The Judgment of Animals in Classical Greece: Animal Sculpture and ...

BDELYCLEON
This Labes will eat meat-scraps
and fish-bones, and he never stays in one place for long.
48
Aristotle, Categoriae 1a IV B.C.
Text: L. Minio-Paluello, ed., Aristotelis Categoriae et Liber de Interpretatione (Oxford,
1949; repr. 1966).
Translation: H. P. Cooke, ed., tr., Aristotle I. Categories. On Interpretation. Prior
Analytics (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1938; repr. 1996).
9Omw&numa le/getai w{n o1noma mo&non koino&n, o( de\ kata_ tou1noma lo&goj th~j ou)si/aj
e3teroj, oi[on zw|~on o3 te a1nqrwpoj kai\ to_ gegramme/non: tou&twn ga_r o1noma mo&non
koino&n, o( de\ kata_ tou1noma lo&goj th~j ou)si/aj e3teroj: e0a_n ga_r a)podidw|~ tij ti/
e0stin au)tw~n e9kate/rw| to_ zw|&w| ei]nai, i1dion e9kate/rou lo&gon a)podw&sei. sunw&numa
de\ le/getai w{n to& te o1noma koino_n kai\ o( kata_ tou1noma lo&goj th~j ou)si/aj o( au)to&j,
oi[on zw|~on o3 te a1nqrwpoj kai\ o( bou~j: tou&twn ga_r e9ka&teron koinw|~ o)no&mati
prosagoreu&etai zw|~on, kai\ o( lo&goj de\ th~j ou)si/aj o( au)to&j: e0a_n ga_r a)podidw|~ tij
to_n e9kate/rou lo&gon ti/ e0stin au)tw~n e9kate/rw| to_ zw|&w| ei]nai, to_n au)to_n
lo&gon a)podw&sei. parw&numa de\ le/getai o3sa a)po& tinoj diafe/ronta th|~ ptw&sei
th_n kata_ tou1noma proshgori/an e1xei, oi[on a)po_ th~j grammatikh~j o( grammatiko_j
kai\ a)po_ th~j a)ndrei/aj o( a)ndrei=oj.
Things are equivocally named, when they have the name only in common, the definition
(or statement of essence) corresponding with the name being different. For instance,
while a man and a portrait can properly both be called ‘animals’ these are equivocally
named. For they have the name only in common, the definitions (or statements of
essence) corresponding with the name being different. For if you are asked to define
what the being an animal means in the case of the man and the portrait, you give in either
case a definition appropriate to that case alone.
Things are univocally named, when not only they bear the same name but the name
means the same in each case—has the same definition corresponding. Thus a man and an
ox are called ‘animals.’ The name is the same in both cases; so also the statement of
essence. For if you are asked what is meant by their both of them being called ‘animals’
you give that particular name in both cases the same definition. Things are ‘derivatively’
named that derive their own name form some other, that is given a new verbal form, as,
for instance, ‘grammarian’ from ‘grammar,’ from ‘heroism,’ ‘hero,’ and so on.
49
Aristotle, De Generatione Animalium 743b IV B.C.
Text: H. J. D. Lulofs, ed., Aristotelis de Generatione Animalium (Oxford, 1965; repr.
1972).
Translation: A. L. Peck, ed., tr., Aristotle. Generation of Animals (Cambridge, Mass. and
London, 1943; repr. 1953).
356