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The Judgment of Animals in Classical Greece: Animal Sculpture and ...

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kaq' au(to_ ei]nai…qew&rhma), <strong>and</strong>, at the same time, as “an image <strong>of</strong> someth<strong>in</strong>g else”<br />

(fa&ntasma& e0st<strong>in</strong>, h| { d' a1llou) that serves as aid to memory (mnhmo&neuma). When<br />

transferred to the context <strong>of</strong> the arts, these two different ontological statuses correspond<br />

to the two different ways that a pa<strong>in</strong>ted or drawn picture/image (gegramme/non) could be<br />

perceived: as a zw|~on <strong>and</strong> ei0kw&n. Simply put, this correspondence suggests that zw|~on<br />

was, for Aristotle, “an object <strong>of</strong> speculation <strong>in</strong> its own right” <strong>and</strong> ei0kw&n, “an image <strong>of</strong><br />

someth<strong>in</strong>g else.” Hett translates ei0kw&n as “portrait,” which implies a human subject.<br />

Sachs, on the contrary, translates it as “likeness” <strong>and</strong> expla<strong>in</strong>s that: “a ‘likeness’ (ei0kw&n)<br />

means not any <strong>and</strong> every th<strong>in</strong>g that resembles someth<strong>in</strong>g else (o(moi/wma), but someth<strong>in</strong>g<br />

derivative that imitates or represents the “orig<strong>in</strong>al.” 622 In agreement with Hett is also<br />

Thomas Aqu<strong>in</strong>as, whose commentary on the passage suggests that he, too, understood<br />

ei0kw&n as “likeness.” 623 Additional evidence that supports this mean<strong>in</strong>g derives from his<br />

statement that ei0kw&n stood for or represented someth<strong>in</strong>g or someone perceived<br />

previously, but out <strong>of</strong> sight now. This belief is exemplified <strong>in</strong> Aristotle’s reference to the<br />

contemplation <strong>of</strong> an ei0ko&na <strong>of</strong> someone called Coriscus, which he def<strong>in</strong>es as an image<br />

represent<strong>in</strong>g this person, <strong>and</strong> therefore, function<strong>in</strong>g as a rem<strong>in</strong>der <strong>of</strong> this person’s<br />

existence to the viewer. Although not identical, this l<strong>in</strong>e <strong>of</strong> thought is very close to that<br />

<strong>of</strong> Plato, who, as seen earlier, thought <strong>of</strong> a)ga&lmata as substitutes <strong>of</strong> the presence <strong>of</strong><br />

gods. Aristotle’s passage states, however, that the image held <strong>in</strong> memory (fa&ntasma)<br />

ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>and</strong> exhibited these qualities <strong>of</strong> ei0kw&n, but it was also a zw|~on.<br />

As noted above, Aristotle provides an explicit def<strong>in</strong>ition <strong>of</strong> this term as “an object<br />

<strong>of</strong> speculation <strong>in</strong> its own right,” thus, not <strong>in</strong> relation to someth<strong>in</strong>g else, or a fa&ntasma,<br />

622 Sachs, Aristotle’s On the Soul <strong>and</strong> On Memory <strong>and</strong> Recollection 171, n. 4, where he refers to specific<br />

passages, such as Plato’s Sophist (240b-240c), which carries this mean<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

623 White <strong>and</strong> Macierowski, St. Thomas Aqu<strong>in</strong>as. Commentaries 202, n. 18.<br />

323

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