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The Judgment of Animals in Classical Greece: Animal Sculpture and ...

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e3teron le/ontoj, kai\ e0k kuno_j a1rrenoj kai\ le/ontoj qh&leoj e3teron<br />

kai\ e0k le/ontoj a1rrenoj kai\ kuno_j qh&leoj e3teron:<br />

Two animals which differ <strong>in</strong> species produce <strong>of</strong>fspr<strong>in</strong>g which differs <strong>in</strong> species; for<br />

<strong>in</strong>stance, a dog differs <strong>in</strong> species from a lion, <strong>and</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fspr<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> a male dog <strong>and</strong> a<br />

female lion is different <strong>in</strong> species; so is the <strong>of</strong>fspr<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> a male lion <strong>and</strong> a female dog.<br />

52<br />

Aristotle, De Memoria et Rem<strong>in</strong>iscentia 450b-451a IV B.C.<br />

Text: W. D. Ross, ed., Aristotle. Parva Naturalia (Oxford, 1955; repr. 1970).<br />

Translation: W. S. Hett, ed., tr., Aristotle VIII. On the Soul. Parva Naturalia. On Breath<br />

(Cambridge, Mass. <strong>and</strong> London, 1995).<br />

oi[on ga_r to_ e0n pi/naki gegramme/non zw|~on kai\ zw|~o&n e0sti kai\ ei0kw&n, kai\ to_ au)to_ kai\<br />

e4n tou~t' e0sti\n a1mfw, to_ me/ntoi ei]nai ou) tau)to_n a)mfoi=n, kai\ e1sti qewrei=n kai\ w(j<br />

zw|~on kai\ w(j ei0ko&na, ou3tw kai\ to_ e0n h(mi=n fa&ntasma dei= u(polabei=n kai\<br />

au)to& ti kaq' au(to_ ei]nai kai\ a1llou [fa&ntasma]. h| { me\n ou}n kaq' au(to&, qew&rhma h2<br />

fa&ntasma& e0st<strong>in</strong>, h| { d' a1llou, oi[on ei0kw_n kai\ mnhmo&neuma. w3ste kai\ o3tan e0nergh|~ h(<br />

ki/nhsij au)tou~, a2n me\n h| { kaq' au(to& e0sti, tau&th| ai0sqa&nhtai h( yuxh_ au)tou~, oi[on<br />

no&hma& ti h2 fa&ntasma fai/netai e0pelqei=n: a2n d' h| { a1llou kai\ w3sper e0n th|~ grafh|~ w(j<br />

ei0ko&na qewrei= kai/, mh__<br />

e9wrakw_j to_n Kori/skon, w(j Kori/skou, e0ntau~qa& te a1llo to_<br />

pa&qoj th~j qewri/aj tau&thj kai\ o3tan w(j zw|~on gegramme/non qewrh|~, e1n te th|~ yuxh|~<br />

to_ me\n gi/gnetai w3sper no&hma mo&non, to_ d' w(j e0kei= o3ti ei0kw&n, mnhmo&neuma.<br />

Just as the picture pa<strong>in</strong>ted on the panel is at once a picture <strong>and</strong> a portrait, <strong>and</strong> though one<br />

<strong>and</strong> the same, is both, yet the essence <strong>of</strong> the two is not the same, <strong>and</strong> it is possible to th<strong>in</strong>k<br />

<strong>of</strong> it as a picture <strong>and</strong> as a portrait, so <strong>in</strong> the same way we must regard the mental picture<br />

with<strong>in</strong> us both as an object <strong>of</strong> contemplation <strong>in</strong> itself <strong>and</strong> as a mental picture <strong>of</strong> someth<strong>in</strong>g<br />

else. In so far as we consider it <strong>in</strong> itself, it is an object <strong>of</strong> contemplation or a mental<br />

picture, but <strong>in</strong> so far as we consider it <strong>in</strong> relation to someth<strong>in</strong>g else, e.g., as a likeness, it<br />

is also an aid to memory. Hence when the stimulus <strong>of</strong> it is operative, if the soul perceives<br />

the impression as <strong>in</strong>dependent, it appears to occur as a thought, or a mental picture; but if<br />

it is considered <strong>in</strong> relation to someth<strong>in</strong>g else, it is as though one contemplated a figure <strong>in</strong><br />

the picture as a portrait, e.g., <strong>of</strong> Coriscus, although he has not just seen Coriscus. As <strong>in</strong><br />

this case the affection caused by the contemplation differs from that which is caused then<br />

one contemplates the object merely as a pa<strong>in</strong>ted picture, so <strong>in</strong> the soul the one object<br />

appears as a mere thought, but the other, be<strong>in</strong>g (as <strong>in</strong> the former case) a likeness, is an aid<br />

to memory.<br />

53<br />

Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea 3.10.7 IV B.C.<br />

Text <strong>and</strong> translation: H. Rackham, ed., tr., Aristotle. <strong>The</strong> Nicomachean Ethics<br />

(Cambridge, Mass. <strong>and</strong> London, 1926; repr. 1956).<br />

ou)de\ ga_r tai=j o)smai=j tw~n lagww~n ai9 ku&nej<br />

358

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