo
Page 3 and 4: Germany’s war against the
Page 5 and 6: which includes reputed experts led
Page 7 and 8: BACKGROUND AND PRECURSORS TO THE HO
Page 9 and 10: against which antisemites in <stron
Page 11 and 12: declaring in the p
Page 13 and 14: them. Thus, he con
Page 15 and 16: We must organize ourselves for a wa
Page 17 and 18: ureaucracy of wart
Page 19 and 20: this direction by Nicolae C. Paules
Page 21 and 22: promising leader of</strong
Page 23 and 24: organized a tariff and tax strike.
Page 25 and 26: Legion of
Page 27 and 28: less so in Romanian society as a wh
Page 29 and 30: This ambiguous, self-contradictory
Page 31 and 32: The Gigurtu government began to con
Page 33 and 34: The Case of Român
Page 35 and 36: Cuza’s argument that it is possib
Page 37 and 38: Românesc,” Sociologie Româneasc
Page 39 and 40: ole in the early 1
Page 41 and 42: European states, notably Romania an
Page 43: Germany's immediate interests at <s
Page 47 and 48: counterpart, “when [he] first met
Page 49 and 50: de Istorie şi Arheologie, “A. D.
Page 51 and 52: Romania. Muler to Luthe</st
Page 53 and 54: demands on territorial revisions an
Page 55 and 56: military mission to come to Romania
Page 57 and 58: High Command, informing the
Page 59 and 60: The Jews and the R
Page 61 and 62: Romanian army. Thus, in Ciudei in <
Page 63 and 64: antisemitism in Romanian society an
Page 65 and 66: Ibid., fond Micro-films, roll I.II,
Page 67 and 68: manifestations of
Page 69 and 70: power, as this power colonized West
Page 71 and 72: attraction, many Jews resettled in
Page 73 and 74: to defend itself; hence its support
Page 75 and 76: about the Holocaus
Page 77 and 78: Nichifor Crainic, “Dupa douazeci
Page 79 and 80: Isaia Tolan, “Revizuirea incetate
Page 81 and 82: X. Y. Z., “Rezolvarea problemei e
Page 83 and 84: andom searches and arrests, robberi
Page 85 and 86: Bucharest Prefectura. Almost two th
Page 87 and 88: epression was not ordered by Antone
Page 89 and 90: from villages and small towns. On J
Page 91 and 92: accident; it was contrived by <stro
Page 93 and 94: The second train to leave Iasi for
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care of th
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"premilitary," were also placed at
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according to the o
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Tighina Agreement On August 30, Tra
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elieved Transnistria would be occup
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the 331,000 Ukrain
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those inside to take the</s
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[longer] move.” After several wee
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eappear a few seconds later and sig
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operation and that “some
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Bukovina and Bessarabia. Einsatzkom
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other things, <str
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Berezovka district and burn <strong
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them in exchange f
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transport of 2,000
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Bulgarian, Turkish, Italian, or Swi
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were at least 122,000 Jews. Bukovin
Page 129 and 130:
Wilhelm Hoettl, The Secret Front: T
Page 131 and 132:
Ancel, Documents, vol. 2: no. 136,
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Carp, Cartea neagra, vol. 3: pp. 30
Page 135 and 136:
Gosudartsveni Archiv Odeskoi Oblast
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Cable from the Mil
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1-1087, p. 114; list of</st
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Ibid. “Rezolvarea problemei evrei
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child’s birth, would be considere
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Indeed, the system
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Romanianization instead of<
Page 149 and 150:
The Cultural Ghettoization
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The Status of Jewi
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give up any radios able to send and
Page 155 and 156:
Conclusions The anti-Jewish legisla
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L.A., no. 99, p. 344. Trei ani de g
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moral, social, and intellectual nee
Page 161 and 162:
gradually, in reality the</
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except being defined as a Jew. I be
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egulate and authorize, under <stron
Page 167 and 168:
y Lecca: Jews were privileged, and
Page 169 and 170:
through the activi
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oth as a cry of re
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After coming to power, the<
Page 175 and 176:
and then to send <
Page 177 and 178:
their non-evacuate
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villages of <stron
Page 181 and 182:
Return of Roma Sur
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(in many cases, the</strong
Page 185 and 186:
in Romania. History and Contemporar
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THE ROLE OF ION ANTONESCU IN THE PL
Page 189 and 190:
December 16, 1941, meeting
Page 191 and 192:
me from carrying out the</s
Page 193 and 194:
did not do it because…the
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more ironically, this leader’s wa
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THE HOLOCAUST IN NORTHERN TRANSYLVA
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Others 22 968 Magy
Page 201 and 202:
ultimatum but also consented to <st
Page 203 and 204:
military, political, and psychologi
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command over the g
Page 207 and 208:
Huedin. The Jews of</strong
Page 209 and 210:
authorities set up two ghettos in <
Page 211 and 212:
Secuilor counties was carried out i
Page 213 and 214:
the procedure foll
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deportation trains per day. While E
Page 217 and 218:
Deportation Trains from Nor
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Câtcău Kackó Ciuc Csík Ciucea C
Page 221 and 222:
Rona de Sus Felsöróna Rozavica Ro
Page 223 and 224:
Bözödújfalu Bezidu Nou Budfalva
Page 225 and 226:
Nagysajó Şieu (Bistrita-Nasaud Co
Page 227 and 228:
(Indictment of Naz
Page 229 and 230:
Randolph L. Braham, comp. and ed. (
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perceived by a significant part <st
Page 233 and 234:
Romanian government not to adopt <s
Page 235 and 236:
still alive in the
Page 237 and 238:
the Jews who worke
Page 239 and 240:
We have been informed that various
Page 241 and 242:
church bells announce the</
Page 243 and 244:
Mitropolit pleaded with Mihai Anton
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Pozdnyakova, Yefrosiniya Starostina
Page 247 and 248:
Ibid., pp. 224-225. Ibid., pp. 46-4
Page 249 and 250:
the examined cases
Page 251 and 252:
escape with negligible punishment;
Page 253 and 254:
immense scale, enslaved millions <s
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means. The “ethnic Christian stat
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it is evident that the</str
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face să pară evident că victimel
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viaţă, 100 milioane lei amendă
Page 263 and 264:
Articolul 15 al Convenţiei de armi
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members accepted as authoritative s
Page 267 and 268:
camp in January 1945, for several m
Page 269 and 270:
Beginning in the 1
Page 271 and 272:
such access was strictly supervised
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enefit from translation into Englis
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furthermore, he ha
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lucrative Jewish business ever,”
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deaths of thousand
Page 281 and 282:
Treptow who was residing in Romania
Page 283 and 284:
Finally, it must b
Page 285 and 286:
A.) Integral Negationism Although <
Page 287 and 288:
other genocides re
Page 289 and 290:
mankind, such as wars; the<
Page 291 and 292:
age of 44, only on
Page 293 and 294:
After deploring the</strong
Page 295 and 296:
Michael Shafir, “Ex Occidente Obs
Page 297 and 298:
See, for example, Giurescu who make
Page 299 and 300:
Randolph L. Braham, Romanian Nation
Page 301 and 302:
Mediafax, March 18, 2002, Monitorul
Page 303 and 304:
See Ibidem, pp. 3, 54-55. Ibidem, p
Page 305 and 306:
Radu Theodoru, Mareşalul, Editura
Page 307 and 308:
egained from the U
Page 309 and 310:
was a record of an
Page 311 and 312:
secondary school use. Those institu
Page 313:
including erecting statues, mountin
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